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IT'S A LORAX KIND OF MARKET!
BUT IS IT A SNEETCHES KIND OF SOLUTION?: A CRITICAL
REVIEW OF CURRENT LAISSEZ-FAIRE ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION
Like a soldier marching to the beat of environmental protec-
tion, in struts the twenty-first century giving rise to increased con-
sumer awareness and concern.1 Consumers are finally grasping the
importance that their individual actions and social responsibility
have on the environment and are actively seeking products that
1. See, e.g., U.S. EPA, ASSESSING THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSUMER MARKET
(EPA 21P-1003) (April 1991) [hereinafter U.S. EPA]. In a 1990 survey, 83% of
respondents indicated that they were "concerned about the environment." Id. at
A-2 (citing USA TODAY, Apr. 13, 1990 at 10A). Furthermore, 64% of consumers
polled believed that the efforts of a single individual could effect a change in the
environment and 57% polled would pay more money for a product packaged with
recyclable materials. See id. Significantly, 52% of the respondents maintained that
they had rejected companies using products that purportedly maltreated the envi-
ronment. See id. See generally Dennis Chase & Therese Kauchak Smith, Consumers
Keen on Green But Marketers Don't Deliver: Survey Quizzes End-Users About Environmen-
tally Responsible Companies but Comes Up Empty, ADVERTISING AGE, June 29, 1992 (dis-
cussing results of surveys about environmentally responsible companies); Scott
Donaton & Kate Fitzgerald, Polls Show Ecological Concern is Strong, ADVERTISING AGE,
June 15, 1992 (discussing results of survey about environmentally conscious con-
sumers); Roger D. Wynne, Defining "Green:" Toward Regulation of Environmental
Marketing Claims, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 785 (1991) (quoting results from 1989
Gallup Report that 76% of Americans considered themselves to be environmental-
ists); U.S. EPA, EVALUATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS IN THE UNITED
STATES (EPA 741-R-92-003) at 7 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter EPA ON ENVIRONMENTAL
MARKETING TERMS] (quoting survey performed by Roper Organization that found
public concern about environment as faster growing concern than any other na-
tional issue). For a general discussion of America's lure toward environmental
conservation in consumer products, see Brett B. Coffee, Environmental Marketing
After Association of National Advertisers v. Lungren: Still Searching for an Improved Regu-
latory Framework, 6 FoRDHAm EN VrL. L.J. 297 (1995) (stating "[i]n the . . . early
1990's, mainstream America discovered the environment"). See also Casey Bukro,
Shopping for an Ideal: Consumers Hungry for 'Recyclable' or 'Biodegradable' are Finding
Their Environmental Diet Heavy on Ambiguity (Ecology Special Report 1991), CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 17, 1991, at 24 (discussing consumers' confusion concerning advertis-
ing claims of environmental soundness in products).
Some commentators, however, advance the notion that consumer environ-
mental concern is waning in light of many unregulated years of deceptive environ-
mental advertising. See Coffee, supra, at 305 (noting environmental marketing
craze has faded). See generally Nicholas Schoon, Whatever Happened to the Green Mar-
ket?, THE INDEPENDENT - LONDON, Sept. 10, 1996 (arguing "[b]ut for the past six
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pose the fewest negative environmental effects. 2 Perhaps they have
heard the "sawdusty sneeze" and delicate voice of the Lorax who
"speaks for the trees."13 Or perhaps the news broadcasts filled with
2. "Green marketing" is a general term connoting the way in which compa-
nies market products based on their environmental attributes. Other terms used
throughout this paper include: environmental marketing, environmental advertis-
ing, and green advertising. The introduction to this article refers to the following
terms: green mania, green revolution, green war, and green consumerism. These
terms reflect the current consumer interest in environmentally safe products and
the market-based efforts to meet this consumer demand. For a general discussion
of green marketing, see Joanna L. Watman, Note, Whose Grass is Greener? Green
Marketing: Toward a Uniform Approach for Responsible Environmental Advertising, 2
FORDHAM ENvrL. L. REp. 163, 163-68 (1992) (addressing advent of green market-
ing and consumer interest in environmentally benign products). See also Ciannat
M. Howett, The "Green Labeling" Phenomenon: Problems and Trends in the Regulation of
Environmental Product Claims, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 401, 402-03 (1992) (discussing con-
sumer confusion over legitimacy of environmental labels); Wynne, supra note 1, at
786 (pointing out consumers "want goods and packaging that use fewer resources
and less energy to produce, whose production generates less pollution, and whose
disposal will not contaminate the environment"); Roger D. Wynne, The Emperor's
New Eco-Logos?: A Critical Review of the Scientific Certification Systems Environmental
Report Card and the Green Seal Certification Mark Programs, 14 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 51, 51
n.2 (1994) (indicating socially responsible "green" consumer is not new phenome-
non); EPA ON ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 1, at i (pointing out
"[miany American consumers, not only the most environmentally conscious, have
sought to lessen the environmental impacts of personal purchasing decisions by
buying and using products perceived to be less harmful to the environment").
3.-THEODOR SEUss GEISEL (DR. SEUSS), THE LoRAx (Random House, Inc.
1971). Through vivid imagery and clever characters, Dr. Seuss describes the re-
sults of a local pollution problem and the community's growing awareness and
concern. See id. He begins his tale with a disgruntled older gentleman called the
Once-ler reminiscing about the good 'ole days:
Way back in the days when the grass was still green
and the pond was still wet
and the clouds were still clean,
and the song of the Swomee-Swans rang out in space ...
one morning, I came to this glorious place.
Id. The Once-ler then relates his part in the diminishment of our natural
resources:
In no time at all, I had built a small shop.
Then I chopped down a Truffula Tree with one chop.
And with great skillful skill and with great speedy speed,
I took the soft tuft. And I knitted a Thneed!
Id. According to the Once-ler, the only creature voicing concern was the Lorax:
"Mister!" he said with a sawdusty sneeze,
"I am the Lorax. I speak for the trees.
I speak for the trees, for the trees have no tongues.
And I'm asking you, sir, at the top of my lungs" -
he was very upset as he shouted and puffed -
"What's that THING you've made out of my Truffula tuf."
Id. Absorbed solely with potential riches, the Once-ler ignored the cries of the
Lorax and continued on with business:
"NOW... thanks to your hacking my trees to the ground,
there's not enough Truffla Fruit to go 'round.
And my poor Bar-ba-loots are all getting the crummies
because they have gas, and no food, in their tummies! . .
2
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overflowing landfills, contaminated waterways and smog-ridden cit-
ies have edified consumers and fostered a change in their purchas-
ing and disposal habits. Businesses sense the dissemination of
"green-mania" and correspondingly attempt to "out-green" their
competition. 4 Unfortunately, the virtual inundation of "environ-
mentally friendly" products makes consumer confusion inevitable
and environmental protection questionable. 5 Today, manufactur-
I, the Once-ler, felt sad
as I watched them all go.
BUT ...
business is business!
And business must grow...
Id. The Once-ler realized his mistake after chopping the last Truffla tree:
Now all that was left 'neath the bad-smelling sky
was my big empty factory ...
the Lorax...
and I.
Id. One may use Dr. Seuss imagery to describe the current consumer market. As
described by numerous scholars, American consumers are becoming more envi-
ronmentally conscientious, or "Loraxian." For a discussion about the onset of en-
vironmental consumerism, see supra notes 1-2 and infra notes 4-5 and
accompanying text.
4. See David Hoch & Robert Franz, Eco-Porn Versus the Constitution: Commercial
Speech and the Regulation of Environmental Advertising, 58 ALB. L. REV. 441, 441
(1994) (quoting Hubert H. Humphrey III, Making Sure Green Claims Aren't Gray,
ENVrL. F., Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 32). See also U.S. EPA, supra note 1, at 2 (citing
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 2, 1990, at 55, 59) (indicating marketers advertise green
products with twenty to thirty times more frequency than other products). Accord-
ing to Roger D. Wynne, "green consumers are left awash in this tide of [environ-
mentally beneficial] claims with little or no capacity to discern truly green
products from those merely labeled as such." Wynne, supra note 2, at 54. See gener-
ally NAT'L ASS'N OF ATT'Y GEN., AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTIS-
ING, THE GREEN REPORT: FINDINGS AND PRELIMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
RESPONSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING (Nov. 1990) [hereinafter GREEN REPORT
I] (explaining rapid growth in "environmentally friendly" product designations at-
tests to need for marketing guidelines).
[E] nvironmental problems facing the world today are largely the result of
the way we do business. In order to reverse the pattern of widespread
environmental degradation, substantial changes must be made in the way
products are formulated, manufactured, used and disposed. Considering
the magnitude of the problem facing the United States and the desire of
consumers to support positive environmental improvements, it is dis-
turbing to see a growing number of confusing and misleading claims that
take advantage of consumers, and, in many cases, violate existing law.
Id. at 1-2. For a discussion of the initial recommendations of the National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General (NAAG), see infra notes 16, 79 & 210 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of NAAG's 1992 recommendations detailed in its Green Re-
port II, see infra notes 115, 172-73 & 210 and accompanying text.
5. See David F. Welsh, Comment, Environmental Marketing and Federal Preemp-
tion of State Law: Eliminating the "Gray" Behind the "Green", 81 CAL. L. REv. 991, 992
(1993) (noting survey finding that 96% of respondents thought they needed more
environmental information to make sense out of claims already being made) (cit-
ingJudann Dagnoli, Green Buys Taking Root, ADVERTISING AGE, Sept. 3, 1990, at 27);
Jamie A. Grodsky, Certified Green: The Law and Future of Environmental Labeling, 10
1998]
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ers resemble Sylvester McMonkey McBean with his Sneetches Star-
On-Off machine; 6 claiming to be the "Fix-It-Up-Chappie," each ex-
ploits the current laissezfaire attitude toward environmental market-
ing.7 With preaching and promises, undercutting and guarantees,
these companies perpetuate the "green revolution."8 Regulators,
YALEJ. ON REG. 147, 150 (1993) (pointing out that green advertising is more prob-
lematic than other types of advertising because "consumers generally cannot sub-
stantiate environmental claims on their own" and noting that consumer confusion
is likely to change into consumer apathy, and hence less environmentally con-
cerned society).
6. See THEODOR SEUSS GEISEL (DR. SEuss), THE SNEETCHES AND OTHER STORIES
(Random House, Inc. 1961) (1953) (depicting manipulation and unawareness of
consumers in an unregulated or under-regulated market).
7. See id. (analogizing Sneetch nation with America). Day in and day out, the
Star-Belly Sneetches prance around convinced of their superiority over the Plain-
Belly Sneetches. See id. Sylvester McMonkey McBean conveniently happens upon
the Sneetches and preys on their social concerns:
"My friends," he announced in a voice clear and keen,
"My name is Sylvester McMonkey McBean.
And I've heard of your troubles. I've heard you're unhappy.
But I can fix that. I'm the Fix-it-Up Chappie.
I've come here to help you. I have what you need.
And my prices are low. And I work at great speed.
And my work is one hundred per cent guaranteed!"
Id. Like green consumers who desire to advance environmental policy, Plain-Belly
Sneetches enter Mr. McBean's Star-On machine in hopes of securing equality.
Both groups of consumers have social concerns that are exploited by opportunistic
marketers:
All the rest of that day, on those wild screaming beaches,
The Fix-it-Up Chappie kept fixing up Sneetches.
Off again! On again!
In again! Out again!
Through the machines they raced round and about again,
Changing their stars every minute or two.
They kept paying money. They kept running through
Until neither the Plain nor the Star-Bellies knew
Whether this one was that one... or that one was this one
Or which one was what one ... or what one was who.
Id. McBeanish marketers are successful because they capitalize on a consumer's
inner social concerns. While Marvin McMonkey McBean created a product for so-
cially-conscious consumers, manufacturers today adapt and advertise their products
to take advantage of the green market. Regulators should take these concerns into
consideration when crafting their legislation. Consumers want more than just
non-deceptive advertising; they want truly greener products. Only a program that
addresses both of these interests is worth undertaking. For manifestation of con-
sumers' desire to purchase environmentally safer products, see supra notes 1-6 and
accompanying text and infra notes 8-47 and accompanying text. The Federal
Trade Commission's (FTC) environmental marketing guides are not sufficient be-
cause their focus is limited to deceptive marketing. For a discussion and the perti-
nent text of FTC's guidelines, see infra notes 9-21 & 80-101 and accompanying
text. In light of FTC's laissez-faire case-by-case enforcement of its environmental
marketing guidelines, it seems that Seuss' art depicts life. For further discussion
and critique of FTC's case-by-case enforcement methods, see infra notes 12-16, 58-
79, 155-66 & 288-98 and accompanying text.
8. See U.S. EPA, supra note 1 (using surveys to determine environmental con-
4
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scholars and private crusaders sound reveille in an attempt to mini-
mize consumer confusion and environmental degradation. Armed
with non-binding guidelines,9 third-party certification programs 10
and pre-existing inapplicable laws," each group crafts individual-
ized solutions to the "green war."
While federal agencies, states and private companies have all
explored various environmental market control methods, most
agree that the answer lies in uniform governmental standards for
the labeling of environmentally-preferable products.1 2 Parties seek-
sciousness of consumers and to identify problems in environmental advertising).
See also Bukro, supra note 1, at 24 (acknowledging rewards for companies deemed
environmentally acceptable can be great, both in profits and loyalty); Norman
Kangun & Michael Jay Polonsky, Regulation of Environmental Marketing Claims: A
Comparative Perspective, 14 INT'LJ. ADVERTISING Jan. 1, 1995, at 1, available in 1995
WL 12321755 (arguing consumer distrust of environmental marketing advertise-
ments results from industry deception); GREEN REPORT I, supra note 4 (noting
growing number of misleading environmental marketing claims and proposing so-
lutions to resulting problems).
9. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg.
36,363 (1992), codified at 16 C.F.R. § 260 (1994), revised by 61 Fed. Reg. 53,311,
53,316 (1996) [hereinafter FTC Guides II]. For the pertinent text of FTC Guides
II, see infra notes 18-21 & 80-101 and accompanying text. For a discussion of FTC
Guides I changes as reflected in FTC Guides II, see infra notes 90-101 and accom-
panying text.
10. See Introduction to Green Seal (last modified July 17, 1997) <http://green-
seal.org/index.html> [hereinafter Introduction to Green Seal] (noting that under en-
vironmental product certification program, evaluator would set standards and
award "seal of approval" to products meeting such standards). Green Seal, Inc. is
an independent, non-profit organization often advertised as the most prominent
third-party certification program in the United States today. See id. For an in-
depth discussion of environmental certification programs and their impact on con-
sumer purchases, see generally Wynne, supra note 2. For a discussion of the Green
Seal Certification Mark and applicable certification criteria, see infta notes 260-61
& 263-66 and accompanying text. For a discussion of other environmental certifi-
cation programs, see infra notes 239-59 & 267-70 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the implications of third-party certifiers, see infra notes 271-87. For a
discussion ofjudicial actions applicable to third-party certifiers, see infra notes 288-
98.
11. Courts have frequently addressed the viability of pleadings that include
the following accusations: tort liability for negligent mislabeling of products; viola-
tions of deceptive advertising practices under The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lan-
ham Act) §§ 1-46, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994); the fostering of anti-competitive
or monopolistic practices according to Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-40
(1994); and mail fraud and wire fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1995). These causes of action,
however, do not adequately address the problems associated with environmental
marketing. For a discussion of judicial and regulatory attempts to squeeze decep-
tive green marketing within such pre-existing causes of action, see infra notes 291-
314 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 5, at 994-95 (concluding appropriate remedy is
uniform nationwide regulation at federal agency level); Howett, supra note 2, at
403-04 (assessing various solutions and recognizing need for uniform standards).
See also E. Howard Barnett, Green With Envy: The FTC, the EPA, The States, and the
19981
5
Cavanagh: It's a Lorax Kind of arket - But Is It a Sneetches Kind of Solut
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
138 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 133
ing relief typically look to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC or
Commission) for guidance.13 Hesitant to take an active role in reg-
Regulation of Environmental Marketing, 1 ENvrL. LAw. 491, 507-11 (1995) (calling for
cooperative regulatory scheme involving both FTC and EPA); Grodsky, supra note
5, at 163-64 (promoting EPA-only determination of uniform regulatory standards);
Wynne, supra note 1, at 803-13 (recognizing need for change in green marketing);
Letter from Norman L. Dean, Green Seal, to the Secretary of Federal Trade Com-
mission (Sept. 18, 1995) (on file with author) (denouncing FTC Guides I as insuf-
ficient and ineffective without further enforcement mechanisms); Letter from
Hubert H. Humphrey, III et al., National Association of Attorneys General, to the
Secretary of Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 28, 1995) (on file with author) (re-
marking FTC Guides I have "fallen short of eliminating all environmental market-
ing problems"); Letter from Harry Sullivan, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, Food Marketing Institute, to the Secretary of Federal Trade Commission
(Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with author) (reminding FTC that Food Marketing Insti-
tute's primary reason for petitioning FTC was to promote consistency within indus-
try); Letter from Ford Motor Company to the Secretary of Federal Trade
Commission (Sept. 28, 1995) (on file with author) (suggesting FTC Guides I had
imposed burdens and show few benefits); Letter from Donald R. Theissen, Ph.D.,
Director of 3M Corporate Product Responsibility, to the Secretary of Federal
Trade Commission (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with author) (arguing for harmoniza-
tion of FTC Guides I with ISO's in progress environmental marketing guides);
Letter from Walter J. Foley, General Manager, Federal Relations, Steel Recycling
Institute to Secretary of Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with
author) (advocating adoption of FTC Guides I by all 50 state governments); Letter
from Daniel L. Jaffe and John J. Sarsen, Jr., Association of National Advertisers,
Inc., to Secretary of Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with au-
thor) (advocating uniform, national and comprehensive environmental marketing
standards).
13. For a discussion of the most current FTC guidelines, see supra note 9 and
infra notes 17-21 & 96-105 and accompanying text. FTC is empowered under the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) §§ 1-26, c. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994)) to prevent unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices and to issue trade regulation rules defining such acts or practices. See FTCA
§§ 5, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 58 (1994). For the pertinent language of FTCA, see infra
notes 59 & 63 and accompanying text. For a more in-depth discussion of FTCA,
see infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text. Since its inception, FTC's sole func-
tion has been consumer protection. See FTCA §§ 1-5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-45. It is
therefore reasonable for consumers to look to FTC for protection and for busi-
nesses to look to FTC for compliance standards and guidance. In a recent report,
FTC made the following acknowledgment: "[t]he Federal Trade Commission en-
forces statutes to preserve competitive markets for the benefit of consumers." FED-
ERAL TRADE COMMISSION REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION ACr AMENDMENTS OF 1994 (Slip Copy, February 1995). FTC further
observed that " [a] dvertising is a vital means by which consumers receive informa-
tion about the relative merits of competing products and services." Id. Explain-
ing their mission, FTC pointed out that "the Commission focuses its resources on
investigating seemingly false, unsubstantiated or otherwise deceptive advertising
claims that are likely to cause serious consumer injury." Id. FTC articulated the
ways in which the Commission regulated deceptive advertising:
Private quality and performance standards are routinely adopted and in-
corporated into regulations and codes issued by federal, state, and local
governments .... Although such standards and seals of approval often
may facilitate the efficient operation of the economy, at times, they may
distort the market and result in more expensive, less efficient, unsafe or
unreliable products. Standards development may be manipulated by es-
6
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ulating environmental advertising, FTC prefers to handle such mat-
ters on a case-by-case basis. 14 The advent of "green consumerism"
has done little to sway FTC from this position. Accordingly, the
Commission's actions reflect its fervent belief that environmental
marketing claims are merely a form of deceptive advertising, sus-
ceptible to the current provisions of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (FTCA). 15 To combat growing criticism and assuage environ-
mentalists, FTC formed the National Association of Attorneys Gen-
eral Task Force on Environmental Marketing (NAAG) in 1989,16
tablished firms at the expense of consumers or small innovative produ-
cers, to encourage dissemination of product information that may be
deceptive to reasonable consumers.
Id.
14. See Petitions for Environmental Marketing and Advertising Guides: Public
Hearings, 56 Fed. Reg. 24,968 (1991) [hereinafter Petitions FTC Guides I] (noting
that Commission has begun to provide guidance via case-by-case enforcement). See
also Request for Comment Concerning Environmental Marketing Guides, 60 Fed.
Reg. 38,978 (1995) [hereinafter Request for Comment FTC Guides I] (asserting
since adoption of Green Guides, Commission has used its case-by-case basis
approach).
15. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1973) (deceptive advertising clauses found at
§§ 45-55). Congress eliminated FTC's regulatory power with respect to unfair
claims in the FTC Improvement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 374
(1980) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-1 to b-4 (1994)) [herinafter FTC
Improvement Act]. It is likely that the FTC Improvement Act and the time-con-
suming nature of rulemaking procedures has led FTC to embrace the concept of
enforcement-action solutions for all deceptive marketing practices, including
those in the environmental context. For a discussion of this theory, see Barnett,
supra note 12, at 495. As a result, FTC resorts to a case-by-case enforcement
method. For a discussion of FTCA, its historical background and the evolution of
FTC's case-by-case enforcement approach, see Welsh, supra note 5, at 1005-11. See
generally PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYsis: PROBLEMS, TEXT,
CASES 59-60 (4th ed. 1988) (providing comprehensive study of deceptive advertis-
ing and FTC's case-by-case enforcement practice). For expression of FTC's aver-
sion to rulemaking procedures, see FTC Improvement Act and Federal Trade
Commission Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-312, 108 Stat. 1691 (1994)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 57b-5 (1994)). For a critique of FTC's case-by-case ap-
proach, see Welsh, supra note 5, at 1008-10 (analogizing slow-developing FTC nu-
tritional label guidelines to environmental marketing). For explication of FTC's
view that environmental marketing claims are merely a form of deceptive advertis-
ing susceptible to the current provisions of FTCA, see infra notes 58-105 and ac-
companying text.
16. See GREEN REPORT I, supra note 4 for a discussion of the initial proposals of
the Attorneys General Task Force on Environmental Marketing. NAAG made the
following conclusions in Green Report I:
Environmental claims should be as specific as possible, not general,
vague, incomplete or overly broad.
Environmental claims relating to disposability (e.g., "degrad-able" or "re-
cyclable") should not be made unless the advertised disposal option is
currently available to consumers in the area in which the product is sold
and the product complies with the requirements of the relevant waste
disposal programs.
Environmental claims should be substantive.
1998]
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and promulgated non-binding regulatory guidelines (FTC Guides
I) in 1992.17 In December of 1996, FTC updated and expanded
these guidelines (FTC Guides II).18 Significantly, however, they re-
main non-obligatory. 19 According to the Commission, the purpose
of F-C Guides I & II is to "help advertisers voluntarily comply with
the law by indicating how FrC intends to apply section five of...
[FTCA] to environmental claims." 20 In spite of the fact that the
Environmental claims should, of course, be supported by competent and
reliable scientific evidence.
Id. at 3. NAAG further urged that "FIC and EPA work jointly with the states to
develop uniform national standards for environmental marketing claims." Id.
Likewise, NAAG requested that the federal government develop standards and de-
fine the necessary terms used in the standards and in the entire area of environ-
mental advertising. See id. For a discussion of NAAG's findings as explained in
Green Report II, see infra notes 113, 172-73 & 210 and accompanying text.
17. See Guides for the Use of Environmental Marketing Claims, 57 Fed. Reg.
36,363 (1992), codified at 16 C.F.R. § 260 (1994) [hereinafter FTC Guides I]. For a
discussion of the implemented changes in FTC Guides II and the effect on FTC
Guides 1, see infra notes 90-105 and accompanying text.
18. See FTC Guides I, supra note 9. Examples of changes in FTC Guides II
include: associating the "chasing arrow symbol" with the term "recycled;" provid-
ing examples of "ozone safe/friendly" deception; providing examples of "non-
toxic" and "chlorine free;" suggesting expanded explanation of seals-of-approval
and "environmentally preferable" claims. See Roscoe B. Starek, III, Commissioner,
FTC, F.T.C. 'Green Guides: A Consumer Success Story, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Dec. 23,
1996, available in 1996 WL 730228.
19. See FTC Guides II, supra note 9, § 260.2 (explaining "guides are not legis-
lative rules under Section 18 of the FTC Act [and] are not themselves enforceable
regulations, nor do they have the force and effect of law").
20. Starek, supra note 18. FTC Chairman Janet D. Steiger assured that:
[gluidelines would not be the only answer to the problem that we face.
As a law enforcement agency, we will continue vigorously to pursue cases
of deceptive and false advertising of environmental claims. Likewise, you
can anticipate that any guideline would draw heavily from the principles
- both legal and economic - that are represented in Commission gen-
eral case law and enforcement actions.
Janet D. Steiger, Hot Issues in National Advertising: Environmental Advertising and
Health Claims in Food Advertising, 759 P.L.I./CoRp. 359, 376 (1991). Steiger views
national standards as the most efficient way to disarm the uncertainty surrounding
green advertising. See Steiger Suggests Quick Development of Environmental Claims
Guidelines, 61 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 398 (Oct. 3, 1991) [hereinafter
Steiger Supports Development of FTC Green Guides]. FTC Commissioner Mary
Azcuenaga's views sharply contrast those of Chairman Steiger and Commissioner
Starek. She argues that FTC has no special expertise in the science underlying
environmental claims and no mandate to establish or promote environmental pol-
icy. See Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Role in Developing Guidelines For Green Claims,
59 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 777 (Nov. 22, 1990) [hereinafter
Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Green Guides] (explicating reasons why FTC should
not develop environmental marketing guidelines). Commissioner Azcuenaga at-
tached a dissenting statement to FTC Guides I. See FTC ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS:
DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER MARY L. AZCUENAGA CONCERNING ISSU-
ANCE OF COMMISSION GUIDES ON ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING CLAIMS (1992) [here-
inafter AZCUENAGA DISSENTING STATEMENT]. This statement reads, in part, as
follows:
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guides counsel industry on potential FrCA infractions, critics fault
their rigidity, failure to preempt state regulation and inability to
force manufacturers to account for their deceptive practices.21
I differ from the Commission in its decision not to place the guides on
public record for a short period of time to enable the public to comment
on them. Although we have sought to obtain accurate information and
to consider the issues thoroughly, it is conceivable, nevertheless, that
someone outside the agency might offer useful observations and sugges-
tions for improvement.... [Such a period for comment] coincide [s] with
the public comment period on the Environmental Assessment that is re-
quired under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§ 4321, as amended.
Id. at 7.
21. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 500; Welsh, supra note 5, at 1009 (likening
FTC's dilemma to "Catch-22:" to enforce the guides in FTC's desired case-by-case
manner, there needs to be well-defined predictable standards set, and to set such
standards, there needs to be significantly more case-by-case enforcement). "Catch-
22" is a phrase coined by Joseph Heller in his 1955 novel. See JOSEPH HELLER,
CATCH-22 (Dell Publishing Co., Inc. 1970) (1955). Heller uses the word in the
following context:
"Daneeka was telling the truth," ex-P.F.C. Wintergreen admitted. "Forty
missions is all you have to fly as far as Twenty-seventh Air Force Head-
quarters is concerned."
Yossarian was jubilant. "Then I can go home, right? I've got forty-eight."
"No, you can't go home ... Are you crazy or something?"
"Why not?"
"Catch-22."
"Catch-22?... What... has Catch-22 got to do with it?"
"Catch-22 ... says you've always got to do what your commanding officer
tells you to do."
"But Twenty-seventh Air Force says I can go home with forty missions."
"But they don't say you have to go home. And regulations do say you
have to obey every order. That's the catch. Even if the colonel were dis-
obeying a Twenty-seventh Air Force order by making you fly more mis-
sions, you'd still have to fly them, or you'd be guilty of disobeying an
order of his. And then Twenty-seventh Air Force Headquarters would
really jump on you."
Id. at 60. The circular logic outlined in Heller's piece is equally applicable to envi-
ronmental marketing regulation by FTC. For further discussion of FTC's "Catch-
22," see Welsh, supra note 5, at 1009. For a more complete discussion of the
problems associated with FTC regulation of the environmental market, see supra
notes 12-16 and accompanying text and infra notes 58-79, 155-66 & 288-98 and
accompanying text.
Attorney General Humphrey recognized that with the magnitude of the green
marketing issue "a case-by-case approach will be too slow and too cumbersome in
developing boundaries for legitimate environmental claims." Environmental Market-
ing: Hearings on Industry Guidelines Before the Federal Trade Commission, at 5 (July 17,
1991) [hereinafter Hearings 1991]. Commentors on FTC Green Guides I indi-
cated that they would prefer a trade regulation rule because it would have the
force of law and preempt state laws regulating the use of environmental advertis-
ing claims. See FTC's Revisions to Environmental Marketing Guides, 71 ANTrRsT &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 345 (Oct. 10, 1996) [hereinafter FTC Guides I Revisions].
Others complained of undue restrictions placed on their ability to make environ-
1998]
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Prior to FTC rulemaking, legislators proposed a framework for
voluntary compliance within national environmental marketing
guidelines. 22 The bills permitted the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA or Agency) to define the terminology, and ultimately,
the standards to which marketers would adhere.2 3 In both 1991
and 1992, Congress refused these legislative efforts. 24 The emer-
gence of FTC Guides I squelched all attempts to put EPA at the
helm of the environmental marketing movement. 25 To some ex-
mental claims and the rigidity of the guides. See id. In addition, a few commentors
observed that changes in FTC Guides I would impact on the developing global
standards by the International Standards Organization (ISO) and various state
measures. See id.
22. See National Waste Reduction, Recycling and Management Act, H.R. 3865,
102d Cong. (1992) (proposed by Rep. Al Swift); Environmental Marketing Claims
Act of 1991, S. 615, 102d Cong. (1991) (reintroduction by Sen. Frank Lautenberg
of Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991) (requiring EPA to establish defi-
nitions and standards governing use of environmental claims). Neither bill was
enacted. For a discussion of the history of H.R. 3865 and S. 615, see I. Leo Motiuk
& Diane M. Miller, Giving the Green Light to Marketing, 761 P.L.I./CoRP. 729, 733-34
(1991). For further discussion concerning the history of H.R. 3865 and S. 615, see
infra notes 106-112 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the pertinent text
of H.R. 3865 and S. 615, see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
23. Hearings on Environmental Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before the Subcomm. on
Environmental Protection of the Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong.,
240 (1991).
We need to provide incentives to make products and packages environ-
mentally beneficial. We need to create a level playing field for manufac-
turers. We need to prevent [deceptive] claims . . . [a]nd establish
standards by which consumers can measure these claims. In sum, we
need to eliminate advertising pollution. That's what S. 615, the Environ-
mental Claims Marketing Act, is intended to do.
It requires EPA, the agency with the environmental expertise, to establish
standards for environmental marketing claims.
Id. at 4 (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). See also Alexandra McClure, Envi-
ronmental Marketing: A Call for Legislative Action, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1351, 1361-
62 (1995) (providing overview of early EPA efforts at marketing regulation); Gui-
dance for the Use of the Terms "Recycled" and "Recyclable" and the Recycling
Emblem in Environmental Marketing Claims, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,992 (1991) [herein-
after EPA Guidance on Recycle] (soliciting comments on options for guidance to
be used by marketers in product labeling and advertising).
24. See McClure, supra note 23, at 1361 (discussing demise of H.R. 3865 and S.
615). For a discussion of the history of H.R. 3865 and S. 615, see infra notes 106-
112 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the pertinent text of H.R. 3865
and S. 615, see infra notes 107-11.
25. See GREEN REPORT I, supra note 4, at 9-10 (discussing EPA early involve-
ment in regulating environmental market). The Green Report I states:
The EPA also had several divisions looking into issues relating to environ-
mental advertising. In February 1990, the EPA submitted a comprehen-
sive report to Congress entitled "Methods to Manage and Control Plastic
Wastes." The report included a review of issues relating to the develop-
ment of degradable plastics. The EPA had also commissioned a report
on the feasibility of implementing a nationwide environmental "seal of
approval" product labeling program in the United States, similar to pro-
10
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tent, EPA still participates in the regulation of environmental mar-
keting.26 Although there is no statute explicitly granting authority
to EPA, the Agency uses its implicit rulemaking ability to interject
policy into certain circumscribed areas of environmental
marketing.27
With EPA's limited authority and F-C's stronghold to a case-
by-case framework, states have increasingly begun to statutorily de-
fine and delimit the encroaching environmental market. 28 By giv-
grams already in place in Germany, Canada and Japan. Eager to draw on
the EPA's environmental experience and expertise, [NAAG] invited the
EPA staff to participate ... in hosting [a public hearing on environmental
marketing issues].
Id. at 9-10. Although EPA conducted considerable research on the issue of envi-
ronmental marketing, Congress ultimately called on FTC to make the needed reg-
ulatory attempts. See Motiuk & Miller, supra note 22, at 733 (indicating that EPA
"joined forces with the FTC and the White House Office of Consumer Affairs to
develop national environmental labeling guidelines"). With the emergence of
FTC Guides I, FTC took prominence in future regulatory attempts. See id. EPA
indicates that "along with others interested in environmental marketing [the
Agency] will continue to investigate developments... affect[ing] the U.S. market-
place and environmental quality." EPA ON ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS,
supra note 1, at vii (explaining EPA intention to "further public policy discussions
regarding the role of environmental marketing in U.S.").
26. See, e.g., Consumer Labeling Initiative; Notice of Project Initiation, 61 Fed.
Reg. 12,012 (1996) [hereinafter CLI] (fostering pollution prevention, empowering
consumer choice, and improving consumer understanding by clear and consistent
product labels on safe use, environmental consequences and health risks); Gui-
dance on Acquisition of Environmentally Preferable Products and Services; Solici-
tation of Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,722 (1995) [hereinafter Environmentally
Preferable Products] (providing guidance for Executive Agencies in identification
and acquisition of environmentally preferable products); Agency Information Col-
lection Activities; EPA's Energy Star Buildings Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 57,714
(1995) [hereinafter Comments on Energy Star Buildings Program] (implementing
another arm of EPA's Energy Star Partnership program which allows participants
to display EPA-endorsed logos on products); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) §§ 2-31, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86 Stat. 973 (1972) (codified
as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 13 6-136y (1994)) (requiring registration of pesticides
with copy of product's label and any proposed environmental benefits); Clean Air
Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 77 Stat. 392 (1967) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401- 767 1 q (1994)) (mandating proof of emission standards com-
pliance by attachment of label to vehicle); Solid Waste Disposal Act §§ 1002-11012,
Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997, as added Pub. L. No. 94-580 (1976) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988)) (requiring lubricating oils to bear
statement urging recycling).
27. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 500-03. For a list of measures EPA has taken
in the area of environmental marketing, see supra note 26.
28. See Todd A. Rathe, Note, The Gray Area of the Green Market: Is it Really Envi-
ronmentally Friendly? Solutions to Confusion Caused by Environmental Advertising, 17 J.
CORP. L. 419, 434-39 (1992) (discussing how case-by-case adjudications through
general state deceptive advertising laws are disadvantages of method); Glenn
Israel, Comment, Taming the Green Marketing Monster: National Standards for Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims, 20 B.C. ENvTL. Arr. L. REV. 303, 309-17 (discussing cur-
rent application of state and federal deceptive trade practice laws, RICO and
antitrust actions); Howett, supra note 2, at 436-43 (same); Thomas C. Downs, "Envi-
1998]
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ing legal definitions to such vague terms as "environmentally
friendly," states aim at the curtailment of deceptive advertising.29
Not surprisingly, state practices have created a patchwork of laws
and regulations: one state adopted FTC guidelines as law;30 some
states attempted to harmonize with FTC provisions; 31 one state an-
nounced legislation more stringent than did FTC;3 2 and a few states
focused their efforts on consumer education and state labeling of
individual products. 33 The Ninth Circuit upheld California's rigor-
ronmentally Friendly"Product Advertising: Its Future Requires a New Regulatory Authority,
43 Am. U. L. REV. 155, 176 (1992) (indicating state initiatives alone will not solve
green marketing problem).
29. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West 1995). This section
provides:
It is unlawful for any person to represent that any consumer good which
it manufactures or distributes is "ozone friendly," or any term which con-
notes that stratospheric ozone is not being depleted, "bio-degradable,"
"photodegradable," "recyclable," or "recycled" unless that consumer
good meets the definitions contained in this section, or meets definitions
established in trade rules adopted by the Federal Trade Commission.
Id. The section goes on to define the relevant terms. See id. California's statutory
scheme was once heralded as the most stringent of all state-enacted schemes. See
Rathe, supra note 28, at 441-42. It is questionable whether the FTC compliance
amendment will affect the rigor of California's statute. For further discussion of
California's statutory scheme, see infra notes 174-75, 182-84 & 235-38 and accom-
panying text. Most states with environmental marketing regulations choose to de-
fine relevant environmental claims and invalidate the deceptive and vague claims.
For a discussion of such state environmental marketing statutory schemes, see infra
notes 174-204 and accompanying text.
30. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (West 1996). The Maine statute
reads in pertinent part:
A person who labels, advertises or promotes a product in violation of
guidelines for the use of environmental marketing claims published by
the Federal Trade Commission in 16 Code of Federal Regulations, Part
260 (1993), as amended, commits a violation of the Maine Unfair Trade
Practices Act.
Id. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 504-05 for a discussion of the patchwork of state
environmental marketing laws. For an illustration of current state environmental
marketing laws, see infra notes 174-204 and accompanying text.
31. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-13.3-4 (1996). The Rhode Island statute reads
in pertinent part:
It shall be a defense to any suit brought under this chapter that the per-
son's environmental marketing claims conform to the standards or are
consistent with the examples contained in the guides for use of environ-
mental marketing claims published by the [F]ederal [T]rade
[C]ommission July 27, 1992.
Id. See also IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2 (1995); N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw § 27-0717
(Consol. 1996); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.1 (1996); MiCH. STAT.
ANN. § 19.418(3) (Law. Co-op. 1996); Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 137.01 (1997). For the
pertinent text of the Indiana statute, see infra note 182. For the pertinent text of
the New York statute, see infra note 188. For the pertinent text of the Michigan
statute, see infra note 179.
32. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5. For the pertinent text of this sec-
tion of the California statute, see supra note 29.
33. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1502.01-11 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); VT.
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ous environmental marketing statute despite its First Amendment
implications.3 4 Because the court found a substantial state interest
in California's strict statute, it is likely that the decision deterred
challenges to other states' statutes and ultimately preserved a lack
of uniformity in environmental marketing.35
Throwing their hats into the ring, private U.S. companies and
independent organizations have developed certification programs
to test products for a broad range of environmental attributes.3 6
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6619, 6621 (1995); N.H. Rrv. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:1 (1995);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.8-3 (1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-225c (1994). For the
pertinent text of the Ohio statute, see infra note 195. For the pertinent text of the
Vermont statute and a discussion of Vermont's statutory scheme, see infra note
176.
34. See Association of Nat'l Adver., Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726, 733 (9th Cir.
1994) (concluding "standardization of terms used in commercial representations
about a product's environmental attributes is directly related to California's undis-
putedly substantial interests in truthful environmental advertising and conserva-
tion"). At the time Lungren was decided by the Ninth Circuit, California's statutory
scheme was more demanding than FTC's non-binding guidelines. For a discussion
and pertinent text of FTC Guides I and II, see supra notes 17-21 and infra notes 80-
101 and accompanying text. For a discussion of California's rigorous statutory
scheme, see supra notes 29 & 32 and infra notes 174-75, 182-84 & 235-38 and ac-
companying text. Subsequent to the Lungren decision, California amended its law
to permit compliance with FTC Guides I. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17508.5 (West
1995). For the pertinent text of the California statute, see supra note 29. For a
discussion of the Lungren decision, see infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
35. See Lungren, 44 F.3d at 733. The biggest concern echoed by commenta-
tors is the lack of uniformity in state regulatory measures. See Welsh, supra note 5,
at 1003 (calling state lack of uniformity "unacceptable"); Hoch & Franz, supra note
4, at 463 (predicting Supreme Court address of "this patchwork of dissimilar stat-
utes"); Coffee, supra note 1, at 354 (aligning conflicting state statutes with current
decline of environmental marketing); Barnett, supra note 12, at 506 (predicting
lack of uniformity resulting from Ninth Circuit Lungren decision). For a catalogue
of letters to FTC urging uniformity in the environmental marketing context, see
supra note 12 and infra notes 89, 155 & 166. For a catalogue of statements from
industry, regulators and scholars urging uniformity in the environmental market-
ing context, see supra note 12 and infra notes 89, 155-56, 166 & 198.
36. See U.S. EPA, DETERMINANTS OF EFFECTIVENESS FOR CERTIFICATION AND LA-
BELING PROGRAMS (EPA 742-R-94-001) (April 1994) [hereinafter EPA ON CERTIFICA-
TION AND LABELING PROGRAMS] (analyzing effectiveness of environmental labeling
in United States and effects on consumer choice and industry marketing tech-
niques). "Green Seal" and "Scientific Certification Systems" are two well-respected
eco-label programs that have made a place for themselves in the environmental
market. For a thorough analysis of the individual approaches of each group, see
generally Wynne, supra note 2. For further discussion of Green Seal and Scientific
Certification System's programs, see infra notes 260-87 and accompanying text.
For an overview of Green Seal's methodology and a listing of current Green Seal-
approved products, see generally Introduction to Green Seal, supra note 10. Because
of the widespread embrace of eco-label solutions by the European community, the
programs may succeed in America. For a discussion of the individual efforts by
individual European communities, see infra notes 239-59 and accompanying text.
See generally George Richards, Note, Environmental Labeling of Consumer Products:
The Need for International Harmonization of Standards Governing Third-Party Certifica-
tion Programs, 7 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 235 (1994) (advocating continued and
13
Cavanagh: It's a Lorax Kind of arket - But Is It a Sneetches Kind of Solut
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
146 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. IX: p. 133
Certification programs set out both to provide incentives for manu-
facturers to develop products that do not harm the environment
and to establish a system for evaluating environmental attributes.37
These programs inundate consumers with information that will af-
fect their final purchases by "raising consumers' awareness of envi-
ronmental issues, educating them about the role of green
consumerism, and directing their buying power toward the most
environmentally benign products."38 Focusing on the demand side
of the economic market affords adequate protection for marketers'
commercial speech and encourages interchanges of information
between manufacturers and consumers.3 9 Trademark restrictions
expanded use of eco-labeling in United States). However, because of the diversity
of approaches toward certification, it seems that eco-logo programs do more harm
than good. See generally Richards, supra (outlining foreign eco-logo programs and
positing effect in United States); Wynne, supra note 2 (same). The particular aim
of eco-logo programs is consumer education. Introduction to Green Seal, supra note
10. Unfortunately, the current mass of conflicting standards and conflicting labels
will not educate consumers. Since the labels may not aid the consumers choices
nor enable them to discern environmentally preferable products, it is likely that
they will have little effect on regulating the environmental market. For a discus-
sion of the effectiveness of certification programs, see infra notes 271-87 and ac-
companying text. See generally Wynne, supra note 2; Richards, supra.
37. See EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36. EPA
explains:
Environmental labeling programs attempt to offer a cost-effective means
of using market forces to mitigate the environmental impacts, by both
manufacturers and consumers, by shifting market shares among products
toward those that are environmentally preferable and by providing incen-
tives for (beneficial) product reformulation.
Id. at i. See also, Wynne, supra note 2 at 55-56 (explaining purpose and goals of
environmental certification programs).
38. Wynne, supra note 2, at 55. See also Richards, supra note 36, at 246-52
(outlining pros and cons to adoption of eco-label programs). Noted benefits of
third-party certification programs include: heightened consumer awareness; gains
in efficiency; reduction in misleading advertisements; and reductions in environ-
mental impacts. See id. Potential harms of third-party certification programs in-
clude: continued consumer confusion; lack of industry participation; reduction in
ongoing innovation; loss of performance safety and a potential barrier to trade.
See id.
39. See John M. Church, A Market Solution to Green Marketing: Some Lessons
From the Economics of Information, 79 MINN. L. REv. 245 (1994) (presenting a con-
sumer-focused approach to environmental market difficulties). Church points out
that "recognition ... [of the] market for information has very important policy
implications." Id. at 273. He suggests that information is subject to the same sup-
ply and demand concepts inherent in economic markets. See id. Using these as-
sumptions, Church relates the advantages of third-party evaluations and the
disadvantages of consumer search and seller provision of information:
"spread[ing] the cost of producing evaluations among large numbers of consum-
ers, thereby lowering their cost to individual purchasers[;] . . .scal[ing] in the cost
of testing[; and] . . . 'hav[ing] little incentive to distort the facts or steer the con-
sumer to a particular product.'" Id. at 288 (quoting Howard Beales, et al., Con-
sumer Search and Public Policy, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 11, 16 (1981)). For further
14
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and recurrent fairness concerns suggest that only neutral third par-
ties implement these incentive-based environmental certification
programs. 40
In 1992, the United Nations held a conference on develop-
ment and its effect on the environment. As a result, many interna-
tional organizations have attempted to address environmental
concerns.4 1 The countries involved in the U.N. Conference came
to an understanding, formerly known as the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which advocated the establishment of a
special committee to oversee the development of trade in the envi-
ronmental market arena and to provide recommendations for
checking any conflicts. 42 Similarly, the enactment of the North
discussion of Church's market theory, see infra notes 271-72 and accompanying
text.
40. See Grodsky, supra note 5, at 193. Because eco-logo programs seek to re-
ward manufacturers who create environmentally exemplary products, the policy of
protecting consumers from confusion, manufacturer deception and monopolies is
implicated. See id. Ridding consumer confusion and manufacturer deception is
also the chief aim of trademark regulation. See Lanham Act §§ 1-46, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-1127 (1994). A trademark is defined in the Lanham Act to include "any
word, name, symbol, or devise, or any combination thereof- used by a person...
to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured or sold
by others and to indicate the source of the goods." Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127. A certifier must use both a mark that indicates source of origin and stan-
dards that identify the evaluator. If not, consumers may confuse the implication of
particular marks and garner no benefit from the information provided. For a
more complete discussion of certification programs, see infra notes 239-87 and
accompanying text. For a discussion ofjudicial processes applicable to third-party
certifiers, see infra notes 288-314 and accompanying text. See generally Church,
supra note 39 (promoting third-party certification programs over all other regula-
tory efforts). Relevant fairness concerns include restrictions on trade. Because the
United States has signed numerous treaties regarding international trade, a gov-
ernment certifier must heed such relevant treaty implications. For a discussion
about international trade restrictions on environmental certification programs, see
infra notes 4143, 273-87 & 340-41 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., U.N. Commission on Sustainable Development, 32 I.L.M. 236,
Draft Resolution IV U.N. Doc. A/C.2/47/L.16 (1993). See also Church, supra note
39, at 314-19 (outlining international efforts in area of eco-labeling); Richards,
supra note 36, at 241-46 (same); Wynne, supra note 2, at 60-64 (same); Howett,
supra note 2, at 455-59 (same); Grodsky, supra note 5, at 204-09 (same).
42. See Richards, supra note 36, at 244 (citing Peter Behr, Environment Face Off
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 1994, at F1). For a comprehensive discussion of the General
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade's (GATT) role in the development of voluntary
international standards in the environmental arena, see Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Shift-
ing the Point of Regulation: The International Organization for Standardization and
Global Lawmaking on Trade and the Environment, 22 ECOLoGy L.Q. 479 (1995); Jen-
nifer Schultz, The GATTWTO Committee on Trade and the Environment - Toward Envi-
ronmental Reform, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 423 (1995). See also Roszell D. Hunter,
Standardization and the Environment, 16 INT'L ENV r. REP. (BNA) 5, 185 (Mar. 29,
1993) (explicating international approach to trade and environment). For further
discussion about the effect international trade treaties have on environmental cer-
tification programs, see supra notes 41-43 and infra notes 273-87 & 34041.
19981
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) brought environmental
trade issues to the international forefront.43 Private international
groups, such as the International Standards Organization (ISO),
have undertaken the burden of unifying international environmen-
tal markets. 44 ISO is in the process of developing voluntary stan-
dards. 45 Although these non-binding standards contemplate some
of the same concerns as FTC Guides I and II, their scope is much
more broad. 46 Through their review of third-party certification
programs, first-party claims and basic principles of eco-labeling,
ISO aims to "harmonize methodologies, terms, and principles for
the various . . . [international responses to product] labeling."47
43. See North American Free Trade Agreement Between the Governments of
the U.S., Can., and Mex. (NAFTA), Dec. 8 & 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289, 1-104 (1993).
Any subsequent agreement preempts NAFTA to the extent of inconsistencies. See
id. NAFTA permits the adoption of standards with respect to a variety of issues,
including consumers and the environment. See id. The Clinton Administration
negotiated an Environmental Side Agreement to NAFTA which reaffirmed each
country's right to establish its own levels of environmental protection as originally
established in NAFTA. North American Agreement on Environmental Coopera-
tion (NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement), Sept. 9 & 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480
(1993).
44. See generally Hunter, supra note 42 (providing overview of ISO and its ef-
forts to create internationally uniform environmental marketing standards); Roht-
Arriaza, supra note 42 (same);Joseph DiMento & Francesco Bertolini, Green Man-
agement and the Regulatory Process: For Mother Earth, Market Share and Modern Rule, 9
TRANSNAT'L LAw. 121 (1996) (same); C. Foster Knight, Comment, Voluntary Envi-
ronmental Standards vs. Mandatory Environmental Regulations and Enforcement in the
NAFTA Market, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L COMP. L. 619 (1995) (providing general explana-
tion of ISO's international environmental standards); Henry R. Balikov & Patrick
0. Cavanaugh, What We Need to Know About ISO 14000, 10-SPG NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T 64 (1996) (same); Marc E. Gold, ISO 14000: A New Global Business Benchmark,
10 No. 12 ENVrL. COMPLIANCE & Lyric. STRATEGY 1 (1995) (same). For a discussion
of ISO's standard-setting procedures, see infra notes 315-37 and accompanying
text.
45. See INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO/TC 207
(SC3/WG2/N56), Environmental Labeling - Self Declaration Environmental Claims -
Terms and Definitions, Committee Draft (June 25, 1995) [hereinafter ISO SELF-DEc-
LARATION] (on file with author) (stating "Self-Declaration Environmental Claims
may be made by manufacturers, importers, distributors, retailers or anyone else
likely to benefit commercially from such claims. For example, claims may take the
form of statements, symbols or graphics on products or package labels, product
literature, technical bulletins, advertising, publicity, telemarketing"). See Roht-Ar-
riaza, supra note 42, at 512-15 for a complete discussion of ISO eco-labeling formal
hierarchy and administrative procedures. For a comparison between FTC Green
Guides II and ISO self-declaration standards, see infra notes 329-37 and accompa-
nying text. For predictions and implications of ISO's efforts in the environmental
marketing context, see infra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.
46. See generally ISO Self-Declaration, supra note 45. For a more complete dis-
cussion of ISO and its international draft standards, see infra notes 315-37 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of FTC Guides II, see supra notes 17-21 and
infra notes 81-101 and accompanying text. For a comparison between FTC Guides
II and ISO's draft standards, see infra notes 329-37 and accompanying text.
47. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 512 (providing clear picture of ISO efforts
16
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Part II of this Comment examines federal solutions to the
evolving problem of environmentally deceptive marketing
schemes.48 Essentially, it addresses the rejection of EPA influence
and the embrace of FTC's ineffective regulatory attempts. 49 Be-
cause any answer to the green marketing problem implicates juris-
dictional issues, Part II also discusses EPA and FTC's battle for
control.50 Part III traces the evolution of state environmental mar-
keting regulation and the ever-looming threat of federal preemp-
tion.51 Furthermore, it reviews First Amendment challenges that
manufacturers use as weapons against respective legislation.5 2 Part
IV identifies private attempts to elicit environmental awareness and
compliance within a nationally recognized framework. 53 This part
focuses on third-party certification programs and various private re-
medial and regulatory measures. Part V notes international endeav-
ors to unify environmental marketing, 54 and questions whether
certain legislation would withstand the scrutiny of NAFTA and
GATT.5 5 In addition, Part V likens ISO draft standards to FTC
Green Guides. 56 Briefly summarizing ISO's framework in the envi-
ronmental marketing arena, this part highlights relevant policies
and programs implicating ISO designations. Finally, Part VI offers
a proposal of uniform federal legislation that will most effectively
address the concerns of all parties involved: marketers, consumers
in environmental marketing arena and benefits and drawbacks to independent
third-party guidelines). For a discussion of ISO's attempts to regulate the environ-
mental market, see infra notes 315-45 and accompanying text.
48. For a discussion of FTC efforts toward regulating the environmental mar-
ket, see supra notes 9-21 and infra notes 58-105 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of EPA efforts towards regulating the environmental market, see supra
notes 22-27 and infra notes 106-51 and accompanying text.
49. For a discussion of FTC and EPA positions in the area of environmental
marketing regulation, see infra notes 152-66 and accompanying text.
50. For a discussion of FTC's and EPA'sjurisdictional skirmish, see infra notes
152-66 and accompanying text.
51. For a discussion of current state environmental marketing legislation, see
supra notes 28-35 and infra notes 167-201 and accompanying text. For a discussion
about federal preemption of state environmental marketing schemes,. see infra
notes 202-33 and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of First Amendment challenges to environmental regula-
tory attempts, see infra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
53. For a discussion of private remedial and regulatory measures, see supra
notes 36-40 and infra notes 239-314 and accompanying text.
54. For a discussion of international environmental regulatory schemes, see
supra notes 41-47 and infra notes 239-59 & 315-45 and accompanying text.
55. For a discussion of NAFTA and GATT in the environmental marketing
context, see supra notes 4143 and infra notes 273-82 & 340-41 and accompanying
text.
56. For a discussion of ISO's environmental marketing guidelines, see infra
notes 315-45 and accompanying text.
1998]
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and environmentalists. 57
II. FEDERAL SOLUTIONS
A. FTC to the Rescue?
By enacting FTCA, Congress provided a federal vehicle for re-
straining deceptive advertising. 58 Section five of FTCA empowers
FTC to prevent "[u]nfair methods of competition" and "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce."59 As deter-
mined jointly by FTC and the courts, FTCA anticipates the Commis-
sion's regulation of false, deceptive and misleading advertising. 60
Three approaches inhere in FTC's exercise of authority: (1) case-
by-case prosecution; 61  (2) publication of interpretive guide
57. For explication of the author's uniform regulatory proposal, see infra note
346 and accompanying text.
58. See FTCA §§ 1-26, c. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (codified as amended in 15 U.S.C.
§§ 41-58 (1994)). For a general discussion of FI'C's authority under FTCA and its
ability to bring a civil action, see Introduction to FTC (last modified October 17,
1997) <http://ftc.gov.html> [hereinafter Introduction to FTC].
59. FTCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45. For additional discussion of FTC's authority
under FTCA, see supra notes 13 & 15 and infra notes 61-79 & 288-98 and accompa-
nying text.
60. See FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937) (articulating
"courts do not have a right to ignore the plain mandate of ... [FTCA and t] he
courts can't pick and choose bits of evidence to make findings of fact contrary to
the findings of the Commission"); Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143
F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944) (finding trademark registration of deceptive term "does
not prevent its use from falling within the prohibition of [FTCA]"); United States
v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 662 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1981) (pointing out
"[c]ommensurate with ... [FT1CA's] duty [to prevent] .. .deceptive and mislead-
ing.., advertising is the power to fashion broad remedial relief to prevent a com-
pany . . .from engaging in similarly deceptive practices in the future"); Unified
Agenda of FTC: Statement of Regulatory Priorities, 61 Fed. Reg. 62211 (1996)
(FTC articulation of duties under FrCA).
61. See FTCA § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). The pertinent provision of FTCA
reads:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such per-
son, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method
of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting com-
merce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in
respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it shall issue and
serve upon such... [wrongdoer] a complaint stating its charges.... If
• .. [after a] hearing the Commission shall be of the opinion that the
method of competition or the act or practice in question is prohibited by
this subchapter, it shall make a report in writing in which it shall state its
findings as to the facts and shall issue ... an order requiring such person,
partnership, or corporation to cease and desist from using such method
of competition or such act or practice.
18
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lines;62 and (3) issuance of trade regulation rules.63 To maintain a
cause of action, FTCA does not require proof of intent, reliance,
actual injury or damages; rather, it directs FTC to demonstrate only
the likelihood of consumer deception. 64 Because FTCA lacked a
62. See FTCA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a (a)(1)(A) (stating "the Commission may
prescribe . . . interpretive rules and general statements of policy with respect to
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce (within the meaning
of section 45(a) (1) of this title")). For an illustration of FTC interpretive guide-
lines, see FTC Guides I, supra note 17; FTC Guides II, supra note 9; Endorsement
Guides, infra note 290. For a discussion of the provisions of FTC Guides I and II,
see supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text and infra notes 80-101 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of the provisions of Endorsement Guides, see infra
notes 290-96 and accompanying text.
63. See FTCA § 18, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a) (1) (B). The pertinent provision of
FTCA reads:
[T] he Commission may prescribe .. .rules which define with specificity
acts or practices which are unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or af-
fecting commerce (within the meaning of section 45(a) (1) of this tide),
except that the Commission shall not develop or promulgate any trade
rule or regulation with regard to the regulation of the development and
utilization of the standards and certifications activities pursuant to this
section. Rules under this subparagraph may include requirements pre-
scribed for the purpose of preventing such acts or practices.
Id.
64. See FTCA § 5(n), 15 U.S.C. § 45(n). The relevant language of this provi-
sion states:
The Commission shall . . .declare unlawful an act or practice on the
ground that such act or practice is unfair [if] the act or practice causes or
is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.... The Commission may con-
sider established public policies as evidence . . .[of unfair practice but
s]uch public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for
such determination.
Id. See also JEFF I. RICHARDS, DECEPTIVE ADVERTISING: BEHAVIORAL STUDY OF A
LEGAL CONCEPT 28 (1990) (informing FTC need not show falsity or deception-in-
fact under FTCA). But cf Lanham Act §§ 1-46, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994) (re-
quiring proof of actual consumer confusion prior to trademark infringement pros-
ecution). Although no statutory definition of the term deceptive exists, use of the
word deceptiveness alludes to the fact that actual deception need not be proven
under the FTCA. See RIcHARDS, supra, at 13. FTC will identify an act or practice as
deceptive "if first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is
likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third,
the representation, omission or practice is material." In re Cliffdale Assoc. 103
F.T.C. 110, 164-65 n.4 (1984) (explicating when representation is deceptive under
FTCA section five). For a discussion of the three elements contingent to a finding
of deceptive advertising under FTCA (the Cliffdale standard), see Rathe, supra note
28, at 428-34. See Welsh, supra note 5, at 1006-08 (denouncing generality and flexi-
bility of Cliffdale standard in context of green marketing regulation). For a discus-
sion of the phrase "reasonable consumers likely to be deceived," see Grodsky, supra
note 5, at 153 and Rathe supra note 28, at 430-31. For a discussion of the necessity
of substantiated advertising claims, see Policy Statement Regarding Advertising
Substantiation Program, 49 Fed. Reg. 30,999 (1984). But see Rathe, supra, at 431
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concrete definition of "deceptive practices," Congress sanctioned
FTC's case-by-case demarcation and development of impermissible
"deceptive marketing. '65 As such, FTC customarily chooses to en-
force its Congressional mandate by execution of "cease and desist"
orders, which warrant imposition of fines upon the second
offense. 66
FrC noted concern for "green" advertisements and began en-
forcement against claims of deceptive and misleading environmen-
tal marketing as early as 1973.67 Instead of fashioning new rules,
because no intent to deceive on the part of the manufacturer is required
and because a manufacturer is liable for a representation that conveys
more than one meaning to a reasonable consumer, only one of which is
false, good faith, substantiated claims for which no uniform definitions
exist may also mislead reasonable consumers.
Id. (citations omitted). Lastly, Cliffdale explains a material representation, practice
or omission as one "likely to affect [consumers'] choice of, or conduct regarding, a
product... [and] likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circum-
stances." 103 F.T.C. at 165 n.4.
65. See S. REP. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937) (advocating FTC case-
by-case determination of deceptive behavior); Petitions FTC Guides I, supra note
14, at 24,968 (articulating lack of concrete definition of "deceptive practices" and
case-by-case enforcement of FTCA); Request for Comment FTC Guides I, supra
note 14, at 38,979 (same). Not surprisingly, changing times and political influ-
ences have resulted in several fluctuations of the "deceptive practices" standard
since the inception of FTC. For a discussion of some of these changes and the
accompanying problems, see Roger E. Schechter, The Death of the Gullible Consumer:
Towards a More Sensible Definition of Deception at the FTC, 1989 U. ILL. L. REv. 571,
574-76 (1989). For a discussion of the invalidity of FTC's case-by-case approach,
see Welsh, supra note 5, at 1008-09.
66. See FTCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(m) (1994). Remedial measures include:
advisory opinions, consent orders, cease and desist orders, civil fines, restitution
and damages (less frequently), and injunctions and corrective advertising (equita-
ble relief). Id. For a brief synopsis of FTC cease and desist order procedure, see
Grodsky, supra note 5, at 154 n.27 (citing DAVID G. EPSTEIN, CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION 17-21 (1976)). For a more complete discussion of FTC enforcement proce-
dures under FTCA, see STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
REGULATORY MANUAL SERIES § 6.01 (1992). Since FTC has not yet developed bind-
ing guidelines for environmental marketing regulation, consumers must rely on
Section 5 of FTCA for the policing and punishing of all deceptive advertising
schemes. See Starek, supra note 18 (stating "Commission does not rely solely on
Guides to promote compliance with the law .... [but] continue[s] to investigate
individual instances of deceptive claims under Section 5 of the FTC Act"). See also
Barnett, supra note 12, at 495 (suggesting why FTC has limited its regulatory efforts
to case-by-case approach).
67. See In re Ex-Cell-O Corp., 82 F.T.C. 36 (1973) (forbidding company from
using term "biodegradable" in its advertising); In re Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 84
F.T.C. 1401 (1974) (prohibiting representations of "pollution-free" exhaust); In re
Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 84 F.T.C. 1493 (1974) (requiring scientific sup-
port for assertions that product reduces engine exhaust emissions and gives off
"pollution-free" exhaust); In re Albano Enterprises, Inc., 89 F.T.C. 523 (1977)
(same). For a more complete discussion of early FTC enforcement of deceptive
environmental advertisements, see Carl F. Patka, Of Diapers, Lawnbags, and Land-
fills: The Federal Trade Commission Cracks Down on False Advertising in the Environmen-
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the Commission attempted to manipulate green marketing into the
already existing false advertising framework.68 FTC garnered sup-
port for their position from FTCA,69 case precedent 70 and agency
policy statements, 71 which were designed to apprise marketers of
FTC's position on unfair advertising. Unfortunately, without the
needed guidance and enforcement mechanisms, marketers as-
sumed their actions were proper. 72 The close of the 1980s, how-
tal Marketplace, 5 Loy. CONSUMER L. REP. 43, 44-45 (1993); Welsh, supra note 5, at
1005-11; Grodsky, supra note 5, at 153-56.
68. See Paul H. Luehr, Comment, Guiding The Green Revolution: The Role of the
Federal Trade Commission in Regulating Environmental Advertising, 10 UCLA J. ENVTL
L. & POL'Y 311, 312-16 (1992) (noting that "case-by-case prosecution of deceptive
[environmental] advertising continued with fervor"). FTC received consent or-
ders from the following companies for alleged inaccuracies in environmental
claims: American Environ Products (disposable diapers); First Brands (Glad trash
bags); Jerome Russell Cosmetics, Inc. (ozone claims); Zipatone Inc. (ozone
claims). See id. See also Barnett, supra note 12, at 495-99 (noting that FTC chiefly
relies on case-by-case prosecution of misleading environmental claims). During
these early years of environmental marketing regulation, FTC Commissioner
Azcuenaga urged that injection of environmental policy was outside the scope of
the Agency's congressional mandate. See Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Green
Guides, supra note 20, at 777; AZCUENAGA DISSENTING STATEMENT, supra note 20, at
1-3. Azcuenaga felt that FTC should defer issuing environmental marketing regu-
lations until the Agency can gather more insight through its current case-by-case
prosecution. Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Green Guides, supra note 20, at 777.
For further discussion of Azcuenaga's position, see supra note 20 and infra notes
113, 118 & 157 and accompanying text. Steiger and Starek both agree that FTC
should regulate the environmental market. See Steiger Supports Development of FTC
Green Guides, supra note 20, at 398; Starek supra note 18. For further discussion of
Starek's and Steiger's opposing position, see supra notes 18-20 and infra notes 113,
118 & 157 and accompanying text.
69. FTCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). To view the pertinent language of
FTCA, see supra notes 61 & 64 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 60 & 67 (discussing case precedent that supports FTC regu-
lation of environmental marketing). See also FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380
U.S. 374, 385 (1965) (holding FTC judgment as to deceptive practice is accorded
great weight by courts); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 612-13 (1946)
(granting FTC authority to determine what is necessary to eliminate deceptive or
unfair marketing practice).
71. See, e.g., Policy Statement on Deceptive Advertising, appended to Cliffdale
Assocs. Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174 (1984) (defining deceptive advertisement as one
which is likely to misguide reasonable consumers and prompt them to adjust be-
havior with regard to advertised products); Policy Statement Regarding Advertis-
ing Unfairness, appended to International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1072
(1984) (endorsing balancing test of burden on manufacturer and harm on con-
sumer to aid determination of whether advertisement is unfair and injurious to
consumers); Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, 49 Fed. Reg.
30,999, 31,000 (1984) (endorsing balancing test of burden on manufacturer and
harm on consumer to aid determination of whether advertisement is sufficiently
substantiated). These provisions summarize the Commission's case holdings in
particular areas and attempt to establish factual tests to judge advertising claims.
72. See Patricia P. Bailey & Michael Pertschuk, The Law of Deception: The Past as
Prologue, 33 Am. U. L. REv. 849, 850-51 (1984) (written by two FTC Commissioners
who dissented in Cliffdale) (noting "[t]he novel phrasing of this standard consti-
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ever, brought industry outcry.73 Arguing selective enforcement,
businesses pointed to the unfairness in tarnishing a company's rep-
utation and imposing FTC suit expenses where the Commission
had failed to issue indispensable "compliance" guidelines.74
As the Loraxian 75 consumers grew, so grew the Marvin
McMonkey McBean marketers. 76 Each passing year evidenced in-
tutes a departure from nearly fifty years of essentially consistent federal jurispru-
dence and raises many questions and much uncertainty about the Commission's
ability to prevent certain 'deceptive' trade practices"); Welsh, supra note 5, at 1007
(pointing out "[a] bsent uniform definitions of green marketing terms, compliance
with a generic deceptive advertising clause will simply be a guessing game for man-
ufacturers"). For a critique of FTC's case-by-case enforcement methodology and
the Commission's involvement in the regulation of the environmental market, see
supra notes 12-16 & 58-71 and infra notes 73-79, 155-60 & 288-98 and accompany-
ing text.
73. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 497 (outlining chronological progression of
environmental marketing regulation). See also Manufacturers, Retailers Petition fTC
to Adopt Uniform Labeling Guidelines, 60 ANTTRuST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 279
(Feb. 21, 1991) [hereinafter Petitions for Green Labeling Guidelines] (detailing initial
steps in FTC guidelines development). Industry representatives exhibited the fol-
lowing concerns:
[S]ome companies [were] misleading consumers with claims of "recycl-
able" or "reusable"... and asked [FTC] to make a level playing field....
[A representative of National Food Processors Association remarked that]
"[d]espite the numerous benefits that flow from truthful environmental
claims, there is a reluctance on the part of many members of industry to
make such claims .... Many industry members are uncertain how the
Commission would interpret unqualified statements that a product is 're-
cyclable,' or statements about the recycled content of a package."
Id.
74. See Barnett, supra 12, at 497 (articulating problems associated with lack of
guidance from FTC); Jason W. Gray-Lee et al., Review of Legal Standards for Environ-
mental Marketing Claims, J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING, 169 (1994) (reinforcing case-
by-case approach failed to provide guidance in industry); Hearings on Environmental
Labeling: Hearings on S. 615 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the
Senate Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong., 240, 13-15 (1991) (testi-
mony of Deborah Becker, Vice President, Environmental Policy, Kraft General
Foods, Inc.) (alluding to industry confusion accompanying selective enforcement
and lack of uniform national standards); FTC Conducts Two-day Hearing on Need to
Develop Environmental Marketing Guide, 61 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 117
(July 25, 1991) [hereinafter Summary of Hearings 1991] (explicating unfairness of
FTC policy which required charging company with deceptive advertising practice
before adjudicating its claim).
75. See GEISEL (DR. SEUSS), supra note 3. In THE LoRAX, Dr. Seuss wove the
social message of environmental conscientiousness into his rhyming storyline. The
Lorax serves as the social conscience of both the manufacturing Once-ler and of
the consuming public at large. Loraxian consumers, therefore, signify environ-
mentally conscious purchasers. For a discussion of Dr. Seuss' literary depiction of
the developing "green" consumer, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
76. See GEISEL (DR. SEUss), supra note 6 (reflecting social undertones). In
THE SNEETCHES, to sell his star-on/star-off service, Marvin McMonkey McBean
preys on the social concerns of the Sneetch consumers. See id. Such manufactur-
ers do more than read their market. They take advantage of the insecurities and
22
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creasing fervor for federal regulation. 77 Initially, states filled a per-
ceived void by enacting new legislation and by enforcing state
consumer protection laws.78 NAAG, recognizing the import of uni-
fying state statutory schemes, entreated FTC to promulgate green
advertising and labeling guidelines. 79 Because of the technical
complexity and scientific uncertainty surrounding many environ-
mental claims and the increase in their use, FTC requested com-
ments on the proposed environmental marketing and advertising
guidelines.80 Finally, in July 1992, FTC Guides for the Use of Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims (FrC Guides I) was born.8 '
FTC Guides I, as its name suggests, has no force of law.82 It was
adopted merely to enlighten marketers and explain how FTC will
enforce section five of FTCA in the environmental marketing and
advertising context.8 3 FTC aimed to regulate the environmental
concerns of respective consumers. For Dr. Seuss' illustration of an underregulated
market and an unchecked marketer, see supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
77. See Bukro, supra note 1, at 24 (divulging 400% more environmental mar-
keting advertisements were unleashed in 1991 than in 1989). For further discus-
sion of the "green mania" characterizing the early 1990s, see Coffee, supra note 1,
at 298; Wynne, supra note 2, at 51; Chase & Smith, supra note 1, at S-2; Donaton &
Fitzgerald, supra note 1, at 49; U.S. EPA, supra note 1; Wynne, supra note 1, at 785;
Howett, supra note 2, at 401-03.
78. For a discussion of the myriad of state resolutions, see supra notes 28-35
and infra notes 167-204 and accompanying text.
79. For a discussion of NAAG initial regulatory suggestions, see GREEN RE-
PORT I, supra note 4. See also NAAG Urges National Strategy on Energy Shortages, Envi-
ronmental Marketing Claims, 58 ANTiTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 424 (Mar. 22,
1990) (articulating NAAG's proposal); Petitions for Green Labeling Guidelines, supra
note 73 (same). The following words sum up NAAG's position on the regulation
of the environmental market:
[NAAG's] ultimate goal is to prompt the development of specific and
concrete definitions for terms commonly used in environmental advertis-
ing and standards for applying those definitions. Based on ... testimony
and written comments . . . and [NAAG's] . . . ongoing investigation of
environmental claims, [NAAG] has developed . . . preliminary recom-
mendations to provide guidance to businesses desiring to make environ-
mental claims until such standards are enacted.
GREEN REPORT I, supra note 4, at 47. For further discussion of NAAG's position,
see supra notes 4 & 16 and infra notes 113, 172-73 & 210 and accompanying text.
80. See Request for Comments FTC Guides I, supa note 1.
81. FTC Guides I, supra note 17. For an overview of FTC Guides I, see supra
notes 14-21 and accompanying text and infra notes 79-89 and accompanying text.
For a general discussion of FTC Guides II, see infra notes 90-105 and accompany-
ing text. For a discussion of the changes in FTC Guides I that are implemented in
FTC Guides II, see infra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
82. See FTC Guides I § 260.2 (stating "[t]he guides themselves do not pre-
empt regulation of other federal agencies or of state and local bodies governing
the use of environmental marketing claims").
83. See id. § 260.1 (stating "[tihese guides represent administrative interpreta-
tions of laws by the [FTC] for the guidance of the public in conducting its affairs in
conformity with legal requirements ... [and] specifically address the application
1998]
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market by framing its approach in terms of voluntary compliance, 4
and agreed to shelter those marketers heeding Guide examples.8 5
In conjunction with the issuance of FTC Guides I, the Commission
established a three-year review period in which public comment
would be sought to determine whether and how the guidelines
should be modified in light of experience.8 6 Because FTC desired
to make the guides responsive to changes in consumer understand-
ing and developments in environmental technology, the Commis-
sion solicited comments with the intention of implementing any
needed changes.8 7  According to FTC, comments received from
industry, environmental groups, and federal and state authorities
confirmed that industry had done a good job of voluntarily comply-
ing with FTC Guides I and that the most egregious claims had dis-
appeared.88  However, scholars, federal agencies, individual
businesses, trade associations and environmental groups suggest
otherwise. 89
of section 5 of the FTC Act (15 U.S.C. § 45) to environmental advertising and
marketing practices").
84. See id.
85. See id. § 260.3 (stating "[t]he guides are composed of general principles
and specific guidance ... and are followed by examples that generally address a
single deception concern . . . [and] options . . . for qualifying a claim. These
options are intended to provide a 'safe harbor' for marketers who want certainty
about how to make environmental claims").
86. See id. § 260.4 (stating "[t]hree years after the date of adoption of these
guides, the Commission will seek public comment on whether and how the guides
need to be modified in light of ensuing developments .... Following review of
[party] petition[s], the Commission will take such action as it deems
appropriate").
87. See FTC Guides I § 260.4 (requesting comments from industry and regula-
tors alike); Request for Comments FTC Guides I, supra note 14 (same). See also
Starek, supra note 18 (addressing comments received from those implementing,
encountering and adhering to FTC Guides I).
88. See Starek, supra note 18; Ira Teinowitz, FTC Stands by Regs for 'Green' Ad
Claims No Big Revisions Made in Rules Though Guide Gets More Specific, ADVERTISING
AGE, Oct. 7, 1996, at 61 (alluding to FTC Guides I's intended changes). "The
commission is gratified that the guides received such broad appeal during this
review process . . . [and so] only those changes necessary to further protect con-
sumers from misleading claims and to provide guidance to manufacturers on how
to advertise truthfully the environmental benefits of their products were made."
Teinowitz, supra, at 61 (quoting Jodie Bernstein, director of the Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection).
89. See EPA, Packagers and Others Comment on FTC Green Guides, 4 FooD LABEL-
ING NEWS 4 (1995) (responding to industry claims of "recyclability," "com-
postability" and "degradability," EPA disputed FTC Guides I effect on marketers).
Specifically, the Agency praised FTC's laudatory attempts at promoting national
consistency for environmental marketing claims, but "'strongly oppose[d] al-
lowing [the] unqualified use of [such terms at this time].'" Id. at 4. Because the
Agency espoused life-cycle assessment methodology of products and felt that such
methodology should be used in conjunction with environmental marketing claims,
24
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On October 4, 1996, FTC announced an updated version of
the guidelines which evinces relatively minor changes and the same
non-binding repercussions.90 A few noteworthy revisions include: a
redraft of recycling provisions to address changing consumer per-
ceptions with respect to the chasing arrow symbol;91 explication of
the term "ozone-friendly" and its designation as a per se deceptive
advertisement;02 the inclusion of additional examples for previously
defined environmental claims;93 and a substantiation requirement
EPA opposed F[C's use of unqualified terms. See Letter fromJulie W. Lynch, Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission
(Sept. 26, 1996) (on file with author) (qualifying use of environmental marketing
guidelines with use of terminology defined by EPA). In addition to emphasizing
strong need for continued usage of environmental marketing guidelines, EPA
pointed out that FTC Guides I proved useful in EPA program activities. For a
discussion of the effectiveness of FTC Guides I from the perspective of regulators,
scholars, industries, and trade organizations, see ENVIRONMENTAL GUIDELINE RE-
VIEW, MEETING BEFORE THE COMMISSION, Docket No.: P954501 (Dec. 7, 1995)
[hereinafter HEARINGS 1995]. Mr. Bud Golden of the National Recycling Coalition
observed that "there has been a steady growth in recycling since the guides went
into effect . . . [but] I think that [the growth is] largely . . . a result of public
policies that were established prior to the guides." Id. at 19-20. According to Mr.
Barry Meyer of the Aluminum Association, "recycling is, first and foremost, a busi-
ness. It is all a matter of economics and what you can afford to do.... No amount
of education, no amount of recyclable claim standards are going to do away with
[the problem]." Id. at 84-85. Mr. Hal Shoup with American Association of Adver-
tising Agencies implied that there was less of a need for national environmental
marketing guidelines because marketers no longer focused on a product's environ-
mental attributes and consumers no longer needed environmental sensitivity train-
ing. See id. at 41-42. While a number of organizations congratulated FTC on their
efforts, few felt FTC Guides I were sufficient. See generally id. For further discussion
of the disputed success of FTC Guides I, see supra notes 12-16 & 58-79 and infra
notes 155-60 & 288-98 and accompanying text.
90. FTC Guides II, supra note 9. For a discussion of the changes in FTC
Guides I that are reflected in FTC Guides II, see supra notes 18-21 and infra notes
96-101 and accompanying text.
91. See id. § 260.7(e) (ex.10) (stating "[b]y itself the [three chasing arrows]
symbol is likely to convey that the packaging is both 'recyclable' and is made en-
tirely from recycled material. Unless both messages can be substantiated, the
claim should be qualified").
92. See id. § 260.7(h) (noting "[i]t is deceptive to misrepresent, directly or by
implication, that a product is safe for or 'friendly' to the ozone layer or atmos-
phere"). The examples help flesh out situations in which claiming a product is
"ozone safe" or "ozone friendly" is a deceptive form of advertising. See, e.g., id
§ 260.7(h) (ex. 2). The pertinent provision reads:
An aerosol air freshener is labeled "ozone friendy." Some of the prod-
uct's ingredients are volatile organic compounds (VOCs) that may cause
smog by contributing to ground-level ozone formation. The claim is
likely to convey to consumers that the product is safe for the atmosphere
as a whole, and is therefore, deceptive.
Id.
93. See id. § 260.7. One of the examples reads:
A brand name like "Eco-Safe" would be deceptive if, in the context of the
product so named, it leads consumers to believe that the product has
environmental benefits which cannot be substantiated by the manufac-
1998] 157
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for both general "environmentally preferable" product assertions
and environmental seals of approval.9 4 Significantly, instead of al-
tering its unsatisfactory 5 recyclable and compostable guides, FTC
decided to "await the results of ongoing consumer research. '96
Both sets of guidelines represent a step in the right direction,
but they are simply not adequate. Although many hoped FTC
Guides I would provide the basis for a uniform, national environ-
mental marketing scheme,9 7 the issuance of FTC Guides II
trounced such optimism. 98 Uniformity in the environmental mar-
turer. The claim would not be deceptive if "Eco-Safe" were followed by
clear and prominent qualifying language limiting the safety representa-
tion to a particular product attribute for which it could be substantiated,
and provided that no other deceptive implications were created by the
context.
Id. § 260.7(a) (ex.1).
94. See FTC Guides II, supra note 9, §§ 260.7(a) (ex.5), (ex.6) (stating "[i]t is
deceptive to misrepresent, directly or by implication, that a product or package
offers a general environmental benefit. Unqualified general claims of environ-
mental benefit . . . [a]s explained in the Commission's Ad Substantiation State-
ment ... must be substantiated").
95. See Starek, supra note 18 (admitting that FTC Guides I needed revising).
For an in-depth critique of the recyclable and compostable guides, see HEARINGS
1995, supra note 89. For a general discussion of FTC Guides' I effectiveness, see
supra notes 12-16 & 58-79 and infra notes 155-60 & 288-98 and accompanying text.
96. Starek, supra note 18 (elaborating on revisions to FTC Guides I and on
FTC's position to forestall revisions to "recycling" and "compostable" guides). See
generally Teinowitz, supra note 88 (same). To view FTC's compostable and reycl-
able guides, see FTC Guides I, supra note 17, §§ 260.7(c), (d).
97. See Summary of Hearings 1991, supra note 74, at 118 (quoting National Food
Processors Association: "[a]lthough a guide will not preempt states, the secondary
effects of guides will be a positive force in shaping national uniformity"); Hearings
1991, supra note 21, at 30, 66, 140, & 169 (recording support for FTC Guides I
from NAAG; The Grocery Manufacturers Association; the Cosmetic, Toiletry and
Fragrance Association; the Environmental Defense Fund; Green Cross Certifica-
tion Company); EPA ON ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 1, at 110-13
(pointing out "advocates of strong governmental regulation of environmental ad-
vertising . . . want to see regulations go beyond truth-in-advertising laws"). EPA
noted the following:
Advocates for greater governmental involvement argue that environmen-
tal claims inherently affect environmental policy by affecting consumer
purchasing decisions, and should therefore be allowed only on products
that have meaningful environmental benefits. They also point out that
misleading or deceptive claims not only harm consumers, they can under-
mine broader environmental policy goals, such as encouraging recycling
and responsible solid waste management.
EPA ON ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 1, at 111.
98. See FTC Guides I Revisions, supra note 21 (pointing out much criticism and
lack of uniformity in environmental marketing context existed although three
years had passed since issuance of FTC Guides I). For a discussion of the effects of
FTC's issuance of non-binding FTC Guides II, see supra notes 17-21 & 88-97 and
infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. For a discussion of FTC's efforts in
regulating the environmental market, see supra notes 9-21 and infra notes 58-105,
288-98 & 329-37 and accompanying text.
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keting context is a "pipe dream," only to be realized in FTC's typical
leisurely fashion.99 Like the original version, FTC Guides II merely
mandates that marketers provide "substantiated," "clear and promi-
nent" and "not overstated" professions of environmental merit.100
Even coupled with explanatory examples, such amorphous stan-
dards do not provide the guidance needed to unify green market-
ing. Moreover, states are not required to harmonize their
legislation with FTC efforts. 10' While a few have conformed their
laws to FTC Guides 1,102 many states have not taken FTC enact-
ments into consideration when drafting their green marketing
laws. 103 An updated non-binding set of guidelines will not advance
99. See Welsh, supra note 5, at 1008 (denoting F'C case-by-case enforcement
regulator methods as laggard and suggesting "[one need only look at how long it
has taken the FTC to establish a clear definition of 'deceptive' through the case-by-
case method [to determine that such an approach is ineffective]"). For a critique
of FTC's half-hearted regulatory attempts, see id. at 1005-11. For further discus-
sion of FTC's case-by-case enforcement regulatory methodology, see supra notes
12-16 & 58-79 and infra notes 155-60 & 288-98 and accompanying text.
100. FTC Guides II, supra note 9, §§ 260.6(a), (c). The pertinent provision
reads:
The Commission traditionally has held that in order to be effective, any
qualifications or disclosures such as those described in the guides in this
part should be sufficiently clear and prominent to prevent deception.
Clarity of language, relative type size and proximity to the claim being
qualified, and an absence of contrary claims that could undercut effec-
tiveness, will maximize the likelihood that the qualifications and disclo-
sures are appropriately clear and prominent.
Id. § 260.6(a). Section 260.6(c) reads in pertinent part:
An environmental marketing claim should not be presented in a manner
that overstates the environmental attribute or benefit, expressly or by im-
plication. Marketers should avoid implications of significant environ-
mental benefits if the benefit is in fact negligible.
Id. § 260.6(c).
101. See id. § 260.2. The text of this provisions is identical in FTC Guides I
and II. For the pertinent text of § 260.2 in FTC Guides I, see supra note 82.
102. For a discussion of the states conforming their laws to FTC Guides I, see
supra notes 30-31 and infra notes 177-87 and accompanying text.
103. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 504-07 (explicating states' role in environ-
mental marketing and explaining that many states legislated green marketing with-
out regard to FTC guidelines). Presently, all states with environmental marketing
laws permit, as a statutory defense, conformance with FTC Guides I. For a discus-
sion of state environmental marketing laws, see supra notes 28-34 and accompany-
ing text and infra notes 167-204 and accompanying text. One state has even
adopted FTC Guides I into law. See ME. Rxv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (West
1996). For the pertinent text of the Maine statute, see supra note 30. The same
states conforming their laws with FTC Guides I have not yet updated their laws to
allow conformance with FTC Guides II as a defense to deceptive environmental
advertising. For a discussion of likely implications of issuance of non-binding FTC
Guides II, see supra notes 98-102 and infra notes 105 & 33846 and accompanying
text. Because most states have yet to enact any green marketing law, one may view
the impact of FTC regulatory guidelines as insignificant. It is clearly not. For a
discussion concerning why FTC's regulatory attempts are not insignificant, see Bar-
1998]
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the goal of nationalizing environmental advertising. FTC's unfamil-
iarity with complex environmental claims and technical terminol-
ogy has served to hinder the Commission's work in its main area of
expertise: unfair marketing regulation.1 0 4 Thus, sufficient manage-
ment of the environmental market may only be accomplished
through the joint endeavors of EPA and F FC. 1°5
B. EPA or Bust?
Before the issuance of FTC Guides I, Congress considered two
bills which granted EPA the power to create voluntary national
guidelines for environmental marketing terminology.' 0 6 Emphasiz-
ing uniform definitional standards and rejecting a national seal of
approval program, both bills set minimum standards to which EPA
must adhere. 10 7 Most importantly, both schemes mandated a pub-
nett, supra note 12, at 504-507. See also infra notes 105, 209-23, & 338-46 and ac-
companying text.
104. See Welsh, supra note 5 at 1009-11 (using FTC's nutritional label failure
to demonstrate why Commission should not be involved in environmental market-
ing regulation). For further discussion of the nutritional labels guidelines, see in-
fra notes 114, 156, 159-61, 209 & 219-20 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of FTC's inability to adequately regulate the environmental market, see
supra notes 12-16 & 58-79 and infra notes 155-60 & 288-98 and accompanying text.
105. For a discussion concerning the reasons why joint EPA and FTC efforts
are needed, see supra notes 9-27 & 58-104 and infra notes 152-66 & 346 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of other joint-Agency regulatory plans, see supra
notes 104 and infra notes 114, 156, 159-61, 209 & 219-20 and accompanying text.
For an explanation of the author's joint EPA/FrC proposal, see infra note 346 and
accompanying text.
106. See National Waste Reduction, Recycling, and Management Act, H.R.
3865, 102d Cong. (1992) (proposed by Rep. Al Swift); Environmental Marketing
Claims Act of 1991, S. 615, 102d Cong. (1991) (reintroduction by Sen. Frank
Lautenberg of Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1990, S. 3218, 101st Cong.
(1990)). See also Environmental Marketing Claims Act of 1991, H.R. 1408, 102d
Cong. (1991) (companion bill to Senate Bill 615 introduced in the House by Rep.
Gerry Sikorski); National Recycling Markets Act of 1991, H.R. 2746, 102d Cong.
(1991) (containing cursory legislative efforts to regulate environmental market);
National Recycling Markets Act of 1992, S. 2363, 102d Cong. (1991) (same). A few
earlier bills touched on environmental marketing regulation. See, e.g., National
Recyclable Commodities Act of 1989, S. 1884, 101st Cong. (1989) (introduced by
then Sen. Albert Gore); National Recyclable Commodities Act of 1990, H.R. 4942,
101st Cong. (1990) (introduced by Rep. Gerry Sikorski); Materials Recycling En-
hancement Act of 1991, S. 1473, 102d Cong. (1991). For the pertinent text of
Senate Bill 615 and House Bill 3865, see infra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
107. See S. 615, §§ 6-7; H.R. 3865, § 501. Both bills attach arbitrary percent-
age thresholds to which marketers must adhere. See, e.g., S. 615 § 6(b) (7). Critics
of Senate Bill 615 argued that such thresholds are akin to rulemaking and not
appropriate for environmental marketing guidelines. See Hearings on Environmental
Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong. 240, 87-88 (1991) (prepared statement of
American Paper Institute). Richard A. Denison, Environmental Defense Fund,
supported Senate Bill 615 but argued for limitations on FTC's role. See id. at 52-61
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lic education campaign to raise consumer awareness of the types of
claims covered and the manner in which EPA would regulate
claims.108 The chief purposes of the proposed legislation were to
"encourage both consumers and industry to adopt habits and prac-
tices that favor natural resource conservation and environmental
protection" and to protect consumers from deceptive advertising
claims. 109 Purporting to engender national uniformity, one bill110
allowed states to enact more stringent regulation while the other 1
permitted regulation of green claims to which EPA had not spoken.
Not garnering enough Congressional votes, both bills died in the
Senate. 112
Meanwhile, FTC's hesitancy in distinguishing "green claims"
from other deceptive advertising practices incited requests for
assistance." 3 Environmentalists petitioned EPA to develop "techni-
(stating "[to] fully address[ ] the question of ... environmental marketing ...
claims will clearly need the expertise of EPA").
108. See S. 615, §§ 11-12; H.R. 3865, § 501. See, e.g., S. 615 § 12 (establishing
public information campaign). Richard H. Seibert, of the National Association of
Manufacturers, indicated support for the use of voluntary labels and a public edu-
cation campaign. See Hearings on Environmental Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before
Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Comm. on Environment and Public Works,
102d Cong. 240, 89-90 (1991) (alluding to commerce clause implications stem-
ming from adoption of binding regulatory rules).
109. S. 615, § 2; H.R. 3865, § 501.
110. See S. 615, § 13(c).
111. See H.R. 3865, § 501. For a discussion of the variations between
Lautenberg and Swift's proposals, see Howett, supra note 2, at 427-28. The differ-
ences between Swift's bill and Lautenberg's bill including: (1) "authoriz[ation
for] the EPA ... to formulate the environmental claims regulations .... [and] to
enforce violations of these regulations;" (2) a requirement that persons who in-
tend to use an environmental claim file a certification that their claim meets the
Act; (3) a "require[ment that] environmental claims . . . relate to a specific envi-
ronmental impact or attribute;" and (4) authorization of claims referring to the
absence of a characteristic (such as "CFC free") only if the characteristic is usually
present in that type of product or if it would aid consumers' purchases. See id.
112. See McClure, supra note 23, at 1361-62 (insinuating bills' failure resulted
from emergence of FTC Guides). For further discussion of the demise of Congres-
sional attempts to put EPA at the helm of the environmental marketing regulatory
movement, see supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
113. See FTCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994) (indicating that present federal laws
are capable of restricting deceptive advertising). Since labeling is specifically ex-
cluded from the definition of false advertising, FTCA can not sufficiently address
the problems associated with the ever-growing green market. FTC Commissioner
Azcuenaga recognized the link between green claims regulation and environmen-
tal policy and expressed a reluctance to set environmental policy. See Azcuenaga
Will Not Endorse FTC Green Guides, supra note 20, at 777 (cautioning FTC not to
define specific green marketing terms without input and guidance from EPA,
manufacturers and other experts). For further discussion of Commissioner
Azcuenaga's position, see supra notes 20 & 68 and infra notes 117-18 & 157 and
accompanying text. Commissioner Starek and Chairman Steiger both encouraged
FTC's promulgation of environmental marketing guidelines. See Steiger Supports the
19981
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cally-based standards and definitions capable of advancing a policy
of environmental protection while preventing consumer decep-
tion."114 Showing a willingness to take on this task, EPA announced
its plans to formulate voluntary national guidelines.1 15 Accordingly,
the Agency proposed to: (1) establish standards for the legitimate
use of environmental claims; (2) determine the environmental ben-
efits of various products; and (3) aid government officials and man-
ufacturers in applying a life-cycle product assessment (LCA). 116
Development of FTC Green Guides, supra note 20, at 398; Starek, supra note 18. For
further discussion of Commissioner Starek's and Chairman Steiger's contrasting
positions on this issue, see supra notes 18-20 & 68 and infra notes 117-18 & 157 and
accompanying text. NAAG explains the pressing need for environmental advertis-
ing standards:
In "The Green Report," [NAAG] called upon the federal government to
adopt national standards for environmental marketing claims used in la-
beling, packaging and promotion of consumer products. The Task Force
now reaffirms its initial recommendation.... [I]ndustry groups have...
come forward recently and called for the federal government to develop
uniform marketing standards.... In addition, separate petitions calling
for environmental guidelines have been filed with FTC by several individ-
ual companies and trade associations.
AD Hoc TASK FORCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
ATTORNEYS GENERAL, THE GREEN REPORT II: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RESPONSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVERTISING (May 1991) at 1-2 [hereinafter GREEN REPORT II].
114. Howett, supra note 2, at 423 (citing Mr. Richard A. Denison, Environ-
mental Defense Fund, Remarks at the FTC Public Hearings on Environmental Marketing
and Advertising Guides (July 17, 1991) at 4-5. See also Richards, supra note 36, at
264. From the start, the Environmental Defense Fund espoused ajoint regulatory
plan that made use of both EPA and FTC authority. See Hearings on Environmental
Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong. 240, 56 (1991) (statement of
Mr. Richard A. Denison, Environmental Defense Fund) (comparingjoint efforts of
FTC and EPA to "already established division of authority between the FTC and
FDA under the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act"). Ms. Deborah Becker, Vice Presi-
dent, Environmental Affairs, Kraft General Foods, Inc., voiced that "EPA authority
over environmental marketing claims is inappropriate." Id. at 15. Ms. Becker feels
that positive environmental change will come through industry efforts and not pre-
scriptive regulation. Id. Accordingly, Ms. Becker stresses that stringent regulation
will "stifle innovation" instead of promoting environmental policy. Id. For a dis-
cussion of the author's joint regulatory plan, see infra note 346 and accompanying
text. For a comparison between nutritional and environmental labeling guide-
lines, see supra note 104 and infra notes 156, 159-61, 209 & 219-20 and accompany-
ing text. For further discussion of advocates of non-binding legislation, see supra
notes 20, 68, 108 & 113 and infra notes 117-18 & 157 and accompanying text. See
also supra notes 12 & 89 and infra notes 155-56, 166 & 198 and accompanying text
(cataloguing comments of supporters and advocates of FTC Guides I).
115. See Howett, supra note 2, at 423-24 (citing U.S. EPA, LIFE-CYCLE ASSESS-
MENTr METHODOLOGY DEVELOPMENT, PROJECT UPDATE, No. 2 (Summer 1991)).
116. See id. at 424. Howett explains EPA's efforts in developing life-cycle as-
sessment methodology and emphasizes the significance of life-cycle product
assessments:
In order to produce a guidance document on the application of the life-
cycle assessment method, the EPA has put together a project team from
EPA's Offices of Air and Radiation, Pollution Prevention and Evaluation,
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However, upon the promulgation of FTC Guides I, EPA took a
back-seat and assisted the Commission from its position on the In-
teragency Task Force on Environmental Marketing Claims.' 17 FTC
underscored the difference between its goals and those of the EPA
by stating that: "[t]he Commission does not have a statutory man-
date to set environmental policy. ... [A] ny Commission cases, rules
or guides would be designed to address how such terms may be
used in a non-deceptive fashion in light of consumer understanding
of the terms."1 18
Numerous pre-existing environmental statutes sanction EPA's
injection of policy into the "green market."' 19 For example, the
Research and Development, and Solid Waste. This intra-agency team is
charged with developing a comprehensive life-cycle assessment methodol-
ogy that can be used by industry, government officials and consumers to
evaluate a product's effect on the environment from the extraction of raw
materials to its final disposal and reuse. The EPA has also created a seven-
teen-member technical advisory panel .... Additionally, the agency has
undertaken a review of international programs involving life-cycle assess-
ments and environmental labeling.... Finally, in August 1990, the EPA
cosponsored a workshop organized by the Society of Environmental Toxi-
cology and Chemistry (SETAC) that had as its objective the identification
of state-of-the-art in life-cycle assessments so that methodology could be
applied in a uniform and consistent manner.
Id. at 411 n.57 (citing U.S. EPA, LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY DEVELOP-
MENT, PROJECT UPDATE No. 1, at 1-2 (1991)). For a discussion of cradle to grave
life-cycle product analysis, see infra notes 131-32, 165-66, 203, 239-88, 315-28 & 330
and accompanying text. For the definition of life-cycle assessments, see infta note
241. For a complete discussion of eco-labels and life-cycle assessments, see generally
Wynne, supra note 2.
117. See Richards, supra note 36, at 264 (explaining EPA, FTC and White
House together promulgated environmental marketing guidelines "under the ae-
gis of the FTC"); Public Commentators Give Recommendations on EPA's Proposed Green
Marketing Terms, 61 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1541, 600 (Nov. 14,
1991) (summarizing comments of C. Bowdoin Train, EPA Deputy Assistant Admin-
istrator of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, that if FTC issues guidelines,
EPA will assist from the Task Force); FTC Commissioners, Industry Plan to Meet About
Guidelines on Environmental Labeling, 23 ENvTL. REP. (BNA) 11 (May 1, 1992) (ex-
plaining FTC Chairman Steiger pushed Agency to promptly issue green marketing
guidelines); Steiger Supports the Development of FTC Green Guides, supra note 20, at 398
(same). For further discussion of Chairman Steiger's position on FTC environ-
mental guidelines, see supra notes 68 & 113 and infra notes 118 & 157 and accom-
panying text.
118. Petitions FTC Guides I, supra note 14, at 24,968. See also Azcuenaga Will
Not Endorse FTC Green Guides, supra note 20, at 777 (articulating Commissioner
Azcuenaga's position that FTC does not have authority to regulate environmental
policy). For further discussion of Commissioner Azcuenaga's position, see supra
notes 20, 68 & 113 and infra note 157 and accompanying text. See also supra note
107 (discussing views of non-binding guidelines advocate). But see supra notes 12 &
89 and infra notes 155-56, 166 & 198 (cataloguing various viewpoints of myriad
interest groups).
119. For a list of the environmental statutes sanctioning EPA's injection of
policy and a discussion of EPA's authority to regulate environmental labeling, see
supra note 26 and infra notes 120-51 and accompanying text.
1998]
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Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) grants
EPA broad authority to regulate labeling of pesticides. 120 After ana-
lyzing the application, product label and attestations of product su-
periority, EPA may oblige a registrant to substantiate any claims. 121
General avowals of "environmental friendliness" and other such
marketing incentives fall within EPA's rulemaking authority. 122
Likewise, the Clean Air Act substantially delimits marketers' ability
to tout the "greenness" of their products.1 23 EPA remains the chief
enforcement agency for the following mandates: (1) compliance
with vehicle emission standards;124 (2) placement of warning labels
120. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) §§ 2-31, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y (1994). See also U.S. EPA, STATUS REPORT ON THE USE OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL LABELS WORLDWIDE (EPA 742-R-9-93-001) (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter
EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS] (providing succinct overview of FIFRA pesticide labeling
program). Those who support EPA regulation of environmental marketing claims
often refer to EPA's labeling expertise as evidenced by FIFRA. See, e.g., Barnett,
supra note 12, at 500-03. It may be argued, however, that EPA's expertise extends
to disclosure labeling of harmful and dangerous products, and that FTC is best
able to regulate deceptive environmental advertisements. See FIFRA §§ 2-31, 7
U.S.C. §§ 136a-136y. Environmental marketing invokes both environmental policy
and deceptive advertising. As such, a joint-agency plan would best resolve green
marketing concerns. For a discussion of the intermingling of environmental and
consumer deception issues, see supra notes 12, 89 & 104-05 and infra notes 152-66,
202-23, 289-98 & 346 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the author's
joint-agency plan, see infra note 346 and accompanying text.
121. See FIFRA § 3(c) (1), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c) (1). The pertinent text of FIFRA
reads as follows:
Each applicant for registration of a pesticide shall file . . . a statement
which includes . . . a complete copy of the labeling of the pesticide, a
statement of all claims to be made for it, and any directions for its use...
and except as otherwise provided.., a full description of the tests made
and the results thereof upon which the claims are based, or alternatively a
citation to data that appear in the public literature or that previously had
been submitted to the Administrator.
Id. §§ 136a(c)(1)(C), (F).
122. See FIFRA § 25(c), 7 U.S.C. § 136w(c) (granting EPA broad authoriza-
tion to regulate environmental claims on pesticides). According to FIFRA, "[t]he
Administrator, after notice and opportunity for hearing, is authorized ... to estab-
lish standards ... with respect to the package, container, or wrapping in which a
pesticide or devise is enclosed for use or consumption, in order to protect children
and adults from serious injury or illness." Id. § 25w(c)(3). If the product bears
false or misleading statements on its label or its graphic representation, businesses
will be subject to both civil and criminal penalties. See id. § 136L
123. See Clean Air Act (CAA) §§ 101-618, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 401-767 1q (1994).
124. See id. § 7541(c)(3)(C). The pertinent text of CAA reads:
Effective with respect to vehicles and engines manufactured during
model years beginning more than 60 days after December 31, 1970 ...
the manufacturer shall by means of a label or tag permanently affixed to
such vehicle or engine that such vehicle or engine is covered by a certifi-
cate of conformity issued for the purpose of assuring achievement of
emissions standards prescribed under section 7521 of this title. Such la-
bel or tag shall contain such other information relating to control of mo-
tor vehicle emissions as the Administrator shall prescribe by regulation.
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on "ozone detrimental" goods;125 (3) participation in the national
recycling and emission reduction program for ozone-depleting sub-
stances; 126 (4) education and certification for servicers of automo-
bile air conditioners; 127 and (5) elimination of nonessential
products containing chloroflurocarbons (CFCs).128 The Solid
Waste Disposal Act also includes an environmental marketing direc-
tive. 129 By requiring lubricating oil to bear a statement urging re-
cycling, EPA helps promote the minimization of hazardous
waste. 130 Finally, through its Office of Pollution Prevention and
Toxics, EPA has published numerous studies and issued guidance
on environmental labeling.13 1
Id. Likewise, the statute makes it unlawful "for any manufacture of a new motor
vehicle engine ... to sell or lease any such vehicle or engine unless . . . a label or
tag is affixed to such vehicle or engine in accordance with section 7541(c) (3) of
this title." Id. § 7522 (a) (4) (A).
125. See CAA § 202, 42 U.S.C. § 7671j(a) (stating "[t]he Administrator shall
promulgate regulations to implement the[se] labeling requirements").
126. See CAA § 608, 42 U.S.C. § 7671g(a) (1) (permitting EPA to "promulgate
regulations establishing standards and requirements regarding the use and dispo-
sal of class I substances during the ... disposal of appliances and industrial process
refrigeration").
127. See CAA § 609, 42 U.S.C. § 7671h(d)(1). The pertinent text of CAA
reads:
Each person performing service on motor vehicle air conditioners for
consideration shall certify to the Administrator either.. . that such per-
son has acquired, and is properly using, approved refrigerant recycling
equipment . . . and that each individual authorized by such person to
perform such service is trained and certified; or ... that such person is
performing such service at an entity which serviced fewer than 100 motor
vehicle air conditioners in 1991.
Id.
128. See CAA § 619, 42 U.S.C. § 7671i(b) (stating "[tihe regulations under
this section shall identify nonessential products that release class I substances into
the environment.., and prohibit any person from selling or distributing any such
product, or offering any such product for sale or distribution in interstate
commerce").
129. See Solid Waste Disposal Act §§ 1002-1012, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k
(1988).
130. See id. § 6914a (stating "[f] or purposes of any provision of law which re-
quires the labeling of commodities, lubricating oil shall be treated as lawfully la-
beled only if it bears the following statement, prominently displayed: 'DON'T
POLLUTE-CONSERVE RESOURCES; RETURN USED OIL TO COLLECTION
CENTERS'").
131. See generally EPA ON ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING TERMS, supra note 1 (dis-
cussing effects of environmental marketing terminology on consumers); Environ-
mentally Preferable Products, supra note 26 (guiding Executive Agencies in
identification and acquisition of environmentally preferable products); EPA Gui-
dance on Recycle, supra note 23 (guiding legislators on use of terms "recycle" and
"recyclable" and recycling emblem in environmental marketing claims); U.S. EPA,
supra note 1 (discussing effects of environmental marketing terminology on con-
sumers); EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36 (discuss-
ing life-cycle assessment methodology and its effectiveness in environmental
1998]
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From the start, EPA urged the implementation of a Life Cycle
Assessment (LCA) program. 132 The Agency most recently set forth
an approach to aid consumers with the identification and acquisi-
tion of environmentally friendly products. 13 3 Although its stated
certification programs); U.S. EPA, THE USE OF LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT IN ENVIRON-
MENTAL LABELING (EPA 742-R-93-003) (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter EPA ON LIFE CY-
CLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY] (discussing conceptual framework for life-cycle
impact analysis); EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120 (compiling factual state-
ment as to all environmental labeling programs initiated by both government and
private entities); CLI, supra note 26 (initiating labeling project to foster pollution
prevention, empower consumer choice, and improve consumer understanding of
environmental labels).
132. See EPA ON LIFE CYcLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 3
(stating "[i]n the last three years a major effort nationally and internationally has
been undertaken by... [EPA] . .. to develop the tool of [life-cycle assessment]").
For a general discussion of EPA's implementation and use of life-cycle product
assessments, see supra notes 115-16 & 131 and infra notes 156-66 & 203 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of life-cycle product assessments in the context of
eco-labeling, see infra notes 239-88. For a general discussion of ISO's implementa-
tion and use of life-cycle product assessments, see infra notes 315-28 & 330 and
accompanying text. For a definition of life-cycle assessment methodology, see infra
note 241. See also Howett, supra note 2, at 411-14 (discussing EPA stronghold on
life-cycle assessment); Grodsky, supra note 5, at 218-24 (touting life-cycle analyses
as holistic view of environmental effects of products). See generally Wynne, supra
note 2 (weighing pros and cons of environmental certification marks and critiqu-
ing various applications of life-cycle analyses). Wynne points out that "because
[life-cycle assessments] have suffered from a lack of methodological consistency,
several initiatives - led most notably by the Society of Environmental Toxicology
and Chemistry (SETAC) [have been proposed for the purpose of] harmoniz[ing
life-cycle assessment] methodology." Id. at 66. Accordingly, Wynne notes the
three key components to a life-cycle assessment: (1) inventory; (2) impact; and (3)
improvement. See id.
The first "I," life-cycle inventory (LCI), attempts to quantify the amounts
of resources consumed and emissions and wastes released throughout the
life-cycle of a given product or process. The second is impact analysis,
which seeks to identify, characterize, and value the potential environmen-
tal and health impacts associated with the quantities calculated in the
LCI. The third "I," improvement analysis, employs the information gen-
erated from either or both of the first two components to design system
changes that reduce the environmental burdens throughout the life-
cycle.
Id.
133. See Environmentally Preferable Products, supra note 26 and accompany-
ing text. From a life-cycle perspective, this guidance implicates seven guiding prin-
ciples that must be addressed by purchasers. See id. at 50,728-729. These
principles are as follows: (1) environmental preferability considerations should be-
gin right from initial acquisition of the product; (2) environmental preferability is
a function of many attributes; (3) "environmental preferability should reflect life-
cycle considerations of products and services;" (4) "environmental preferability
should involve the weighing of various environmental impacts among products;"
(5) environmental preferability should be tailored to local conditions where ap-
propriate; (6) "environmental objectives of products or services should be a factor
in competition among vendors where appropriate;" and (7) agencies need to ex-
amine product attribute claims carefully, taking into consideration who made the
claim and how the information was derived. Id.
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purpose is to provide background research for executive agencies,
the report evidences EPA's intention to take a more active and in-
fluential role in environmental marketing regulation.134
EPA's Office of Air and Radiation created an environmental
marketing and labeling program to foster energy conservation. 135
Under its Energy Star Program, EPA teams up with manufacturers
willing to meet EPA standards for the purpose of promoting the
production and use of energy-efficient equipment. 13 6 As a general
rule, EPA signs a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with its
Energy Star partner outlining the responsibilities of each party. 137
134. See id. at 50,722-23. The following excerpt indicates EPA's intention to
take a more active role in environmental marketing regulation:
EPA intends this proposed guidance to serve as a broad framework for
acquisitions involving environmentally preferable products or services.
Following the issuance of this broad, umbrella guidance, EPA intends to
issue more specific guidance on certain product categories. Product cate-
gories could include not just common supplies but also services, facilities
and/or systems .... EPA plans to use a public process to develop the
product category-specific guidances.
Id. at 50,723. For a listing of areas in which EPA is authorized to regulate the
environmental market, see supra note 26. For a listing of EPA studies on environ-
mental labeling, see supra note 131. For an in-depth discussion of EPA environ-
mental labeling programs, see supra notes 22-27 & 106-33 and infra notes 135-52
and accompanying text. For further discussion of EPA's eagerness to take a more
operative role in environmental marketing, see supra notes 22-27 & 108-18 and
accompanying text.
135. See Chuck Payne, U.S. EPA Energy Star Programs and Products (last
modified Sept. 17, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/energystar.html> (outlining basics
of EPA's Energy Star Programs). With the induction of its Energy Star Partnership
progam, EPA has taken a huge step into the environmental marketing regulation
arena. Like other environmental certification groups, EPA has approved the use
of a seal-of-approval. See Payne, supra. For the purpose of preventing consumer
confusion between its logo and those of other certifiers, EPA has federally regis-
tered its Energy Star logo according to the terms of the Lanham Act. See id. See
also Barnett, supra note 12, at n.86. The logo may be described as follows: "a half-
sun, under which is the word 'energy' in script and then a star." Barnett, supra
note 12, at n.85. For further discussion of EPA's logo, see also U.S. EPA, ENERGY
STAR OFFICE EQUIPMENT: INTRODUCING ENERGY STAR LABELED OFFICE EQUIPMENT
(EPA 430-F-95-129) (February 1997) [hereinafter ENERGY STAR OFFICE EQUIPMENT]
(describing Energy Star eco-logo). Underneath the sun and star appear the words
"EPA Pollution Preventer." See id.
136. See Payne, supra note 135; EPA, Computer Manufacturers Launch Program to
Introduce Energy-Efficient Personal Computers (EPA 92-R-125) ENVTL. NEws June 17,
1992, available in 1992 WL 192408; Exec. Order No. 12,845, 48 C.F.R. 1523.7000-01
(1996), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 8262g (1994 & Supp. 1997) (stating "[t] he Adminis-
trator of General Services, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the De-
fense Logistics agency, each shall undertake a program to include energy efficient
products in carrying out their procurement and supply functions"); ENERGY STAR
OFFICE EQUIPMENT, supra note 135.
137. See Payne, supra note 135; EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 136-
38 (providing detailed summary of EPA's Energy Star Computers Program).
Under a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), "each participating company
has agreed to introduce computers, monitors, or printers that switch to a low
19981 167
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EPA stamps complying partner businesses with its Energy Star ap-
proval logo and, soon thereafter, publishes a list of certified prod-
ucts and companies. 13 8 To keep industry and consumers abreast of
modernization processes, the Agency provides access to compliance
manuals and publications and prepares promotional materials for
circulation. 139
One type of voluntary Energy Star partnership program, Green
Lights, encourages businesses to switch to energy-efficient light-
ing.140 Under this program, private sector partners agree to up-
grade the energy efficiency of ninety percent of its lighted square
footage within five years. 141 Similarly, makers of energy-efficient
computers may display an EPA-endorsed logo if they participate in
the Energy Star Office Products Program and provide EPA with the
results of a self-test.' 42 EPA's Buildings Program promotes cost-ef-
fective, energy-efficient improvements in existing commercial and
industrial buildings. 43 Partners agree to reduce utility-generated
power state when left idle." Id. at 136. As of February 1997, EPA boasts signed
partnership agreements with industry-leading manufacturers representing 85-95%
of the office equipment market. See ENERGY STAR OFFICE EQUIPMENT, supra note
135; Barnett, supra note 12, at 503-04 & n.84 (summarizing Energy Star Office
Equipment Program).
138. See Payne, supra note 135. See, e.g., EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note
120, at 136-38 (providing detailed summary of EPA's Energy Star Computers Pro-
gram and stating " [ c] ompanies that market qualifying products may use the EPA
Energy Star logo to identify those products. EPA emphasizes that the purpose of
the Energy Star logo is to promote energy efficiency only, and that EPA does not
endorse any particular product").
139. See Payne, supra note 135.
140. See U.S. EPA, GREEN LIGHTS PROGRAM: THE GREEN LIGHTS PROGRAM
(EPA-430-F-97-042) (March 1997) [hereinafter GREEN LIGHTS]. As of March 1997,
the program had 2,400 participants. See id. The following groups from all over the
country have joined forces with EPA to use energy-efficient lighting: "corporations
of all sizes, small businesses, nonprofit organizations ... federal, state, and local
government agencies, [h] ealth care facilities, universities and colleges, and restau-
rant and hotel chains." Id. See also Barnett, supra note 12, at 503-04 & n.84 (sum-
marizing Green Lights Program); Payne, supra note 135 (introducing internet
users to EPA's Green Lights Program).
141. See Payne, supra note 135. See also GREEN LIGHTS, supra note 140 (provid-
ing overview of EPA Green Lights Program). Green Lights participants "agree to
appoint an implementation manager to oversee [the participants'] progress in the
program, and to report at least annually to EPA on their upgrade progress." Id.
142. See Payne, supra note 135. For a discussion of EPA's Energy Star Office
Products Program, see supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text. For a descrip-
tion of the Energy Star logo, see supra notes 135.
143. See U.S. EPA, ENERGY STAR BUILDINGS: INTRODUCING THE ENERGY STAR
BUILDINGS PROGRAM (EPA 430-F-97-042) (March 1997) [hereinafter ENERGY STAR
BUILDINGS]; Comments on Energy Star Buildings Program, supra note 26 (describ-
ing new Energy Star Program and soliciting comments). EPA asks participants to
upgrade their buildings according to a 5-stage implementation strategy that takes
advantage of system interactions and enables owners to achieve additional energy
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emissions by reducing the energy consumed in designated build-
ings. 144 Other EPA Energy Star programs include: Homes; Resi-
dential Heating, Ventilating and Air Conditioning (HVAC); Exit
Signs; Small Businesses Program; and Transformers. 145
"Reinvention" is EPA's newest philosophy for carrying out its
mission.146 From this modern vision sprang the Consumer Label-
ing Initiative (CLI), a pilot project focusing on three principle
product categories: (1) indoor insecticides; (2) outdoor lawn and
garden pesticides; and (3) household hard surface cleaners. 147 In
March 1996, EPA began working cooperatively with a task force,
made up of federal and state agencies, industry partners and other
interested groups, to discover consumers' problems and dissatisfac-
tions with current labels and to improve labeling techniques. 148
savings while lowering capital expenditures. See ENERGY STAR BUILDINGS, supra.
The five stages are as follows: (1) Green Lights; (2) Building Tune-Up; (3) Heat-
ing, Ventilating, and Air Conditioner (HVAC) Load Reductions; (4) Fan System
Upgrades; and (5) HVAC Plant Improvements. See id.
144. See Comments on Energy Star Buildings Program supra note 26, at
55,715; ENERGY STAR BUILDINGS, supra note 143; Payne, supra note 135. In July
1995, 24 companies completed the five-step program. See ENERGY STAR BUILDINGS,
supra note 143 (stating "[t]he completed buildings averaged 28% energy savings,
27% cost savings and prevented 33,000 tons of [carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide,
and nitrogen dioxide], pollutants that contribute to acid rain, smog, and global
time change").
145. See Payne, supra note 135 (noting Residential HVAC Program involves
manufacturers who "agree to manufacture and market high efficiency heating,
cooling and control products"). Use of the Energy Star label will help consumers
differentiate between standard efficiency and high efficiency products. See id.
Through the Energy Star Transformer Program, electric utilities sign agreements
to "purchase cost-effective, high-efficiency transformers for their distribution sys-
tems .... and manufacturers agree to produce and market Energy Star Transform-
ers to electric utilities." Id.
146. Consumer Labeling Initiative, What is the CLI? (last modified Oct. 29, 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/labeling/readmel.html> [hereinafter What is the
CLI?]. Under its reinvention philosophy, EPA proposes to: focus on improved
environmental results while allowing flexibility in how results are achieved; share
information and decision-making with all stakeholders; create incentives for com-
pliance with environmental requirements; and lessen the burden of complying
with environmental requirements. See id.
147. See id. For a general discussion of EPA's CLI project, see also CLI, supra
note 26. EPA emphasizes that it does not intend to "duplicate the efforts of the
Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)" but does intend to add CPSC to
the CLI Task Force. Id. "Specifically, EPA is not planning to propose regulatory
changes to non-pesticide household product labeling which is already under the
purview of [other agencies]." Id. (referencing FTC Green Guides).
148. See CLI, supra note 26 (noting Members of Task Force include represent-
atives from: CPSC, FTC, Food and Drug Administration, Vermont Agency of Natu-
ral Resources, California Office of Environmental Health and Hazard Assessment,
American Association of Pest Control Officials, and Forum of State Tribal Toxic
Actions). The Task Force will assist EPA in: (1) gathering and dissecting input
from diverse stakeholders; (2) probing consumers to aid in the improvement of
current environmental, health and safe use labels; and (3) reviewing current litera-
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EPA indicated that such research would aid the Agency's Adminis-
trator in implementing necessary label changes.1 49 During the
summer of 1996, Agency representatives conducted a literature re-
view and carried out primary qualitative research. 150 According to
EPA predictions, interim label improvements and additional re-
search on major issues will continue throughout 1998.151
C. After the Chips Have All Fallen, Who Will Remain?
Little by little, EPA has chipped away at ETC control of envi-
ronmental marketing regulation. 152 Since the inception of FTC
ture and expanding current understanding of consumer-related product labeling.
See id. See generally What is the CLI?, supra note 146.
149. See generally CLI, supra note 26; What is the CLI?, supra note 146.
150. See What is the CLI?, supra note 146. For a complete discussion of the
initial findings of the CLI project, see CONSUMER LABELING INITITATWVE PHASE I
REPORT (EPA/IAG DW-75937254-01-2) (Sept. 30, 1996) [hereinafter CLI PHASE I
REPORT]. A summary of EPA findings in the CLI Phase I Report includes the
following:
Consumers interviewed... tended to use product labels on an as-needed
basis. Three factors appeared to influence label usage overall. One fac-
tor was familiarity with a product. The more familiar the respondents
were with a product, the less likely they were to read the label .... A
second factor that affected label usage was the perception of risk of the
product to the user, children, pets or the environment, which depended
on the product risk. If a product was considered to be potentially harm-
ful if used improperly, the respondents were more likely to look at the
label before using it than if they did not perceive the product to be partic-
ularly toxic. A third factor that appears to affect label usage is the per-
ceived ease or difficulty in using the product, regardless of the type of
product.... Certain parts of the label tend to be read more often than
others. Since the front panel of the label.., is displayed on the market
shelf, it is the first thing consumers see, and the first information custom-
ers refer to. ... The storage and disposal section was the least read of all
the label sections. Correct storage was considered common sense and in
most cases the product was disposed of in the trash without wrapping or
recycl[ing].
Id. at 79-80. The CLI Phase I Report indicates that even despite the growing social
concern and environment awareness, "consumers are not very knowledgeable
about basic environmental facts." Id. at 80. In addition, the CLI Phase I Report
suggests that regardless of the fact that misuse of products is the leading cause of
injury, consumers perceive little or no threat from use and disposal of household
products. See id. EPA recommendations for future environmental marketing regu-
lation include: (1) further research; (2) label improvements; (3) consumer edu-
cation of environmental labeling; and (4) policy procedural improvements for
environmental label regulation. See id. at 87.
151. See generally What is the CLI?, supra note 146; CLI, supra note 26; CLI
PHASE I REPORT, supra note 150.
152. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 500-03 (outlining EPA's emerging role in
environmental marketing activities); Environmentally Preferable Products, supra
note 26 (defining and distinguishing terms set out in FTC Guides I); CLI, supra
note 26 (continuing attempts to improve consumer understanding of environmen-
tal consumer product labels); Payne, supra note 135 (discussing Energy Star Pro-
gram in which EPA creates and awards its own certification logo to energy efficient
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Guides I and the advent of the Clinton Administration, FTC has
held firm to its case-by-case enforcement procedures and non-bind-
ing policies, 53 and EPA has sought to educate consumers, monitor
marketers and protect the environment through its new "reinven-
tion" vision. 154 In light of the response to current environmental
marketing regulatory approaches, there is little doubt that most af-
fected parties advocate uniform regulations or guidelines. 15 5 While
manufacturers); EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120 (providing comprehen-
sive outline of all EPA environmental labeling programs). For a discussion of cur-
rent EPA efforts to regulate the environmental market, see supra notes 22-27 &
105-51 and accompanying text. For a listing of EPA studies on environmental mar-
keting and labeling, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of FTC's adoption of and stronghold on case-by-case
enforcement procedures, see supra notes 12-16 & 58-79 and infra notes 155-66 &
288-98 and accompanying text.
154. For a discussion of EPA's efforts to regulate the environmental market,
see supra notes 22-27 & 105-51 and accompanying text. For a listing of studies EPA
has conducted on environmental labeling, see supra note 131.
155. See HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89. According to Mr. Bud Colden of the
National Recycling Coalition, "a significant number of consumers are mistrustful
of environmental marketing claims ... [a] nd [regulators and marketers] need...
to maximize the elimination ... of that mistrust of the consuming people or these
environmental marketing claims [will self-destruct]." Id. at 65. Ms. Mary Griffin
from the Attorneys General Task Force advocated a partnership program between
regulators and manufacturers making environmental marketing claims "to provide
specific information that will foster the local programs ... [and] allow people to
make reasonable environmental decisions." Id. at 70. Mr. Richard Denison of En-
vironmental Defense Fund stated: "I still see, on numerous products, totally un-
qualified claims of recyclability and, in fact, rarely do I see claims that use the kinds
of terms that are outlined in the [FTC G]uides [I].... [T] here needs to be infor-
mation provided to the consumer that is actionable." Id. at 87-88. Mr. Mark Mur-
ray with Californians Against Waste felt that, at least with respect to qualified
environmental claims, "FTC guidelines [I] are too open-ended." Id. at 104. Mr.
Peter Bunten of American Forest and Paper Association stated that "any significant
changes in [FTC Guides I] . . . would likely [cause us to] find ourselves back at a
number of disparate proposals within each state to do their own thing once again."
Id. at 106. Mr. Kevin Duke from Ford Motor Company indicated support for na-
tional guidelines, but cautioned against inflexible application. See id. at 116, 231,
298 (referencing inconsistencies in "recycling" definitions and standards across
United States). Moreover, Mr. Chris Taylor from OSPIRG advocates national stan-
dards that carry the "force of law." Id. at 126 (pointing out that six states may enact
local legislation as a result of lack of strong federal standards).
In response to requests for comments on FTC Guides I, FTC received a myr-
iad of responses. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel L. Jaffee, Association of National
Advertisers, Inc., to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 28,
1995) (on file with author) (advocating uniform, national, comprehensive envi-
ronmental marketing standards); Letter from John F. Waski, Managing Director,
The New Consumer Institute, to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission
(Sept. 8, 1995) (on file with author) (suggesting FTC guidelines adopt life-cycle
analysis and harmonize with ISO efforts); Letter from Donald R. Theissen, Ph.D.,
Director, 3M Corporate Product Responsibility, to the Secretary of the Federal
Trade Commission (Sep. 29, 1995) (on file with author) (same); Letter from Wal-
ter J. Foley, General Manager, Federal Relations, Steel Recycling Institute, to the
Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with author)
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it is unclear which agency will prevail as victor of this jurisdictional
"war," it is indisputable that compromise must come before unity.
Environmental advertising policymakers need expertise in the
dissimilar fields of environmental and consumer protection. Be-
cause no one agency is proficient in both fields, current regulatory
attempts have proven ineffective.1 56 FTC, perceiving environmen-
tal policy beyond the scope of its rulemaking power, has focused
efforts on the prevention of deceptive environmental marketing.' 57
(urging adoption of FTC Guides I at state government level); Letter from Hubert
H. Humphrey, III, Attorney General of Minnesota, Representing National Associa-
tion of Attorneys General, to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission
(Sept. 28, 1995) (on file with author) (pointing out FTC Guides I have fallen short
of eliminating all environmental marketing problems and articulating definitional
changes); Letter from Ford Motor Company, to the Secretary of the Federal Trade
Commission (Sept. 28, 1995) (on file with author) (suggesting voluntary guide-
lines and definitions will more likely foster industry self-regulation of environmen-
tal claims); Letter from Harry Sullivan, Senior Vice President and General
Counsel, Food Marketing Institute, to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with author) (arguing FTC Guides I have promoted
national consistency in environmental marketing arena); Letter from Norman L.
Dean, Green Seal, to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 18;
1995) (on file with author) (suggesting FTC Guides I without force of law are
insufficient to prevent misleading environmental claims); Letter from Charles R.
McDuff, Ecolab Inc., to the Secretary of the Federal Trade Commission (Sept. 21,
1995) (on file with author) (arguing FTC Guides I are effective in current format);
Letter from J.A. Bailey, Occidental Chemical Corporation, to the Secretary of the
Federal Trade Commission (Sep. 22, 1995) (on file with author) (same).
156. See HEARINGS 1995 supra note 89, at 246 (statement of Mr. Richard Deni-
son of Environmental Defense Fund) (arguing that he "do [es] believe that a nice,
clean line can be drawn between the consumer deception aspect of this issue and
the environmental policy or benefit aspect. They are intimately intertwined and
cannot be disentangled"). See also Grodsky, supra note 5, at 172-78 (describing
FTC's solo approach as impotent); Barnett, supra note 12, at 507-10 (suggesting
joint EPA and FTC endeavors are more likely to succeed than individual efforts);
McClure, supra note 23, at 1375-76 (stating FTC should not regulate environmen-
tal market because it does not have " 'teeth' in terms of an environmentally con-
scious enforcement strategy"); Welsh, supra note 5, at 1022-27 (noting United
States' need for uniform regulations and FTC's inability to promote national
harmony).
157. See, e.g., Petitions FTC Guides I, supra note 14; FTC Guides I, supra note
17; ETC Guides II, supra note 9. See also Federal Trade Commission, Statement of
Regulatory Priorities, 61 Fed. Reg. 62,211 (Nov. 29, 1996) (discussing role of FTC
and its participation in regulating environmental marketing). FTC suggests that
[it] is an independent agency charged with protecting American consum-
ers from 'unfair methods of competition' and 'unfair or deceptive acts or
practices' in the marketplace. The Commission strives to ensure that
consumers benefit from a vigorously competitive marketplace; it does not
seek to supplant competition with regulation.... The Commission is,
first and foremost, a law enforcement agency.
Id. Since FTC's first attempts at regulating the environmental market, FTC Com-
missioner Azcuenaga articulated that such efforts were outside the scope of the
Commission's congressional mandate. See Azcuenaga Will Not Endorse FTC Green
Guides, supra note 20, at 777. FTC Chairman Janet Steiger and Commissioner Ros-
coe B. Starek, III, both have fervently prompted FTC into regulating the environ-
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However, it is unlikely that FTC can act without concurrently pro-
moting environmental policy goals. Why, then, has FTC continued
to shoulder this burden alone? Despite an arguable lack of general
statutory mandate in the green marketing arena, EPA has at-
tempted to influence green marketing and consumer labeling
agendas.1 58 Although the Agency has direct authority over federal
environmental policy and a great deal of expertise in defining tech-
nical environmental terms, its mission is not to manage advertising
claims.1 59 Thus, a cooperative regulatory scheme that involves both
agencies will best suit the effective regulation of green marketing.
Detailed binding rules are a prerequisite to establishing "mini-
mum threshold requirements" and to "securing affirmative disclo-
sures. ' 160  As such, EPA and FTC should develop a joint
mental market. See id. For further discussion of Azcuenaga, Starek and Steiger's
positions, see supra notes 20, 68, 113 & 117-18 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion of the areas in which EPA has attempted to influence
environmental marketing regulation, see supra notes 22-27 & 105-51 and accompa-
nying text. For a listing of environmental labeling studies conducted by EPA, see
supra note 131. See, e.g., EPA Guidance on Recycle, supra note 23 (discussing EPA
task force attempts to define FTC Guides I environmental terminology). Although
EPA is limited to a consultative role regarding general environmental labeling is-
sues until such time as Congress expands EPA's jurisdiction in this area, EPA has
chosen not to sit idle and wait for Congressional mandate. See id. See also CLI,
supra note 26 (discussing EPA efforts to study effect of product labels on pollution
prevention, consumer choice, and consumer understanding of environmental con-
sequences and health risks); Payne, supra note 135 (discussing contracting with
public sector and reduction of energy inefficiencies for environmental advertising
benefits). For a discussion of EPA efforts to define environmental marketing
terms, see supra notes 26, 113-16 & 131-34 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of CLI, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text. For further dis-
cussion of EPA's Energy Star Programs, see supra notes 135-45 and accompanying
text. For a listing of EPA guidance reports on environmental marketing and label-
ing, see supra note 131 and accompanying text.
159. See FTCA §§ 1-26, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1994) (granting to FTC authority
to regulate deceptive advertising claims). EPA, however, has direct authority over
environmental policy. See HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89 (outlining argument of
Mr. Richard Denison of Environmental Defense Fund that EPA's technical exper-
tise is necessary in setting green marketing standards); Hearings on Environmental
Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong. 240, 56 (1991) (statement of Mr. Richard
A. Denison, Environmental Defense Fund); Carol W. Browner, Introduction to EPA
(last modified Oct. 17, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/epahome.epa.html> (outlin-
ing EPA's authority and mission). Aptly put, "the agency with enforcement exper-
tise lacks the appropriate mission, and the agency with the mission lacks
enforcement authority." Grodsky, supra note 5, at 176.
160. Grodsky, supra note 5, at 173. Grodsky points out that "[t]he debate over
minimum threshold requirements illustrates the FTC's reluctance to become in-
volved in environmental policy issues." Id. The following discussion clarifies the
current minimum threshold debate:
The primary issue is whether new standards for environmental advertis-
ing should incorporate minimum requirements to encourage improve-
ments in manufacturing behavior, or whether they should simply require
1998]
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program.161 In view of its environmental policy mandate, technical
expertise and regulatory experience, EPA should spearhead these
joint efforts by setting standards and defining terms based on cur-
rent scientific evidence. 162 Moreover, FTC should incorporate
EPA's determinations into interpretive rules under the rulemaking
procedures of section eighteen of FTCA. 163  Although the
Magnuson-Moss Act has hardened the Commission against such
disclosure of existing percentages of component materials or other infor-
mation.... Several state laws and proposed federal standards require a
threshold level of recycled content to be met before a related advertising
claim can be made .... New and proposed laws also have established
minimum threshold recycling rates for products advertised as recyclable,
minimum durability requirements for allegedly reusable and refillable
products, and minimum percentage waste reduction requirements for
comparative claims.
Id. at 173-74. FTC Green Guides do not contain minimum threshold require-
ments. See FTC Guides I, supra note 17; FTC Guides II, supra note 9. For a discus-
sion of EPA's view on minimum content standards, see EPA Guidance on Recycle,
supra note 23, at 49,995 - 996. Between FTC's case-by-case enforcement and volun-
tary guidelines, it will take an extremely long time to secure affirmative environ-
mental claims. For a critique of FTC's case-by-case enforcement approach, see
Welsh, supra note 5, at 1007-11. Without detailed binding rules, deceptive green
marketing will likely continue. For an in-depth discussion of minimum threshold
requirements, see HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89, at 59, 79, & 82-113.
161. See Hearings on Environmental Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before the Sub-
comm. on Environmental Protection of the Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d
Cong. 240, 56-57 (1991) (statement of Mr. Richard A. Denison, Environmental
Defense Fund) (discussing similar context in which FTC and FDA teamed up to
develop guidelines for nutritional and health labels). For further discussion of the
FTC/FDAjoint-agency program, see supra notes 104 & 159-60 and infra notes 209
& 219-20 and accompanying text. The problem with the development of nutri-
tional labels was that FTC spearheaded the efforts. FTC was without technical ex-
pertise and relied on case-by-case enforcement of its guidelines. See Welsh, supra
note 5, at 1011. If FTC promulgated binding trade rules and EPA defined the
necessary terms, joint effort in the environmental marketing context should prove
successful. For a discussion of the author's joint-agency proposal, see infra note
346 and accompanying text.
162. See Environmentally Preferable Products, supra note 26, at 50,722 (dis-
cussing Executive Order 12873 and its requirement that EPA make determinations
on environmentally preferable products); EPA Guidance on Recycle, supra note
23, at 49,994 (discussing Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) defini-
tions and why they are applicable to environmental marketing context); Browner,
supra note 159 (articulating directives of EPA). EPA Administrator Carol W.
Browner explains EPA's mission as follows: "In December of 1970, the . . . [EPA]
was created to solve the nation's urgent environmental problems and to protect
the public health." Browner, supra note 159. See also Barnett, supra note 12, at
507-10 (arguing for joint EPA and FTC program with EPA at helm).
163. See FTCA § 18(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(1994). For the pertinent
text of FTCA, see supra notes 62-63. This provision grants FTC the authority to
issue interpretative rules and general statements of policy with respect to unfair or
deceptive acts or practices. See id. For a complete discussion of FTC trade regula-
tion rules, see generally Richards, supra note 36.
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procedures, interpretive rules are key to providing fair notice to the
regulated community.
164
FTC's use of EPA technical standards to scrutinize deceptive or
unsubstantiated claims, along with its reliance on EPA expert ad-
vice, will facilitate and hasten Commission enforcement. With ac-
cess to EPA's LCA analyses of regulated products, the Commission
164. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improve-
ment Act (FTCIA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-48 (1994). FTCIA endorses FTC's legislative
rulemaking authority but directs FTC to follow additional procedural safeguards.
See id. Such safeguard procedures include preparing and publishing regulatory
analyses of proposed rules, delineating reasonable alternatives to proposed rules,
and reviewing FTCIA rulemaking efforts carefully. Grodsky, supra note 5, at n.170
(citing BARRY B. BOYER ET AL., TRADE REGULATION RULEMAKING PROCEDURES OF THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A REPORT TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES (1979)). FTCIA amendments were likely instrumental in
FTC's eventual abdication of trade regulation rules. See Grodsky, supra note 5, at
177-78 & n.170 (noting "hybrid rulemaking procedures and extensive preliminary
and final cost-benefit analyses [mandate]" has led to downturn in trade regulation
rules since 1970s). For a comprehensive discussion of FTC rulemaking procedure
in light of the FTCIA, see Patka, supra note 67, at 47. Patka considered whether
FTC Green Guides "are actually binding legislative rules that the FTC issued unlaw-
fully [in an attempt to sidestep] Magnuson-Moss Act rulemaking requirements."
Id. at 47. Patka explains:
[T]he courts determine as a matter of law whether a particular rule is
voluntary or binding. Thus, the green marketing standards may consti-
tute mandatory regulations even though the FTC itself claims that they
are only voluntary guidelines.... [I]f the agency creates new law, rights,
or duties, the agency pronouncement is a legislative rule.... The FTC
surely possesses the authority to offer voluntary guidance on what manu-
facturers should do to comply with existing false advertising proscrip-
tions.... [However,] the mandatory language employed by the FTC in
the guidelines clearly indicates that the agency has defined specific acts as
false advertising and imposed new duties upon industry in the realm of
environmental marketing... without following the stringent Magnuson-
Moss Act rulemaking procedures.
Id. at 49. Patka concludes that FTC Green guides are, therefore, susceptible to
legal challenge. See id. Patka's observations find support in Commissioner
Azcuenaga's Dissenting Statement to FTC Guides I:
Basic to the exercise of the responsibility of my office is the obligation to
act within the authority conferred on that office and, as I understand that
obligation, it is not satisfied by forecasting that a challenge is unlikely or
by deferring to the courts to decide or review whether the exercise lies
within the bounds of the authority.... [M]y obligation is to decide in the
first instance and without regard to prevailing political climate in which
that decision will be received. As I read the law, the Commission has no
authority to issue these guides, as written, without first employing the
rulemaking procedures of Section 18(b) (1) of the FTC Act, which it has
not done.
AZCUENAGA DISSENTING STATEMENT, supra note 20, at 1-2. Commissioner
Azcuenaga suggests that if "the Commission prefers the more definitive language
because it wants to be definitive about what is or is not deceptive, then it... runs
squarely into the problem that it is in fact issuing rules rather than guides." Id. at
6. It seems that FTC's non-binding green marketing guidelines have engendered
confusion in regulators as well as consumers.
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may more readily determine the deceptiveness of a marketing
scheme.1 65 EPA's embrace and FTC's implementation of this pains-
taking life-cycle inquiry will positively enhance the reliability and con-
sumer comprehension of "green" claims. 166 As a result, the
regulated community will benefit from a national policy and an in-
tegrated regulatory program.
165. For a discussion of life-cycle product assessment methodology and its sig-
nificance in the environmental marketing context, see supra notes 115-16 & 131-32
and infra notes 166, 203, 239-88, 315-28 & 330 and accompanying text. For a more
complete discussion of life-cycle product assessment methodology, see EPA ON
LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131; EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND
LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36. For explication of cradle to grave life-cycle
product assessment, see infra notes 239-88 and accompanying text. For further
discussion of the applicability of life-cycle product assessment methodology in
green marketing, see Wynne, supra note 2, at 64-94; Grodsky, supra note 5, at 218-
24; Howett, supra note 2, at 411-13, 423-26; Richards, supra note 36, at 235. For a
definition of life-cycle product assessment, see infra note 241.
166. See HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89, at 40946. Mr. Norman L. Dean of
Green Seal remarked:
The rest of the world and the... [EPA] are all moving toward the multi-
ple attribute life cycle approach as reflected in the environmentally pref-
erable product draft guidance that recently came out. This is the future,
these multi-attribute claims, because they provide more information to
consumers and because the evidence from 20 years of experience in Eu-
rope is that these programs which use a life cycle prospective on the
world can help improve the environment.
Id. at 414-15. An alternate view was expressed by Mr. Pat Layton of American For-
est and Paper Association:
I think, therefore, that in the international standards community and in
our minds at AFPA, we recognize the value of the life cycle inventory to
basically be an accounting, a mass energy balance accounting process, to
give you information about a cradle to grave aspect of a product. It has
very good usefulness in product design and helping you understand how
your product can be made better ... but it is not ready for I think the
kind of advertising [aspects associated with eco seals].
Id. at 420-21. Mr. Keith Scarborough with the Association of National Advertisers
pointed out that if FTC employed life-cycle analyses, they would be outside their
congressional mandate and injecting environmental policy into the marketplace.
See id. at 422. Ms. Eun-Sook Goidel explained EPA's consensus on how life-cycle
analyses should be performed and expressed her views on FTC Guides I. "I think
the FTC can and should provide some guidance on how [life-cycle] claims [by
manufacturers] should be made. I think the challenge is how to do this in such a
way so that the consumers are not misled, but also without being too restrictive so
that it shuts the door on the whole evolution of this tool that has I think a lot of
promise." Id. at 430-31. Mr. Arthur Graham of Free Flow Packaging Corporation
proposed that manufacturers be banned from making life-cycle claims "until such
time as some Government body has established the standards." Id. at 433. See also
Letter from Norman L. Dean, Green Seal, to the Secretary of Federal Trade Com-
mission (Sept. 18, 1995) (on file with author) (suggesting one of FTC Guides I
failures is rejection of life-cycle analyses). According to Mr. Dean, "Green Seal
believes that [FTC Guides I] do not address a potentially misleading aspect of
claims.... We refer here to claims for single attributes of products... where such
claims are not based on a life-cycle approach identifying the product's key environ-
mental attributes." Id.
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A. California, New York, Washington and Maine: It's a Hard
Enough Life, for Us
To help combat deceptive trade practices, most states have en-
acted their own versions of FTCA. 167 These measures are collec-
tively referred to as "little FTC acts."1 6s Like FTCA, state statutes
aim at the curtailment of misleading advertising through such en-
forcement mechanisms as injunctions, civil fines and criminal pen-
alties. 169 Some state laws even permit consumers to proceed
directly against manufacturers to recover damages and attorneys'
fees. 170 Since the accession of green consumerism and FTC's
heightened interest in pursuing deceptive advertisers, state attor-
neys general have increasingly employed their respective states' stat-
utes to environmental claims. 17' NAAG compiled and published
167. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17500-09 (West 1997); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ch. 93A, § 2 (1997); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 63 (12) (McKinney 1997); N.Y. GEN.
Bus. LAW §§ 349-50 (McKinney 1997); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.826
(West 1997).
168. See Israel, supra note 28 (referring to state deceptive advertising statutes
as "little FTC Acts").
169. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17535, 17535.5, 17536; MASs. GEN.
LAWS ch. 93A § 4; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAws § 350d; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.47.
Massachusetts' statute is a good example of a state deceptive advertising statutory
scheme:
Whenever the attorney general... believe [s] that any person is using or
is about to use any method, act, or practice declared by section two to be
[unfair], and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may
bring an action in the name of the commonwealth against such person to
restrain by temporary restraining order or preliminary or permanent in-
junction the use of such method, act or practice .... Any person who
violates the terms of an injunction or other order issued under this sec-
tion shall forfeit and pay to the commonwealth a civil penalty.
MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 93A § 4.
170. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 93A §§ 9-11; N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAws § 350(e);
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.50. The Texas statute reads, in pertinent part:
In a[n unfair competition] suit . . . each consumer who prevails may
obtain: (1) the amount of economic damages found by the trier of
fact .... (2) an order enjoining such acts or failure to act; (3) orders
necessary to restore to any party to the suit any money or property, real or
personal, which may have been acquired in violation of this subchapter;
and (4) any other relief which the court deems proper. . . . Costs and
fees [and] other relief shall be assessed against the defendant.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 17.50 (b).
171. See generally Stephen Gardner, How Green Were My Values: Regulation of
Environmental Marketing Claims, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 31, 35 (1991) (discussing state
practice of environmental marketing regulation); Don J. DeBenedictis, Protecting
Consumers, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 38 (discussing new green marketing phenome-
non and state regulatory attempts). Gardner discusses numerous early cases in
which states attempted to regulate deceptive environmental marketing according
to their own deceptive advertising laws. See Gardner, supra. In an attempt to
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multistate guidelines for the enforcement of "little FTC acts" in its
Green Report J1.172 Responding to perceived inaction by federal
regulators, the report inspired individual state approaches to envi-
ronmental marketing regulation. 173
The medley of state legislation varies both in scope and rigor-
ousness. While a majority of states have continued to address green
claims under their unfair competition acts, 174 a few have aban-
doned this truth-in-advertising approach for one more market-ori-
demonstrate the extent of public protection against deceptive environmental ad-
vertising in 1990, Gardner discusses Mobil Oil's marketing of Hefty trash bags,
American Enviro Products, Inc.'s "biodegradable" disposable diapers, Chelsea In-
dustries, Inc.'s plastic trash bag advertisements, Alberto-Culver Company's "ozone-
friendly" aerosol products, Tetra-Pak, Inc's drink boxes, Bristol-Myers Squibb Com-
pany's "ozone-safe" aerosol products, and Procter & Gamble Company's "compost-
able" disposable diapers. See id. at 46-50.
172. See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 113, at 4-24. In November 1989, the
Attorneys General of California, Florida, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, New
York, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin formed an ad hoc task force to
study the problems of unregulated green marketing claims. For a discussion of
NAAG's mission, see GREEN REPORT I, supra note 4 and accompanying text. In
November 1990, the task force issued The Green Report: Findings and Prelimi-
nary Recommendations for Responsible Environmental Advertising. See id. After
input from manufacturers, consumers and environmental groups, the task force,
joined by Tennessee's Attorney General, modified Green Report I and released a
set of revised guidelines in May of 1991. See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 113.
173. See GREEN REPORT II, supra note 113 (discussing individual state regula-
tory approaches to environmental marketing). The report contains both general
recommendations calling for specific, substantive and well supported environmen-
tal claims, and explicit recommendations for the appropriate use of terms such as
"recycled," "compostable" and "degradable." See id. These guidelines are meant to
facilitate the uniform application of state deceptive trade practices laws by. attor-
neys general in all states, and to provide guidance to manufacturers distributing
products in a wide geographic area who want to ensure that their green claims do
not violate any state's law. See id. The following is NAAG's guideline concerning
use of the term "recyclable":
Unqualified recyclability claims should not be made for products sold na-
tionally unless a significant amount of the product is being recycled every-
where the product is sold. Where a product is being recycled in many
areas of the country, a qualified recyclability claim can be made. If con-
sumers have little or no opportunity to recycle a product, recyclability
claims should not be made.
Id. at 25. The task force also recommended that "companies desiring to promote
their products' recyclability set up 800 numbers so that consumers can find out if
recycling facilities exist near them." Id. For further discussion of NAAG's findings
in its Green Reports, see supra notes 4, 16, 80, 115 & 210 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (West 1996); MICH. COMP.
LAws § 19.418(3)(1)(dd) (1996); Wis. STAT. § 100.295 (1997); Wis. ADMIN. CODE
§ 137.01 (1997). Three other states have enacted environmental marketing stat-
utes with the intention of regulating green claims in a truth-in-advertising manner:
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5 (West 1997); IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2 (1996); R.I.
GEN. LAws § 6-13.3-4 (1996). For a discussion of the states' application of their
"little FTC acts" to green marketing, see supra notes 170-73 and accompanying
text. For a more complete discussion of the application of state deceptive advertis-
ing laws to green marketing, see Gardner, supra note 171, at 45-51.
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ented. 175 These few favor the use of logos to reward salutary
manufacturing efforts, monitor misleading advertising and bolster
consumer awareness. 176 Hoping to eliminate the trade-disrupting
aspect of conflicting state laws, legislators aligned their truth-in-ad-
175. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 49-833 (1996) (implementing public educa-
tion program and official recycling emblem); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-25 5c (1994)
(adopting official state recycling symbol for use in conjunction with consumer
products); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/6a (West 1996) (developing nationally recog-
nized recyclable logo and public education and awareness campaign); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2525 (West 1997) (focusing on education awareness and litter con-
trol); NEV. REV. STAT. § 444A.110 (1995) (developing public education program to
"increase public awareness of the individual responsibility of properly disposing of
solid waste and encouraging public participation in recycling, refuse and waste
reduction"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 149-N:1-6 (1995) (adopting international
three-arrow recycling emblem); N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAw §§ 27-0401, 27-0717
(McKinney 1996) (implementing consumer education program and establishing
official state recycling emblem); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 368.1 (1996)
(same); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1502.01-11 (Banks-Baldwin 1996) (adopting con-
sumer education and awareness program); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6619, 6621
(1995) (requiring marketers to supply state government with information concern-
ing recyclability of products and packaging); WASH. REv. CODE § 43.21A.520
(1996) (developing "environmental excellence awards program that recognizes
products that are produced, labeled, or packaged in a manner . . . ensur[ing]
environmental protection").
176. For examples of state statutes following a more market oriented ap-
proach, see supra note 175. See also EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120 (sum-
marizing Vermont's Household Hazardous Product Shelf Labeling Program).
EPA reports:
The . . . [Vermont Household Hazardous Product Shelf Labeling Pro-
gram's] purpose is to promote toxic use reduction and pollution preven-
tion by educating consumers about the dangers of household hazardous
products, and encouraging them to consider alternatives.... By prompt-
ing consumers to avoid purchasing such products, the program's goal is
to send a signal to manufacturers to produce less hazardous products.
This in turn would result in a cleaner environment and less costly waste
disposal bills for the state.
Id. at 168. The program has three components: retailer "shelf-talker" cards identi-
fying hazardous products and products free of certain hazardous materials, re-
tailer training, and informational posters and brochures containing background
information on products. See id. The pertinent text of the Vermont statute is as
follows:
To the extent funds are available, the secretary of natural resources shall,
in consultation with Vermont retailers ... establish a program to:
(1) provide information to retailers with respect to the hazardous prod-
ucts ... and alternatives to those products;
(2) approve labels for retail use with respect to the hazardous products.
(3) provide pamphlets for consumers, to be made available by retailers at
the point of sale, describing the toxicity of these hazardous products and
alternative products;
(4) require that retail establishments have these labels in place on
shelves, or in the immediate vicinity of hazardous products, within nine
months of the establishment of the program.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6621.
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vertising ordinances with FTC Guides 1.177 As evidenced by the en-
actment of FTC Guides II, it is the Commission's malleable
definitions that stand in the way of nationally uniform
guidelines. 178
Viewing environmental marketing as a branch of unfair trade
practice law, Michigan and Wisconsin identify environmental
claims as potentially false or misleading advertising. 179 Both states
use the definitions in FTC Guides I to determine which marketers
have acted deceptively.180 Similarly, Maine replaced its waste reduc-
tion, recycling and labeling statute with one faulting marketers who
do not couch their environmental claims within FTC Guides I ex-
amples. 181 Three other states extensively define environmental
marketing terms, but permit adherence to FTC Guides I as a de-
fense.18 2 The state of California, for example, requires substantia-
177. See Letter from Harry Sullivan, Senior Vice President and General Coun-
sel, Food Marketing Institute, to the Secretary of Federal Trade Commission
(Sept. 29, 1995) (on file with author). No state has yet updated its laws to comport
with FTC Guides II. For a discussion about the states' alignment of their environ-
mental marketing statutes with FTC Guides I, see supra notes 28-33 & 140-76 and
infra notes 178-87 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., supra notes 34-35 and infra notes 183-84 & 235-38 and accompa-
nying text (discussing California's strict statutory scheme). All states with statutes
in conflict with FTC Guides I conformed their laws to the guidelines. As such, the
1996 amendments to FTC Guides I placed conforming states out of step with the
Commission. It is likely that many states adapted their laws on the belief that FTC
would soon issue binding interpretive rules. Since FTC has kept its green guides
non-binding, states may now feel free to regulate. Furthermore, because Congress
has not preempted the area of environmental marketing, states may decide to in-
dependently issue stricter statutes or enforce their current ones more rigorously.
179. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 19.418(30) (1) (dd) (1996). The pertinent provi-
sion reads:
Unfair, unconscionable, or deceptive methods, acts, or practices in the
conduct of trade or commerce are unlawful and are defined as follows:
(dd) . .. representations by the manufacturer of a product or package
that the product or package is .. . recycled, recyclable, degradable, or is
of a certain recycled content, in violation of [FTC Guides I] for the use of
environmental marketing claims published by the [F]ederal [T]rade
[C] ommission.
Id. See also Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 137.01 (1997).
180. See MICH. COMP. LAws § 19.418(30)(1)(dd) (employing FTC Guides I
definitions to determine which environmental marketing schemes are deceptive);
Wis. ADMIN. CODE § 137.01 (same). For the pertinent text of the Michigan statute,
see supra note 179. For a discussion of other states conforming their environmen-
tal marketing laws to FTC Guides I, see supra notes 28-33, 140-76 & 178-80 and
infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
181. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 2142 (West 1996). For the pertinent
text of the Maine statute, see supra note 30.
182. See, e.g. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17580.5 (West 1997); IND. CODE § 24-5-
17-2 (1996); R.I. GEN. LAws § 6-13.3-4 (1996). The Indiana statute reads:
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tion of such terms as "environmental choice," "ecologically
friendly," "environmentally lite" and "green product."183 Federal
conformance, however, will have little effect on California's envi-
ronmental regulatory scheme, because FTC Guides I & II are lim-
ited to a few common terms.1 84 On the other hand, the recently-
enacted FTC Guides I defense will significantly affect Rhode Is-
land's statutory ban of such terms as "degradable," "biodegradable,"
"photodegradable" and "environmentally-safe. 1 85 The safe-harbor
provision in Indiana's environmental marketing statute sweeps
broadly.186 By sanctioning environmental representations that har-
monize with any enforceable federal agency regulation, Indiana
reduces the inflexibility associated with controlling environmental
marketing.1 87 Unlike other truth-in-advertising measures, this pro-
vision leaves enough room for federal developments and simultane-
ously promotes national uniformity.
It is a violation of this chapter for any person to represent that any con-
sumer good which the person manufacturers or distributes or its package
is "ozone friendly," "biodegradable," "compostable," "photodegradable,"
"recyclable," or "recycled" unless that consumer good or its package
meets the definitions contained in this chapter or meets definitions estab-
lished in trade regulations or guides adopted by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion or in enforceable regulations adopted by another federal agency
expressly for the purpose of establishing standards for environmental ad-
vertising or representations.
IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2(b) (emphasis added). Significantly, Indiana harmonizes its
law with not only FTC, but also any other federal agency that garners jurisdiction
to regulate the environmental market. Id. Such a flexible statute will withstand
any changes Congress may make with regard to regulation of environmental mar-
keting. For further discussion of Indiana's statutory scheme, see infra notes 186-87
and accompanying text.
183. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17850.5. For the pertinent text of the Califor-
nia statute, see supra note 29. For further discussion of California's statutory
scheme, see supra notes 34-35 and infra notes 184 & 235-38 and accompanying
text.
184. See FTC Guides I, supra note 17; FTC Guides II, supra note 9. For the
pertinent text of FrC Guides I and II, see supra notes 14-21 & 80-105 and accompa-
nying text. See also Coffee, supra note 1, at 306-11 (providing close look at Califor-
nia's environmental marketing framework); Barnett, supra note 12, at 506
(considering breadth of California's statute and Lungren's effect on other environ-
mental marketing statutes).
185. See R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 6-13.3-4 (1996). FFC Guides I & II permit environ-
mental claims as long as such claims comport with predetermined Guide examples
or are substantiated by empirical data. See FFC Guides I, supra note 17; FFC
Guides II, supra note 9. By allowing FTC conformance as a defense, Rhode Island
permits some claims that were previously banned by the state. See R.I. GEN. LAWS
§§ 6-13.3-4. For further discussion of FTC Guides' affect on Rhode Island's envi-
ronmental marketing scheme, see Barnett, supra note 12, at 506.
186. See IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2. For the pertinent text of the Indiana statute,
see supra note 182.
187. See IND. CODE § 24-5-17-2. For the pertinent text of the Indiana statute,
see supra note 182.
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Recognizing the growing public awareness and concern for the
environment, many states choose to regulate the demand for green
products by educating consumers and labeling merchandise. 188
Although New Hampshire adopts the "international three arrow re-
cycling emblem"' 89 and Rhode Island mandates creation of a dis-
tinctive recycling logo, 190 both states identify unauthorized use of
their marks as per se unfair and deceptive trade practices. 19 1 Like-
wise, Connecticut endorses a state-sponsored logo that denotes re-
cycled and recyclable materials. 192 Numerous states couple their
official "recycle" emblems with programs that enhance consumer
awareness.'93 Leading the way, New York allows manufacturers to
use the "international chasing arrows symbol" in conformance with
the examples set forth in FTC Guides 1.194 While neither Vermont
nor Ohio officially adopts state labels, they set forth comprehensive
training programs for waste reduction, consumer education and
188. For a list of states regulating green advertising through consumer educa-
tion programs, see supra note 175. New York's consumer education scheme in-
cludes the following:
[T] he bureau [of waste reduction and recycling] shall establish an official
state recycling emblem and conduct a consumer awareness program....
Such emblem shall be of a design to include terms or symbols for "New
York State", and "recyclable" and/or "recycled" and/or "reuseable."
... The bureau shall implement and conduct a program of public educa-
tion and information to inform the public and private sectors of the state
as to the merits of the use of secondary materials and for consumers to
actively seek consumer products which contain secondary materials or
which are easily recycled or reused.
N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAw § 27-0717 (McKinney 1996).
189. See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:1 (1995).
190. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.8-3(a) (1996).
191. See R.I. GEN. LAws § 23-18.8-3(c); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 149-N:3.
192. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-255c (1994).
193. See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. § 49-833 (1996); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/6a
(1996); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 2525 (West 1996); NEv. REv. STAT. § 444A.110
(1995); N.Y. ENv-rL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-0401, 27-0717 (McKinney 1996). For the
pertinent text of New York's statutory scheme, see supra note 188. For further
examples of states following a more market-oriented approach, see supra notes
188-201 & infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text. Arizona's statute reads as
follows:
[T]he department . . . [of Solid Waste Management] shall implement
and conduct a program of public education and provide information to
increase awareness of individual responsibility for properly reducing and
disposing of solid waste and to encourage participation in recycling, re-
use and source reduction. The program shall communicate the impor-
tance of conserving natural resources, of avoiding harm to the
environment or public health and of promoting resource conservation,
recovery and reuse by industry, this state, municipalities and counties.
AIuz. REv. STAT. § 49-833.
194. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAw § 27-0717; N.Y. COMp. CODES R. & REGs.
tit. 6, § 368.1 (1996). For the pertinent text of the New York consumer education
statute, see supra note 188.
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market development.1 95 New Mexico, Virginia and Texas have lim-
ited their labeling regulation to organic products, but Florida per-
mits substantiated environmental claims to appear on product
labels. 196
Washington, alone, has implemented an "environmental excel-
lence awards program" that "recognizes products ... produced, la-
beled, or packaged in a manner that helps ensure environmental
protection. 1 1 97 State logo programs have the advantages of admin-
istrative flexibility and increased federalism. 198 However, placing
product certification in the hands of local government muddies the
waters for all affected parties: consumers, manufacturers and regu-
lators.199 While Washington's certification program is meritorious
195. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6619, 6621 (1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 1502.01-11 (Banks-Baldwin 1996). For a discussion and the pertinent text of
the Vermont statute, see supra note 176. According to the Ohio statute, "[t]he
chief of recycling and litter prevention shall establish and implement statewide
waste reduction, recycling, recycling market development, and litter prevention
programs that include... the following: ... [elducation and training concerning
recycling and products manufactured with recyclables; [and p]ublic awareness
campaigns to promote recycling." OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1502.03.
196. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 76-22-1-27 (Michie 1996); TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.§§ 18.001-10 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-385.1-8 (Michie 1996); FLA. STAT.
ch. 403.7193 (1996). The Florida statute reads in pertinent part:
Any person who represents in advertising or on the label or container of
a consumer product that ... [it] is not harmful to, or is beneficial to, the
environment through the use of such terms as "environmentally
friendly," "ecologically sound," "environmentally safe," "recyclable," "re-
cycled," "biodegradable," "photodegradable," "ozone friendly," or any
other like term must maintain records documenting and supporting the
validity of such representation.
FLA. STAT. ch. 403.7193.
197. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21A.520 (1996).
198. See HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89, at 447-523 (discussing eco-logo pro-
grams in general); EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120 (summarizing bulk of
environmental labeling programs); EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PRO-
GRAMS, supra note 36 (discussing effectiveness of implemented programs). State
logo programs have the advantages of flexibility and increased federalism. Since
the state itself crafts the standards against which it evaluates green products, it may
adopt provisions that are tailored to local problems existing within its borders. By
distributing power to the states, regulation of environmental claims may more
readily meet local demands. There are no FTC guidelines or binding rules to re-
strict such state efforts. See generally FTC Guides I, supra note 17; FTC Guides II,
supra note 9. State programs may, however, prove problematic. Consider the com-
ments of Mr. Lewis Freeman of SPI: "The interesting dilemma with eco seals is that
if you take it to its logical conclusion, I think you could actually end up denying
the public certain kinds of information because ultimately judgements would be
made for the public, and they could lead to being misled in perhaps an unin-
tended way, but nonetheless misled." HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89, at 488. The
very confusion Mr. Freeman is talking about may result from inconsistent, individ-
ual state programs.
199. For a discussion of why uniformity is necessary in the environmental
marketing context, see supra notes 1-47, 97-105 & 152-66 and infra notes 209, 289-
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on its face, it may ultimately prove problematic for marketers desir-
ing a national advertising scheme. The cost, hassle and potential
consumer confusion associated with meeting different state stan-
dards may pose a serious obstacle to environmental marketing.200
Other concerns include: (1) the interplay between Washington's
standards and FTC's definitions and examples; 20 1 (2) potential re-
strictions on the flow of interstate commerce; 20 2 (3) product "excel-
lence" discrepancies as a result of ISO's and EPA's use of LCA
analyses;203 and (4) product comparisons.20 4
98 & 329-46 and accompanying text. See generally Welsh, supra note 5 (advocating
federal preemption for environmental marketing regulation); Barnett, supra note
12 (supporting joint-agency program with EPA and FTC at helm).
200. For a discussion of the problems associated with meeting many states
standards, see supra notes 1-47, 97-105 & 152-66 and infra notes 209, 289-98 & 329-
46 and accompanying text.
201. See WASH. REV. CODE § 43.21A.520. Washington's statute does not
reproduce standards against which it measures its products. It may prove problem-
atic if Washington's standards are vastly different from those discussed in FTC
Guides II. For a discussion of FTC Guides II examples and definitions, see supra
notes 14-21 & 80-105 and accompanying text.
202. See U.S. CONsT. art. I § 8 (stating "Congress shall have the Power... to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes"). The Supreme Court established that this grant of power to
Congress does not preclude all state regulation that affects such commerce. See
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 302-05 (1851). Even though
there is no provision explicitly prohibiting states from burdening interstate com-
merce, the Court viewed the negative implication of Article I's grant of commerce
power as a constitutional basis for invalidating certain state legislation. See id. at
318. Washington should, therefore, keep a close eye on potential restrictions to
the flow of interstate commerce that result from its statutory scheme. If its envi-
ronmental excellence awards program prevents or inhibits the dissemination of
non-Washington products, the Supreme Court may strike the statute as violative of
the dormant commerce clause. This principle is equally applicable to any statutory
scheme whose terms favor in-state manufacturers and marketers.
203. See HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89, at 409-46 (discussing life-cycle analysis
methodology). For a summary of the comments made at FTC Hearings 1995 on
life-cycle analysis methodology, see supra note 166 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of life-cycle assessments, see supra notes 115-16, 131-32 & 165-66
and infra notes 239-88, 315-28 & 330 and accompanying text. Although Washing-
ton does not list its product assessment standards in its statute, one may assume
that Washington chose not to implement life-cycle analyses. Life-cycle analysis
methodology is a new phenomenon unexplored by most states. Currently, ISO is
developing product assessment standards that take into account the entire life-
cycle of a product. See generally Knight, supra note 44 (providing general explana-
tion of ISO's international environmental standards). EPA has likewise adopted
life-cycle assessment methodology. See Environmentally Preferable Products, supra
note 26, at 50,722 (advocating life-cycle product assessment as means of determin-
ing environmentally preferable products). Since Washington's environmental ex-
cellence labels will likely not reflect life-cycle analyses, consumers may confuse the
underlying meaning of state labels and those based on life-cycle testing. As such,
Washington, EPA and ISO may not honor the same two products. Instead of aid-
ing consumers, multiple labels will ultimately confuse and frustrate them. For a
list of representatives supporting harmonization of FTC Guides I with EPA and
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B. Federal Preemption is the Only Answer
The United States Constitution establishes a limited federal
government, vesting all residual authority not contained within one
of the enumerated powers in the states. Gibbons v. Ogden and the
Supremacy Clause of Article VI make clear that when state and fed-
eral laws conflict, the valid federal law prevails. 2 05 Likewise, if a
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," the federal
government has the power to preempt it.206 Because the non-bind-
ing guidelines issued by FTC do not merit preemptive status, fed-
eral interests are undermined.20 7 The only way to achieve national
uniformity, reduce consumer confusion and encourage product im-
provements is by codifying rules that circumscribe all environmen-
tal marketing. 20 8
ISO life-cycle assessment methodology, see supra notes 12 & 166 and accompany-
ing text.
204. It is important to keep in mind how products compare to one another.
Is Washington awarding its environmental excellence labels on an individual basis?
Or is it comparing products and honoring the "best in class"? It is unclear from
the statutory language. SeeWASH. REV. CODE § 43.21A.520 (1996). The assessment
standards are key in determining the significance of a label. Consumers need such
information to help them make sound purchases. Washington's statute does not
provide the needed guidance. See id.
205. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). "[S]tates may some-
times enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering with, and being
contrary to, an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the [C]onstitution....
Should this collision exist, it will be immaterial whether those laws were passed in
virtue of concurrent power ... or, in virtue of a power to regulate their domestic
trade and police. In [both] case [s] . . . the acts .. . must yield to the law of Con-
gress." Id. at 210. According to Article VI, "the Laws of the United States ... shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby." U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2.
206. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
207. See FTC Guides I, supra note 17, § 260.2; FTC Guides II, supra note 9,
§ 260.2. Both FTC Guides I and FTC Guides II are non-binding. As a result, fed-
eral interests in uniformity of environmental marketing laws and ease of trade are
sacrificed. States may now determine for themselves which standards to adopt,
and companies need only fear the unlikelihood of an FTC cease and desist order.
For a discussion of the impacts of non-binding FTC guidelines, see supra notes 12-
21, 58-79, 113, 117-18 & 155-60 and accompanying text and infra notes 288-98 &
346 and accompanying text.
208. SeeJones, 430 U.S. at 519 (noting that Congress may legislate through its
enumerated powers to preempt state laws). The most successful means of doing this
is to announce one uniform law that is to be followed throughout the country.
Because green marketing regulation would almost certainly effect interstate com-
merce within the broad meaning of the Commerce Clause, Congress necessarily
has the power to preempt state laws that regulate green marketing. The question,
then, is not whether Congress can preempt state laws dealing with green market-
ing, but whether it should do so. For a discussion of the Commerce Clause and
preemption doctrines, see generally Paul Wolfson, Preemption and Federalism: The
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Strong arguments exist on both sides of the preemption issue.
Many argue that federal preemption is justified given FTC's labori-
ous case-by-case enforcement, and that without the state attorneys'
general push, environmental marketing may only be checked by
FTCA.209 On the other hand, the active and resourceful roles of
California, New York and the New England states has proven instru-
mental in achieving their state missions. 210 Considering that state
autonomy includes the enforcement of individual policies and
value judgments, it is arguable that the federal government should
not hamper the crafting of more stringent environmental labeling
standards. The difficulty with this argument is that the dual goals
Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69 (1988). For a discussion of preemption
by administrative agencies, see generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation, Deregula-
tion, Federalism and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation, 46 U.
PITT. L. REv. 607 (1985).
209. See Welsh, supra note 5, at 1005-11 (noting ineffectiveness of FTC's case-
by-case enforcement); Barnett, supra note 12, at 500 (criticizing FTC Guides I for
failure to preempt state regulation and inability to force manufacturers to account
for deceptive practices); FTC Guides I Revisions, supra note 21 (indicating com-
menters on FTC Guides I prefer trade regulation rule to non-binding guidelines);
Hearings on Environmental Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before Subcomm. on Environmen-
tal Protection of the Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong. 240, 56 (state-
ment of Mr. Richard A. Denison, Environmental Defense Fund). See also Welsh,
supra note 5, at 1009 (analogizing FTC dilemma to "Catch 22"). Howett, on the
other hand, feels that "[t] he formation of national guidelines by the FTC will prob-
ably help solve the problem of consumer deception by environmental claims."
Howett, supra note 2, at 461. Howett qualifies his opinion with the following state-
ment: "[i] f the new environmentalism among American consumers is more than a
passing fad, it will be the consumers themselves that force manufacturers not only
to tell them the truth about products, but also to provide consumers with the truly
environmentally-sound products they desire." Id. For a discussion of FTC's
stronghold on case-by-case enforcement, see supra notes 12-21, 58-79 & 155-60 and
infra notes 288-98 and accompanying text. For a critique of FTC case-by-case en-
forcement, see supra notes 12-16, 58-79 & 155-60 and infra notes 288-98 & 329-37
and accompanying text. For a discussion of FTC's "Catch-22," see supra note 21
and accompanying text.
210. For a discussion of the legislative efforts of California, New York and the
New England states in the context of green marketing, see supra notes 28-34 & 167-
201 and accompanying text. Some states have significant expertise in drafting en-
vironmental terms and developing comprehensive green standards. See, e.g., CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17850.5 (West 1997); N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAw § 27-0717
(McKinney 1996). Many individuals feel that, given such noble state efforts, fed-
eral preemption is inappropriate. Others believe that the two levels will work bet-
ter together if the federal government preempts the area of environmental
marketing. See Welsh, supra note 5, at 1018-19 (discussing these two views and
recommending state expertise be harnessed). "States can still play a significant,
influential advisory role by actively commenting on federally proposed definitions
and suggesting improvements in those definitions." Id. at 1019. NAAG's Green
Reports evidence the ability and willingness of states to cooperate in this manner.
See GREEN REPORT I, supra note 4 (providing summary of environmental marketing
problems and guidance to future regulators); GREEN REPORT II, supra note 113
(providing guidance to future regulators). For further discussion of NAAG's find-
ings, see supra notes 4, 16, 79, 113 & 172-73.
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of national uniformity and state autonomy, while both laudable, are
not entirely compatible. 211 After balancing all relevant interests,
the need for domestic uniform regulation overcomes any state ob-
jection to preemption.
While state objections are justifiable, countervailing federal ar-
guments suggest such reasoning is not dispositive. First, uniformity
assures industry that compliance is a realistic goal.2 1 2 The costly
and time-consuming adjustments that manufacturers must imple-
ment in their marketing strategies to meet the myriad of states' laws
often deter companies from becoming environmentally-conscien-
tious.2 13 State statutes ultimately end deceptive advertisements but
do little to promote environmental policy.214 Second, a nationwide
regulatory structure furnishes an entire legislative framework for
states with few resources and less-active enforcement records.215
With such a structure in place, states remain free to exact compli-
ance with the green marketing laws in their independent ways.
211. See Pierce, supra note 208, at 609-13 (discussing dual goals of national
uniformity and state autonomy and opining way in which federal legislation can
serve two disparate interests). For an extensive discussion of federalism and the
values protecting state autonomy, see Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1988).
Welsh suggests that compromise is the most appropriate way to further national
uniformity and state autonomy interests. See Welsh, supra note 5, at 1016 (arguing
for state "implement[ation of federal] green marketing regulations and en-
courage [ment of] state input in the development of green marketing standards").
212. See McClure, supra note 23, at 1377 (pointing out myriad state laws dis-
courage marketers from implementing national marketing schemes and from
manufacturing safer products). McClure notes that unless federal legislation
preempts state environmental marketing laws "states enacting excessively restric-
tive legislation will hamper industry from taking strides toward environmentally
conscious behavior." Id. McClure further explains that industry will view compli-
ance as a realistic goal if there is not the "fear of violating a myriad of states' laws
which use different definitions for the word 'recyclable.' " Id.
213. See id.; Barnett, supra note 12, at 507 (citing Schlossberg, Effect of FJC
Green Guidelines Still Doubtful for Some Marketers, MARKETING NEWS TM, Feb. 1, 1993,
at 1).
214. See Barnett, supra note 12, at 507-08 (suggesting state statutes are too
focused on regulating deceptive advertising and do not adequately address envi-
ronmental policy goals).
215. See generally Merritt, supra note 211. Funding normally available to state
environmental agencies is gravely deficient, given their responsibilities. See id.
The fact that few states have environmental marketing legislation may be due, in
part, to financial constraints. States are on a strict budget, and must allocate funds
to only those programs crucial to the advancement of state objectives. See id. Be-
cause the monitoring and enforcement of deceptive environmental advertising will
require more than just the passing of a law, many will opt for other social pro-
grams. A uniform national plan will correct such problems. For a discussion of
the author's uniform national plan, see infra note 346 and accompanying text. For
a discussion of current state environmental marketing measures, see supra notes
28-35 & 167-204 and accompanying text.
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Third, the gradual globalization of our economy necessitates an
acute eye toward international accord on environmental matters. 216
Increasingly, ISO efforts and treaty agreements have influenced
United States trade regulation.217 The federal government is in the
best position to monitor progress and implement necessary policy.
Finally, as enforcer of national policy, the federal government is
able to alleviate problems, such as environmental marketing, that
affect the United States as a whole. 218 States inject policy through a
very narrow lens. Violations often unworthy of a state's time and
resources significantly impact the nation as a whole and merit fed-
eral attention.
Drawing on the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, many
scholars and regulators propose plans which would allow states to
legislate where the federal government has not specifically spo-
216. See generally Richards, supra note 36 (addressing international implica-
tions of environmental marketing regulatory measures). Richards observes that:
Just as collaboration between trade and the environment was advocated
at the domestic level, so should it be promoted at the international level.
Concurrent authority between national governments would partially alle-
viate the concerns that major western nations have with reducing their
environmental standards in order to reach international consensus. The
dialogue between governments will be necessary, and therefore any pro-
gram in the U.S. must have the endorsement of the federal govern-
ment .... [I]f consumer and government demand continues to call for
environmentally friendly products, then the marketplace will outpace in-
ternational regulations, which will, in turn, force the negotiators to reach
some form of consensus on the issue.
Id. at 264-65. One may make the comparison between environmental marketing
regulation and copyright protection for digitized information and computer
databases. SeeJ. H. Reichman and Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in
Data?, 50 VAD. L. Rv. 51, 95-112 (1997) (discussing necessity of United States
implementation of international agreement provisions into federal law). The
United States has dragged its feet in legislating exclusive copyrights for digitized
information and computer databases. See id. As a result of the Berne Convention,
however, the United States must implement treaty standards into federal law. See
id. at 110-11. In the event no binding rules are issued in the environmental mar-
keting context, the United States could be faced with a similar game of legislative
"catch-up."
217. See supra note 216 for a discussion of the effect of the Berne Convention
Treaty on trade regulation. For a discussion of ISO efforts in light of NAFTA and
GATT and ISO's influence on the environmental market, see supra notes 43-46
and infra notes 31545 and accompanying text.
218. See Welsh, supra note 5, at 1020. In his explanation, Welsh provides the
following example:
For instance, a company which inappropriately labels its product "bi-
odegradable" may distribute that product in relatively small numbers in
any given state, but its distribution area could be all fifty states. Thus, the
problem may not be worth individual state's time and resources to deal
with. But when federal regulators see that an otherwise minor problem is
actually occurring in all fifty states, it might be more inclined to address
the situation.
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ken.2 1 9 Others look to current environmental statutes and advocate
preemption of state laws that are less strict than federal guide-
lines. 220 Perhaps such minimum regulatory floors are successful
where environmental, health and safety problems remain wholly in-
state; states do not feel cheated out of their autonomy, and federal
standards provide the assurance that social policy is not hindered
by a manufacturer's business.221 The federal government must,
219. See Grodsky, supra note 5, at 181 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 343-1(b) (1992)).
The Nutritional Labeling and Education Act's innovative structure requires pre-
emption but grants exemptions to petitioning states for regulations that: "(1)
would not cause any food to be in violation of any applicable requirement under
Federal law, (2) would not unduly burden interstate commerce, and (3) [are]
designed to address a particular need for information which need is not met by
[federal requirements]." Id. For an in-depth comparison between environmental
marketing guidelines and nutritional labels, see Coffee, supra note 1, at 346-55.
Coffee looks at stylistic and content requirements. He finds two reasons for craft-
ing an "environmental facts" label that is reminiscent of the nutritional label:
"first, the structure and design of the label have already been created and their
user-friendliness has already been tested; and second, the approach is capable of
meeting the [oft-emphasized] goals [of environmental labeling]." Id. at 351.
These goals include:
achieving truthful and accurate environmental marketing; creating an at-
mosphere that provides a continuing incentive for companies to improve
the environmental characteristics of their products; securing consumer
confidence in environmental marketing claims; ensuring consumers'
ability to easily understand environmental marketing claims and discern
between competing products; providing consumer access to the environ-
mental characteristics of products; increasing the consumers' ability to
recycle products or packaging and their access to related information;
promoting products that are less harmful to the environment; and, easing
the strain of regulatory and prosecutorial agencies.
Id. at 350-51. For further discussion of the Nutritional Labeling and Education
Act's impact on environmental marketing regulation, see Hearings on Environmental
Labeling: Hearing on S. 976 Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Protection of the
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 102d Cong. 240, 56 (1991). For a discus-
sion of the affinity between regulation of environmental marketing and of nutri-
tional labeling, see supra notes 104, 156, 159-61 & 209 and infra note 220 and
accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., CAA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (7) (1995); Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) § 114, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9614(a) (1995). CAA reads, in pertinent part:
No emission standard or other requirement promulgated under this sec-
tion shall be interpreted, construed or applied to diminish or replace the
requirements of a more stringent emission limitation or other applicable
requirement established pursuant to section 7411 of this title, part C or D
of this subchapter, or other authority of this chapter or a standard issued
under State authority.
CAA § 112, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(7). CERCLA suggests that "[n]othing in this
chapter shall be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing
any additional liability or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous
substances within such State." CERCLA § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a).
221. See Welsh, supra note 5, at 1020 (discussing impact of statutes with mini-
mum regulatory floors). In federal statutes containing minimum standards, viola-
tions can be quantitatively measured. See id. at 1021 (referencing CAA §§ 307(a),
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however, entirely preempt state action in the green marketing con-
text. Individual state approaches have greatly retarded environ-
mental policy goals, leaving the door open to consumer confusion
and international trade disputes. 222 Because of the difficulty in de-
termining what constitutes a law less stringent than the federally-
enacted standard or what policies federal enforcers have addressed,
the federal government alone should regulate environmental mar-
keting. Without additional federal action, state legislation will con-
tinue to fragment a solid national plan, as well as reignite legislative
uniformity concerns. 223
C. Hurdling the First Amendment
The First Amendment's simple mandate that "Congress shall
make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech" leaves wide lati-
tude for interpretation. 224 Since Justice Holmes pronounced "free
trade in ideas" as the theoretical foundation for freedom of speech,
a marketplace metaphor has dominated Supreme Court analy-
ses.2 25 Given the Court's expansive view of the First Amendment,
some have argued that environmental advertising is a form of pro-
tected speech. 226 The inherent remunerative nature of green mar-
516, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(a) (2), 1375 (1988)). See also Grodsky, supra note 5, at 178-
82 for a discussion of minimum regulatory floors. For further discussion of mini-
mum regulatory floors, see supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of the effect of a myriad of states legislating the environ-
mental market, see supra notes 28-35 & 167-204 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of international trade disputes resulting from lack of uniform national
environmental marketing standards, see supra notes 41-43 and infra notes 273-82 &
340-41 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of why uniform national environmental marketing regu-
lations are necessary, see supra notes 12-21, 58-79, 155-60, 209 & 219-20 and infra
notes 288-98 & 328-37 and accompanying text.
224. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 2.
225. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Holmes:
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas -
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory
of our Constitution.
Id. at 630.
226. See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). Traditionally, the
Supreme Court viewed purely commercial advertising as not entitled to any First
Amendment protection. The Court has changed its view and now maintains that
most types of commercial speech are entitled to some protection. See, e.g., Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
For a more complete discussion of commercial speech in the environmental mar-
keting context, see infra notes 224-38. For a discussion of the Central Hudson stan-
dard for First Amendment protection of commercial speech, see infra notes 232-
34. McClure argues that:
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keting implies that marketers and manufacturers will increasingly
bring First Amendment suits to safeguard their right to manipulate
environmentally-conscious consumers.227
In the landmark case of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Counci422 8 the Supreme Court relaxed its in-
quiry into regulations affecting commercial speech.229 As an
example of this relaxed inquiry, the Court held the overbreadth
analysis and the doctrine of prior restraint inapplicable to commer-
cial speech cases.2 30 The Court further noted that it "fores[aw] no
obstacle to a State's dealing effectively with this problem [of decep-
tive or misleading speech] ."231 Although the Court no longer abso-
truthful environmental advertising... is sure to fulfill the purpose articu-
lated repeatedly in First Amendment cases.... [And, i]f dissemination of
ideas is to be the cornerstone of democracy, it can be argued that this
type of advertising is a particularly beneficial mechanism for informing
the public and fostering environmentally sound practices and values.
McClure, supra note 23, at 1374.
227. For a discussion of the inherent remunerative nature of environmental
marketing, see supra notes 1-8, 12, 89, 155-56, 166 & 198 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the effectiveness of First Amendment suits in the environmental
marketing context, see infra notes 224-38 and accompanying text. For Dr. Seuss'
literary depiction of the encroaching environmental market, see supra note 3. For
Dr. Seuss' literary depiction of manipulated consumers, see supra notes 6-7 and
accompanying text.
228. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
229. See id. In a suit brought by consumers alleging advertisement of prescrip-
tion drugs as unprofessional conduct, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy argued
that commercial speech is not wholly outside the protection of the First Amend-
ment. See id. at 748. The Court supported the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy's
position. See id. Observing that "between the dangers of suppressing information,
and the dangers of its misuse ... the First Amendment makes [the choice] for us,"
the Court permitted competing pharmacists to advertise the terms of their service.
Id. at 770. "What is at issue is concededly whether a State may completely suppress
the dissemination of truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of
that information's effect upon its disseminators and its recipients .... [W] e con-
clude that the answer to this one is in the negative." Id. at 773.
230. See Grodsky, supra note 5, at 187 & n.224-25 (tracing Supreme Court's
rejection of doctrines of overbreadth and prior restraint in commercial speech
context). Grodsky relates that:
[s]ince the Supreme Court first recognized some measure of First
Amendment protection for commercial speech in 1976, the Court has
repeatedly emphasized that this protection is more limited than the pro-
tection of non-commercial speech .... [C]ourts have consistently ex-
cluded overbreadth analysis from commercial speech cases, and the
doctrine of prior restraint has been held inapplicable as well.
Id. at 186-87. The Court in Virginia Pharmacy articulated that the resilience of com-
mercial speech "may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for
fear of silencing the speaker... [and] may also make inapplicable the prohibition
against prior restraints." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24.
231. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. For a summary of the
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lutely excluded commercial speech from First Amendment
protection, it left open the possible justification of content-based
restrictions. Four years later the Court again spoke. According to
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New
York, 232 states may now regulate truthful or non-deceptive commer-
cial speech. 233 Well-conceived environmental labeling will likely
meet the Supreme Court's new four prong test, which asks whether:
(1) the utterance is protected by the First Amendment; (2) the gov-
ernment interest is substantial; (3) the government interest is di-
rectly advanced by the regulation in question; and (4) the
regulation of commercial speech is "no more extensive than neces-
sary to serve the government interests asserted."23 4
In a recent challenge to California's Environmental Marketing
Act, the Ninth Circuit classified the plaintiff advertiser's green rep-
resentations as commercial rather than political speech.2 35 With
232. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
233. Id. at 565-73. The Court in Central Hudson stressed that "if the communi-
cation is neither misleading nor related to unlawful activity, the government's
power is more circumscribed. The State must assert a substantial interest to be
achieved by restrictions on commercial speech. Moreover, the regulatory tech-
nique must be in proportion to that interest." Id. at 565. The Court further held
that "[t]o the extent that the Commission's order suppresses speech that in no way
impairs the State's interest in energy conservation, the Commission's order violates
the First and Fourteenth Amendments and must be invalidated." Id. at 570. For
explication of the test adopted by the Central Hudson Court, see infra note 234 and
accompanying text.
234. Central Hudson Gas & Electric, 447 U.S. at 566. When discussing the first
prong, the Court emphasized that deceptive commercial speech is beyond the
reach of the First Amendment. See id.
235. SeeAssociation of Nat'l Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir.
1994). The following trade associations brought an action against the Attorney
General of California: Grocery Manufacturers of America, Inc., Soap and Deter-
gent Association, National Food Processors Association, The Society of the Plastics
Industry, Inc., The American Paper and Forest Association, The American Adver-
tising Federation, The American Association of Advertising Agencies, The Califor-
nia Chamber of Commerce, and The Chamber of Commerce of the United States.
See id. These trade groups "sought a declaration that section 17508.5 impermissi-
bly restricts both commercial and non-commercial speech and is unconstitution-
ally vague." Id. at 728. The court found that:
California ha[d] asserted an interest in preventing commercial harms, and
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial speech is di-
rectly related to that interest. . . . As the district court concluded,
merchants' commercial representations about the environmental attrib-
utes of their wares are far more likely to mislead consumers than their
editorial commentary opposing the statute or encouraging recycling and
use of biodegradable materials.
Id. at 731. For a discussion of the court's holding in Lungren, see Christine Gower
Mooney, Casebrief, Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren: Green Market-
ing and Its First Amendment Implications: An Honest Approach, 6 ViLE. ENVTL. L.J. 435
(1995). For an in-depth discussion of California's environmental marketing stat-
ute, see Coffee, supra note 1. For a discussion of First Amendment implications of
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the exception of the "recyclable" definition, the statute was up-
held.23 6 The Ninth Circuit emphasized an enfeebled fourth Central
Hudson prong by insinuating that the Supreme Court did not con-
template "the least restrictive means" when it fashioned the require-
ment of "no more restrictive than necessary to further the state's
interest."237 Ultimately, the Circuit Court forestalled potential con-
stitutional challengers. "Although state labeling laws are likely to
survive [future First Amendment attacks, such lawsuits,] whether
well intentioned or designed merely to impede legislative efforts,
may provide an additional incentive for enacting federal environ-
mental labeling legislation. '2 38 In light of the Lungren decision, a
environmental marketing, see Hoch & Franz, supra note 4. For the pertinent text
of California's statute, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
236. See Lungren, 44 F.3d at 737-38. The Ninth Circuit applied the Central
Hudson test and found that California's statutory scheme was not restricted by First
Amendment commercial speech protections. See generally id. "[T]he thresholds
drawn do not appear unduly prohibitive and leave considerable room for both
more privileged editorial commentary and . . .alternative expressions conveying
... information about the modest environmental attributes of products not mea-
suring up under section 17508.5." Id. at 736. Coffee disagrees with the court's
application of the Central Hudson test. See Coffee, supra note 2, at 333-36 (stating
"[t]he decision in National Advertisers ignores the Statute's actual effect upon the
environment and green advertising. The actual effects ...defeat many of the
state's goals and violate the theme of flexibility inherent in the Central Hudson
test"). Coffee suggests that the fit required between the third and fourth prongs of
Central Hudson was not met. See id. at 336. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the
district court and held that California's recyclable definition was unconstitutionally
vague. See Lungren, 44 F.3d at 738. For a discussion of the lower court's opinion in
Lungren and predicted effects of the Lungren decision, see Hoch & Franz, supra
note 4, at 454-64.
237. Lungren, 44 F.3d at 735. In 1989, the Supreme Court clarified that "least
restrictive" alternatives are not required in commercial speech cases. See Board of
Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (applying intermediate scrutiny to com-
mercial speech unless non-commercial messages are inextricably linked with com-
mercial speech). "Applying the Fox test for severability of commercial and non-
commercial speech, the district court reasonably concluded that editorializing was
not essential to product advertising." Lungren, 44 F.3d at 730. For a more com-
plete discussion of the weakening of the "less restrictive means" test as applied to
commercial speech, see Grodsky, supra note 5, at 189-90 & n.238. For a discussion
of Coffee's criticism of the Ninth Circuit's application of Central Hudson to Califor-
nia's environmental marketing scheme, see supra note 236.
238. Grodsky, supra note 5, at 184 (discussing effect of future challengers to
environment marketing statutes). In light of the Lungren decision and the devel-
opment of green marketing regulation, there is a chance that the Supreme Court
will modify its initial rejection of vagueness challenges for commercial speech. For
a discussion of the specificity-vagueness paradox, see Grodsky, supra note 5, at 190-
92. "The rationale behind vagueness claims is that the wording of an ambiguous
statute does not provide fair notice of potential legal action." Id. at 190. "Because
commercial speech falls somewhere between an economic activity and a fully pro-
tected fundamental right, the appropriate vagueness analysis is uncertain." Id. at
191. The Trade Associations attempted to use the criminal nature of California's
Environmental Marketing Statute to bolster their vagueness argument. See Lun-
gren, 44 F.3d at 728 n.1. Rationalizing that the high price of non-compliance in
1998]
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carefully constructed federal statute will likely mount the First
Amendment hurdle. This is all the more reason for constructing
uniform national environmental marketing rules.
IV. PRIVATE CONCLUSIONS
A. Evolution of Third-Party Certification Programs
Touted as the "pioneer" of eco-labels, Germany instituted the
first environmental seal of approval program in 1977.239 Under its
scheme, representatives from union, consumer, industrial and envi-
ronmental organizations comprise an Environmental Label Jury
(ELJ), which scrutinizes public and governmental proposals and de-
velops "green" criteria from meritorious suggestions.2 40 As part of
the criteria development, the Federal Environmental Agency (FEA)
employs a "cradle-to-grave" LCA of each product to determine
which stages result in the most significant environmental im-
criminal cases requires a more demanding standard of certainty, the district court
in Lungren invalidated California's "recyclable" definition. See id. The court felt
that California did not meet the requisite heightened standard. See id. "The judi-
cial practice of adopting narrowing constructions for federal statutes suggests that
a federal labeling law would be less susceptible to time-consuming First Amend-
ment suits than would state laws." Grodsky, supra note 5, at 192.
239. See generally EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note
36 (determining effectiveness of environmental certification and labeling pro-
grams); EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120 (summarizing governmental and
private eco-logo programs); EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra
note 131 (exploring use of life-cycle methodology in eco-logo programs); Wynne,
supra note 2 (discussing Germany's environmental labeling scheme). See also Ray
V. Hartwell, III & Lucas Bergkamp, Eco-Labeling in Europe: New Market-Related Risks?,
15 INT'L ENV'T REP. No. 19 at 623 (Sept. 23, 1992) (discussing Germany's environ-
mental labeling scheme); Elliot B. Staffin, Trade Barrier or Trade Boom? A Critical
Evaluation of Environmental Labeling and Its Role in the "Greening" of World Trade, 21
COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 205 (1996) (summarizing foreign eco-logo programs); Wynne,
supra note 2, at 60-64 (explaining roots of eco-label programs); Richards, supra
note 37, at 241 (endorsing international harmonization in environmental certifica-
tion context).
240. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 44. The Environmental
Labeling Jury (ELJ) is one of three institutions participating in the development
involved in the four-stage award procedure. See id. at 44-45. The other two groups
are "The German Institute of Quality Assurance and Labeling" (RAL) and
"Umweltbundesamt." See id. RAL consists of representatives from 140 private-sec-
tor associations. See id. at 44. The role of the Federal Environmental Agency
(FEA), is "to make the initial decision as to whether a new ecolabel proposal
should be pursued, and if the ecolabel has been approved for further development
by the Label Jury, to carry out the necessary testing and to draft an award criteria
proposal." Id. at 45. See also, EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS,
supra note 36 (discussing effectiveness of environmental labeling programs); Hart-
well & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 632 (noting that "key decisions are made by
[the] independent jury [called Environmental Label Jury (ELJ) ]"); EPA ON LIFE
CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 17 (outlining role of ELJ).
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pacts.241 Examples of final standards include: (1) minimum levels
of energy consumption; (2) utilization of recycled materials; (3)
product biodegradability; (4) prohibition of certain hazardous sub-
stances; and (5) reduced noise levels. 242 Applying criteria to prod-
uct, ELJ ultimately determines which manufacturers may display
the "Blue Angel" logo.243 Since the German government charges a
241. See EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 18.
Germany's Blue Angel Program employs more than 75 criteria to each product
assessed. See id. "While a product's entire life cycle is examined initially in a life
cycle matrix... award criteria cannot be practically based on every attribute that a
product possesses." See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 46. The pur-
pose of Germany's life-cycle assessments is to define the scope of the product cate-
gories, identify the stages of the life cycle, and distinguish the most significant
environmental impacts. EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note
131, at 19. For an overview of "cradle-to-grave" life-cycle analyses, see Wynne, supra
note 2, at 64-72. As Wynne explains, "an LCA is an attempt to evaluate holistically
the environmental effects of a product, package, or process throughout its entire
life, 'beginning with raw materials acquisition, continuing through processing,
materials manufacture, product fabrication, and use, and concluding with any of a
variety of waste management options.'" Id. at 65 (quoting U.S. EPA, Office of
Research and Development, LIFE-CYCLE ASSESSMENT: INVENTORY GUIDELINES AND
PRINCIPLES (EPA/600/R-92/245) 98-99 (Feb. 1993)). For a more complete discus-
sion of the history and breadth of life-cycle analyses, see Mary Ann Curran, Broad-
Based Environmental Life Cycle Assessment, 27 ENVrL. Sci. & TECH. 430 (1993).
Although many evaluators embrace and implement life-cycle product anaylses, few
employ a methodological consistency. See generally id. (arguing for methodological
consistency). As such, product evaluators need to coordinate their efforts and find
a single framework that directs consumers to the same green products. For a dis-
cussion of current attempts at harmonizing life-cycle analyses, see Wynne, supra
note 2, at 66-72. For a critique of current uses of LCAs, see HEARINGS 1995, supra
note 89, at 409-46. See also Letter from Norman L. Dean, Green Seal, to the Secre-
tary of the Federal Trade Commission, (Sept. 18, 1995) (on file with author) (sug-
gesting that one failure of FTC Guides I is rejection of life-cycle analyses). For
further discussion of life-cycle product assessments, see supra notes 115-16, 131-32
& 165-66 and infra notes 242-88, 315-28 & 330. For a definition of life-cycle assess-
ment, see supra note 203.
242. See Wynne, supra note 2, at 60 & n.16.
243. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 46. For a complete expla-
nation about the manner in which ELJ and FEA certify products, see Staffin, supra
note 239, at 225-27. See also EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra
note 131 (detailing certification procedure step-by-step); Hartwell & Bergkamp,
supra note 239, at 624 (outlining process for awarding Blue Angel). EPA's new
Energy Star Program functions in a similar way as Germany's Blue Angel Program.
Teaming up with the private sector, EPA secures environmentally preferrable
products for the consumers in exchange for a compliance stamp of approval. See
Payne, supra note 135. The Energy Star logo is a valuable marketing tool and
serves as the perfect incentive for environmentally-conscientious manufacturing.
The Energy Star Program, however, evaluates only products and services that fit
under certain defined categories, such as computers and lighting. See id. Ger-
many's Blue Angel Program serves all consumer products. See EPA ON GLOBAL
LABELS, supra note 120, at 45. For a complete discussion of EPA Energy Star Pro-
grams, see supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text. For a synopsis of Germany's
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fee to marketers who desire to exploit green consumerism through
product certification, critics argue that FEA's professed LCA is
merely propaganda. 244 Many still hold the program in high regard
even though it remains unclear whether the government monitors
a few or all enviromental impacts from creation to disposal. 245
Both the success of Germany's "Blue Angel" logo and growing
consumer environmental awareness have prompted many Euro-
pean nations to develop their own certification schemes.246 Fearing
economic chaos, the European Union (EU) sought to unify con-
flicting criteria and facilitate product marketing throughout the
continent.247 On March 23, 1992, EU ratified Regulation No. 880/
244. See Wynne, supra note 2, at 60 (explaining imposition of fees); Hartwell
& Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 626-27 (discussing critics complaints). A promi-
nent argument against Germany's Blue Angel Program is that the life-cycle prod-
uct assessments are tainted. Specifically, some suggest that since Germany chooses
the product attributes on which to focus and since Germany charges fees for its
product certifications, there is great chance for manipulation of product analyses.
At this point in time, such criticisms are unfounded.
245. Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 626-27 (using examples to show
that Germany is not employing life-cycle analyses to all impacts). A key complaint
is described as follows:
One major complaint voiced by consumer and producers' organizations
is that the product requirements often include no more than one or two
criteria, although the program is supposed to take the full life cycle of the
product into account. Consumer organizations have also criticized the
product definitions, which they feel do not pay due regard to consumer's
needs and decision-making, but are focused on product-related technical
aspects.
Id. Germany's Blue Angel Program does not require manufacturers to meet a na-
tional environmental standard that deals with the production process. See EPA ON
LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 19. Germany provides
two reasons for omitting the production process from life-cycle assessments: "(1)
analytic methods are frequently unavailable to separate the impacts of products
being considered from the whole manufacturing facility's impacts; and (2) such
manufacturing standards would penalize countries with less stringent environmen-
tal standards and may constitute a trade barrier contrary to GATT regulations." Id.
246. See Wynne, supra note 2, at 60-61. For a general discussion of interna-
tional environmental labeling programs, see supra notes 239-45 and infra notes
247-88 & 31545 and accompanying text. For a list of countries not addressed in
this article that have environmental labeling programs, see text accompanying in-
fra note 259.
247. See Wynne, supra note 2, at 61. The following is a brief synopsis of the
European Union's (EU) environmental labeling program:
The . . . [EU] Eco-labelling program operates through official environ-
mental labelling bodies in the member states and an approval process by
the . . . [EU] Commission, the governing political body of the ... [EU].
Proposals for product categories and criteria are made by member states
to the Commission, which engages in consultation with a Consultation
Forum of interest groups in choosing categories. A category is assigned
to the participating Competent Body in a member state, which drafts cri-
teria for certification. The draft criteria are sent back to the Commission,
which consults with the Consultation Forum, and then sends them to the
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92, creating a continentally harmonious eco-labeling scheme. 248
The objectives of the program are to promote the design, produc-
tion, marketing and use of products which have a reduced environ-
mental impact during their entire life cycle, and provide consumers
with better information on the environmental impact of prod-
ucts. 2 49 Delegates from consumer, industrial and environmental or-
ganizations survey the proposed criteria and submit any needed
changes to the EU Council for a final verdict. 250 While individual
Member States are responsible for evaluating products and award-
ing certification, all EU members must enforce the program in
their own territories. 25 1
Committee of Member States for approval. If approved, they are adopted
by the Commission.
EPA ON LiFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 11. For further
discussion of the EU environmental labeling program, see EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS,
supra note 120, at 98-102; Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 623; Richards,
supra note 36, at 242; Staffin, supra note 239, at 227.
248. See Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 623 (citing Council Regula-
tion No. 880/92 of March 23, 1992, on a Community eco-label award scheme, O.J.
L 99/1 (Apr. 11, 1992)).
249. See Staffin, supra note 239, at 227 (quoting Commission Regulation 880/
92, O.J. L 99/1, 2 (Apr. 11, 1992)). Specifically excluded from the regulations are
food, drink and pharmaceutical products. See id. Because the EU does not have
the power to preempt local legislation, member states may adopt national eco-
labeling initiatives. See Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 623. Different life-
cycle assessment methodology approaches have been used by EU countries. See
EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 12-17. The
United Kingdom performs a "streamlined LCA." See id. at 12.
The "streamlined LCA" methodology does not attempt to quantify every
output from every stage of life cycle, but instead incorporates a screening
step in which "impacts" from certain stages of the life cycle are estimated
or ignored based upon information obtained and judgment by the study
practitioner.
Id. at 12-13. The Danish Environmental Protection Agency conducts "quantitative
and qualitative" life-cycle assessments. See id. at 14. "The Danish methodology dif-
fers.., in its inclusion of the concept of 'hurdles' and 'points'.... 'Hurdles' are
specific criteria that must be met for the award of a label.... The 'point' system
assigns scores to certain environmental attributes ... and sets a maximum total
number of points as a criterion for labelling." Id. at 14. France employs an
"Ecobalance," which examines "life-cycle inventories for every product category for
which labelling criteria are developed." Id. at 16.
250. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 98-102; EPA ON Liw CYCLE
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 11; Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra
note 239, at 623. Collectively, such delegates are referred to as "The Consultation
Forum." See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 98. "The [EU] Commis-
sion consults the [Consultation] Forum members before submitting the draft crite-
ria to the Regulatory Committee of Member States for final approval." Id. For a
summary of the EU environmental labeling program, see supra note 247. For a
thorough narration of certification programs under the EU system, see Staffin,
supra note 239, at 227-30.
251. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 239, at 98. Since the EU program
does not preempt individual programs, it is likely that multiple logos will confuse
consumers and dissuade manufacturers from producing environmentally prefera-
19981
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Germany's environmental seal of approval program sparked
legislation in other areas of the world. In 1988, Canada launched a
voluntary "Environmental Choice" program under the auspices of
its Environmental Protection Act.252 Since Canada emulates Ger-
many's LCAs and qualitative product assessments, its Environmen-
tal Choice program is subject to many of the same problems and
concerns as the "Blue Angel." 253 Japan similarly introduced its
ble products. For a discussion about the problems associated with multiple logos,
see supra notes 174-223. For a discussion of the EU program, see Wynne, supra
note 2, at 61; Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 624; Staffin, supra note 239,
at 227; Richards, supra note 36, at 242. Some commentators remonstrate the
vague product-assessment criteria of EU's environmental labeling program. See
Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 624 (stating regulation does not indicate
how considerations of waste relevance, soil pollution, air and water contamination,
and resource consumption are to be weighted or quantified). According to Hart-
well & Bergkamp, regulation does not define concepts of "clean technology" or
"high level of environmental protection," nor does it indicate how these criteria
are to be applied to specific products. Id. See also Environment: U.S. Proposes Ex-
panding Public Role in National Programs on Eco-Labeling, 13 Ir'L TRADE REP. 1445
(BNA) (Sept. 18, 1996) [hereinafter Protectionism and Eco-Labeling (paraphrasing
Elizabeth H. A. Seiler, Director of Governmental Affairs for Grocery Manufactur-
ers of America, who suggests that eco-labeling programs, like EU program, "pur-
port[ing] to judge the environmental effects of products and packaging, often
favor local manufacturers over foreign competitors"). Such favoritism, suggests
Seiler, will lead to increased trade disputes. See id.
252. For a brief discussion of Canada's Program, see Staffin, supra note 239, at
n.137; EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 50; EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESS-
MENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 27; Wynne, supra note 2, at 62; Richards,
supra note 36, at 241-42; Centre for Environmental Labeling, (visited Oct. 17,
1997) <http://www.interchg.ubc.ca/ecolab/canada.html>. For a catalogue of
other environmental certification programs, see Wynne, supra note 2, at n.20-n.21.
Canada's Environmental Choice Program is a voluntary eco-labeling program
which creates market incentives for manufacturers and suppliers to reduce the
burden on the environment of their products or services. EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS,
supra note 120, at 50.
Scientifically-based criteria are established in order to define good envi-
ronmental performance and set benchmarks for identifying environmen-
tal leaders and innovators in a specific market segment. Scientific,
technical and industrial experts contribute to the development of criteria
which form the basis of [Canada's Environmental Choice Program] tech-
nical guidelines and panel certification. Testing, verification and surveil-
lance procedures ensure that these criteria are met and adhered to by
licensed companies. As the marketplace changes and new technologies
and products emerge, a process of review is in place to revise criteria
accordingly.
Centre for Environmental Labeling, supra. The following four steps describe the
process in which a product or service is certified and its relevant company licensed
under an established Environmental Choice guideline: "(1) Completion of an Ap-
plication; (2) Verification and Testing of the product or service; (3) executing of a
License Agreement; (4) Payment of Annual License Fees." Id.
253. See Staffin, supra note 239, at n.137. Critics of Germany's program
chiefly focus on the implementation of life-cycle assessment methodology. See
Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra note 239, at 627. Since Germany often uses only a few
environmental attributes when it analyzes a product, critics suggest that evaluators
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"EcoMark" logo in 1989.254 Its program may be distinguished from
all others. Foremost, no LCAs are performed; instead, certifiers
award the EcoMark to products which are "inherently environmen-
tal."25 5 Such products are not judged according to their environ-
mental impacts, but whether they form "part of an 'ecological
lifestyle.' ''256 The employment of generalized criteria has ulti-
mately expedited the administrative process: more manufacturers
submit applications; more marks are conferred; and more fees are
collected. 257 While New Zealand's independently-run "Environ-
are not conducting true life-cycle assessments. See id. For further discussion of
Germany's environmental labeling program and its drawbacks, see supra notes 239-
45.
254. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 56. For a brief discussion
ofJapan's program, see EPA ON LiFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note
131, at 34; Staffin, supra note 239, at 227; Richards, supra note 36, at 242; Wynne,
supra note 2, at 62. Japan's program may be summarized as follows:
The program is operated by the Japan Environmental Association (JEA),
a non-governmental organization operating under the guidance of the
National Environment Agency.
Two Committees operate within the JEA: the Promotion Committee and
the Expert Committee. The Promotion Committee is responsible for se-
lecting product categories for labelling and for developing labelling crite-
ria in consultation with the Expert Committee. It is a representative
committee with members from academia, local governments, manufac-
turers and distributers, the Environment Agency, and the National Insti-
tute for Environmental Studies.
The Expert Committee determines whether products qualify for the la-
bel. This committee is more technically based, including representatives
from consumer organizations, local governments, environmental re-
searchers, and technical experts from the Environment Agency and the
National Institute for Environmental Studies. Manufacturers apply to the
Expert Committee submitting relevant information, and the Committee
may request testing by a third party. There is no public comment process
for the setting of criteria or the award of the label to the particular
products.
EPA ON LiFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 34 (citations
omitted).
255. EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 56. Japanese certifiers do not
distinguish the manufacturing processes within a particular product category. See
id. "In this way the logo is used to call attention to products that are part of 'an
ecological lifestyle,' more than to weigh the relative impacts of general consumer
products." Id. The following basic principles are used to define products worthy
of a Japanese EcoMark: "(1) incur a minimal environmental burden when used;
(2) improve the environment when used; (3) incur a minimal environmental bur-
den when discarded after use; and (4) contribute to environmental preservation in
other ways." Id.
256. Id.
257. See Wynne, supra note 2, at 62-63. In summarizing Japan's environmen-
tal labeling program, EPA noted:
Members of the committees do not receive a salary. The government's
Environment Agency acts only to "supervise" the JEA, to advise on both
committees and give "guidance" for the nomination of committee mem-
bers. Although start-up costs were paid by the government, the program
1998]
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mental Choice" program certifies products that are environmen-
tally preferable, the Australian government recognizes products
free of misleading environmental claims.258 Other countries subsi-
dizing green consumerism include: Austria, Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, the United King-
dom, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Finland,
South Korea, India, Singapore and Thailand.2 59
is now self-financed from the fees assessed to licensees. It is the only gov-
ernment-related environmental certification program to be self-financed.
EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 57.
258. For a brief discussion of New Zealand's program, see EPA ON GLOBAL
LABELS, supra note 120, at 82-84; EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY,
supra note 131, at 37-38; Wynne, supra note 2, at 62. New Zealand's Environmental
Choice Program is administered by Telarc, the New Zealand Accreditation Author-
ity for Quality Assurance, Laboratory Testing, and Industrial Design. See EPA ON
GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 82. "The Telarc Council .. .establishes the
criteria for product labelling after receiving recommendations from its Environ-
mental Choice Management Advisory Committee (ECMAC)." EPA ON LIFE CYCLE
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 37. ECMAC is comprised of the
following representatives: "persons with expertise in environmental science, con-
sumer interests, manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, environmental policy, and
environmental improvement." Id.
ECMAC selects product categories for evaluation, and Task Groups con-
sisting of experts of different interests in the relevant field are set up to
develop product criteria. The Task Groups present a draft of criteria to
the ECMAC, which is released to the public, and a public comment pe-
riod is held. The Task Group then revises the criteria based upon the
comments and presents the revised criteria to the ECMAC for approval.
Id. For a brief discussion of Australia's program, see EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra
note 120, at 132-34; Wynne, supra note 2, at 62. The goals of Australia's Environ-
mental Choice Program are "to ensure that 'environmental claims made about
products and services are both meaningful and truthful,' and that 'consumers and
the providers of products and services are educated and informed on the environ-
mental impacts of products and services.' " EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120,
at 132.
Environmental Choice Australia is a voluntary program that gives govern-
ment approval to those product environmental claims that can be tested
and quantified. If a manufacturer and its product pass the required tests,
the product may display the Environmental Choice logo .... Environ-
mental Choice has categoried possible claims as follows:
1) claims that can be quantified;




259. See Staffin, supra note 239, at 220. For a comprehensive summary of
these countries' programs, see EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 64-113.
For a discussion on the effectiveness of certification and labeling programs, see
EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36. For an overview of
life-cycle assessment methodology as applied to environmental certification pro-
grams, see Wynne, supra note 2, at 64-71. For a complete discussion of life-cycle
assessment methodology, see EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra
note 131. For further discussion of life-cycle product assessments, see supra notes
115-16, 131-32, 165-66 & 239-58 and infra notes 260-88, 315-28 & 330.
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Eco-logo fever has caught on in the United States as well.
Although it has shown no desire to initiate a voluntary federal eco-
labeling program, the United States does enjoy the presence of two
major, privately operated, multi-criteria labeling schemes. In 1989,
Green Seal founded the first United States environmental seal of
approval program. 260 Keeping in step with Germany's "Blue Angel"
scheme, Green Seal stamps a certification mark on those products
satisfying predetermined environmental criteria.261 Scientific Certi-
fication Systems' (SCS) "Environmental Report Card" is fundamen-
tally different from all existing eco-logo programs. It quantifies the
environmental attributes of each product from "cradle to grave,"
thus enabling consumers to make their own decisions about envi-
ronmental superiority.262
Green Seal is an independent, non-profit organization dedi-
cated to "protecting the environment by promoting the manufac-
ture and sale of environmentally responsible consumer
products."263 Like government-sponsored eco-labeling systems,
Green Seal accepts proposals from a myriad of interested parties,
260. For a brief discussion of Green Seal's environmental labeling program,
see Introduction to Green Seal, supra note 10; EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120,
at 72-75; EPA ON LiFE CYcLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 30-33;
Grodsky, supra note 5, at 208; Wynne, supra note 2, at 73; Howett, supra note 2, at
448. Green Seal is a non-profit environmental labeling organization that awards
the "Green Seal of Approval" to products that cause less harm to the environment
than other similar products. See Introduction to Green Seal, supra note 10. "Accord-
ing to the Green Seal organization, the program 'helps identify environmentally
preferable products in order to encourage and enable consumers to purchase
such products and reduce their impacts on the Earth.' " EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS,
supra note 120, at 72. The awarding of the Green Seal gives manufacturers an
incentive "to improve the environmental attributes of their products." Id.
261. See Introduction to Green Seal supra note 10. "Before a product gets the
Green Seal, it must pass rigorous tests and meet ... [Green Seal's] stringent envi-
ronmental standards." Id. For a discussion of Germany's Blue Angel Program, see
supra notes 239-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Green Seal's envi-
ronmental labeling criteria, see supra notes 10 & 36-40 and infra notes 263-66 &
271-87 and accompanying text.
262. For a brief discussion of Scientific Certification Systems' (SCS) Environ-
mental Report Card, see EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 144-49; Wynne,
supra note 2, at 73; Howett, supra note 2, at 448; Grodsky, supra note 5, at 208.
Initiated in 1989, SCS' long term program goals are to:
(1) support consumers' efforts to optimize their product choices with 'co-
herent comprehensive environmental information'; (2) provide compa-
nies with independent feedback about the environmental ramifications
of their products; (3) encourage manufacturers' efforts to meet the high-
est environmental standards in product design and production; (4) build
a consensus on what constitutes a significant environmental claim; and
(5) help policy makers to set down effective environmental policy.
EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 144.
263. Introduction to Green Seal, supra note 10.
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conducts LCAs and sets standards. 264 Underwriters Laboratories,
Inc., under contract to Green Seal, applies the criteria to manufac-
turer-applicants' products and contemplates whether the product is
deserving of a certification mark.265 After required fees are paid
and the product is certified, manufacturers may sport the Green
"seal of approval" on their products and capitalize on the market-
ing benefits. 266
264. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 72-75. The development
of Green Seal's environmental criteria involves technical evaluation of the product
category "by Green Seal staff or by outside consultants." EPA ON LiFE CYCLE ASSESS-
MENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 30. Before a draft criteria is adopted, it
undergoes careful review and a period of comments and revisions. See id. "The
testing of products and the monitoring of compliance with certification standards
for those products and manufacturers that apply for and receive the Green Seal is
performed generally by Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. under contract with Green
Seal." Id. Green Seal does not perform life-cycle analyses, per se. See id. Because
of the cost involved and lack of consensus for correct application, Green Seal per-
forms environmental impact evaluations. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note
120, at 73. Environmental impact evaluations "attempt[ ] to identify the most sig-
nificant environmental impacts in each stage of the product's life cycle." EPA ON
LiFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 30. The purpose of envi-
ronmental impact evaluations is to "reduce to the extent technologically and eco-
nomically feasible, the environmental impacts associated with the manufacture,
use, and disposal of products." Id.
265. See EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at 30.
266. See Introduction to Green Seal supra note 10. Green includes certain ex-
planatory clauses in every published standard. The clause explaining Green Seal's
certification process reads as follows:
These Environmental Standards and Criteria contain the basic require-
ments for certain products to be certified by Green Seal, and for their
manufacturers to receive authorization to use the Green Seal Certifica-
tion Mark on products and their packaging, and in product advertising.
The requirements are based on an assessment of the environmental im-
pacts of product manufacture, use, and disposal and reflect information
and advice obtained from industry, trade associations, users, government
officials, environmental and other public interest organizations, and
others with relevant expertise. These requirements are subject to revi-
sions as further experience and investigation may show is necessary or
desirable. Green Seal solicits information and advice on issues associated
with these Standards and Criteria.
Id. Other clauses found in the Standard's Criteria deal with: compliance with the
Standards and Criteria; compliance with government rules; limitations on purpose
of Standard; substantially equivalent products; unanticipated environmental im-
pacts; certification agreement and Green Seal rules; disclaimer of liability; care in
testing; referenced standards; and labeling requirements. See id. The following
example is a Green Seal Standard for reusable utility bags (GS-16):
1). Product-Specific Performance and Environmental Requirements
1. The product must be made of strong and durable material,
which may be reinforced by rivets or other strengthening parts;
2. The product must have a minimum lifetime of 300 uses carrying
typical loads under wet conditions, as tested by performance
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In contrast, SCS' "Environmental Report Card" is a content-
neutral scheme designed solely to convey information to the con-
sumer about a product's significant environmental impacts.
2 67
Rather than comparing similar products, SCS seeks to provide the
environmental equivalent of nutritional labels.2 68 Endorsement of
a product results from the following procedure: (1) industry, gov-
ernmental and environmental groups' proposals metamorphose
into testing categories; (2) SCS conducts a life-cycle "inventory anal-
ysis;" (3) testers assign numerical values to each environmental bur-
den and exhibit the results in a bar graph format; and (4)
manufacturers pay a fee for product testing, but not for certifica-
tion mark licensing.269 SCS requires annual renewal for continued
1. The Green Seal Certification Mark may appear on the packaging
and the product itself.
2. Whenever the Green Seal Certification Mark appears on a pack-
age or product, the product or package must contain a descrip-
tion of the basis for certification. The description shall be in a
location, style, and typeface that are easily readable by the
consumer.
Id. Compare FTC Guides II, supra note 9 (providing guidance on recyclability
claims).
267. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 144-49. "The Environmen-
tal Report Card approach to environmental labeling involves the categorization
and inventory of environmental burdens (such as carbon dioxide emissions or the
amount of hazardous solid waste generated) associated with the life-cycle of an
industrial system related to a specific consumer product." Id. at 144. SCS' Envi-
ronmental Report Card conveys information to consumers in the following format:
"[t] he report card lists these burdens directly, and also provides a bar graph repre-
sentation of these burdens on an exponential scale." Id. The report card also
provides information on the potential range of burdens for all consumer products,
"enabling the reader to compare products not only within the same category, but
across other categories as well." Id. Instead of stamping a certification mark of
approval on evaluated products, SCS's report card allows consumers to evaluate
which criteria are important to them and to purchase products accordingly. A
similar scheme exists in the area of nutritional labels. For a discussion of the appli-
cability of nutritional labels to the green marketing context, see supra notes 104,
156, 159-61, 209 & 219-20 and accompanying text.
268. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 145. SCS ranks each
tested product in approximately 20 categories, which follow the mandates of CAA,
Clean Water Act, and RCRA regulations. Id. "SCS selected the report card ap-
proach over the seal approach in order to 'ensure that environmental trade-offs
were not overlooked.., and to find a mechanism capable of representing the full
spectrum of environmental performance in products.' " Id. Critics of SCS' Report
Card argue that the resulting label is too complex for the average shopper and
may confuse them into believing that the label constitutes an endorsement of the
product. See id. Although the Report Card has the added benefit of comparing
labels of different products, this necessitates that SCS' Report Card be affixed to
many products within one product category. See id. at 145-46.
269. Id. at 146-49. SCS' Report Card involves a "cradle-to-grave evaluation of
the environmental burdens (resource depletion, energy consumption, air and
water emissions, and solid wastes) associated with the raw material extraction, man-
ufacture, transportation, use, and disposal of a product." Id. at 144-45. For a com-
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use of its endorsement mark. 270
B. The Straight Scoop on Eco-Labeling and Third-Party
Certifiers
Whether the United States should adopt a universally accepted
emblem or seal of approval program leads to a number of ques-
tions. Is the private or public sector better equipped to enforce
such a program? Should the analyses be content-neutral or focus
on product characteristics? How shall the new scheme fit in with
the preexisting programs? Should certifiers be mindful of the en-
croaching global economy? Scholars, regulators and industry rep-
resentatives continue to grapple with these same questions.
As a market-based initiative, the eco-label is an attempt to har-
ness and utilize the engine of demand to drive changes in supply.271
Studies indicate that consumers increasingly purchase products ac-
cording to environmental implications, and that eco-logo programs
prehensive discussion of life-cycle assessment methodology, see Curran, supra note
241. For a discussion of life-cycle assessment methodology in the context of envi-
ronmental labeling programs, see EPA ON LirE CvctE AssEssMENT METHODOLOGY,
supra note 131. For further discussion of life-cycle analyses, see supra notes 115-16,
131-32, 165-66 & 239-68 and infra notes 270-88, 315-28 & 330 and accompanying
text. For a listing of comments regarding the use of life-cycle product assessments
in conjunction with FTC Guides I, see supra notes 152 & 203.
270. See EPA ON LirE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131, at
147-49. For an in-depth probe into third party certification programs, see supra
notes 239-69 and infra notes 271-314 and accompanying text. For a comparison
between Green Seal and SCS' environmental labeling programs, see infta notes
271-87 and accompanying text.
271. See Peter S. Menell, Symposium, Structuring A Market-Oriented Federal Eco-
Information Policy, 54 MD. L. REv. 1435 (1995) (presenting benefits on international
eco-information programs). "The principal policy effort addressing environmen-
tal degradation has been focused on the supply side of markets.... Promoting
green consumerism can complement the vast array of environmental laws and reg-
ulations by altering the demand for products." Id. at 1435-36. See also Church,
supra note 39 (providing market-solution for environmental marketing regulatory
concerns).
Because the market appears to function efficiently, those who favor addi-
tional regulation bear the burden of proving that government interven-
tion will leave consumers in a better position. . . . Consumers have
become better informed about the environmental attributes of products
without government regulation and have a large amount of information
available to evaluate environmental choices .... Deceiving consumers
under the guise of advertising policy is completely inconsistent with the
underpinnings of consumer protection and should be avoided.
Id. at 323-24. Church prefers to leave environmental marketing regulation to the
market. "[T ] he number of consumers considering environmental impacts in their
purchasing decisions remains substantial." Id. at 254. As such, some commenta-
tors support allowing "consumers to consider environmental attributes in their
purchasing decisions as a way to use market forces to influence manufacturers'
environmental decisions." Id.
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encourage green awareness. 272 By educating consumers, marketers
will hopefully espouse fewer misleading and deceptive advertise-
ments. Moreover, companies choosing to market their products'
environmental certifications must first meet certain standards.2 73
The pride and enthusiasm associated with meeting these standards
can translate into technological innovation and, ultimately, into
long-term profitability.274 It is likely that demand shifts will incite
competitive suppliers and manufacturers to raise the level of envi-
ronmental quality in their products.275
272. See generally Church, supra note 39 (suggesting regulators leave environ-
mental market alone). For further discussion of lassiez-faire environmental mar-
keting regulation, see supra notes 12-21, 58-79 & 155-60 and infra notes 288-98 &
328-37 and accompanying text. For a critique of lassiez-faire environmental mar-
keting regulation, see supra notes 12-16, 58-79 & 155-60 and infra notes 288-98 &
328-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the encroaching environmen-
tal consumer market, see supra notes 1-12 and accompanying text. See also Kangun
& Polonsky, supra note 8 (discussing problems associated with encroaching green
market). "The changing nature and growing complexity of environmental market-
ing claims has served to build distrust among consumers." Id.
273. See EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120 (providing comprehensive
study of environmental certification programs and discussing criteria inherent in
evaluations); EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131 (dis-
cussing environmental labeling standards' criteria as applied through vehicle of
life-cycle analyses); EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36
(discussing effectiveness of certification programs); Hartwell & Bergkamp, supra
note 239 (exploring European environmental certification programs and applica-
ble evaluation processes); Wynne, supra note 2, at 59-63 (exploring global environ-
mental certification programs and applicable evaluation processes); Staffin, supra
note 239 (summarizing foreign eco-logo programs); Richards, supra note 36, at
24143 (summarizing foreign eco-logo programs).
274. See Richards, supra note 36, at 24748 (outlining advantages and disad-
vantages of eco-label programs). See also Bukro, supra note 1, at C24 (noting
problems accompanying use of eco-logos).
275. EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 239, at 12, 29.
In this age of global marketing, the operation of environmental certifica-
tion programs in domestic and international markets may have far-reach-
ing effects. Two key issues stand out as being important. First, there is an
underlying assumption that a voluntary and positive environmental certi-
fication program will be effective in changing the behavior of producers
and/or consumers, leading to specified environmental benefits.... Sec-
ond, with the proliferation of [environmental certification programs] in
many countries worldwide, there is the concern that they may act as in-
tentional or incidental barriers to international trade. Interest in the
"harmonization" of program standards and procedures is rising as more
programs become active and the activity of existing programs increases.
Id. at 29. It is important to note that, although consumer behavior is the most
accurate way to assess the effectiveness of certification programs, it is the most
difficult to measure. See EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra
note 36, at 5. As discussed by EPA, the processes used to evaluate the effectiveness
of environmental labeling programs include: "(1) consumer awareness of labels;
(2) consumer acceptance of labels (credibility and understanding); (3) changes in
consumer behavior; (4) changes in manufacturer behavior; and (5) improvement
of environmental quality." Id. EPA points out that changes in manufacturer be-
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Unless the United States amalgamates its two existing certifica-
tion programs into one which coordinates its definitions with those
already in effect, consumer confusion may result.2 76 Life-cycle as-
sessments may also confound consumers because there is no gener-
ally accepted technique for conducting the calculation. 277 Since
participation in eco-logo programs is voluntary, costs and miscon-
ceptions may discourage industry support.278 In addition, innova-
tions may be reduced to achieving only the required minimum
standards, and environmental gains may come at the expense of
performance or safety.2 7 9 There is also a chance that eco-label re-
quirements will violate NAFTA and GATT, which prohibit all "tech-
havior may be the result of consumer demand or an attempt on the part of the
manufacturer to enhance public, stockholder and employee relations. See id.
276. See Richards, supra note 36, at 249-50. Application of multiple eco-labels
on the same product may confuse consumers because of the difficulty compre-
hending relevant programs and the difference between respective eco-labels. For
a discussion of the implications inherent in use of multiple eco-labels in the con-
text of Washington's environmental certification program, see supra notes 197-204
and accompanying text.
277. See Richards, supra note 36, at 249-50. For a discussion of life-cycle meth-
odology in the context of environmental labeling, see EPA ON LirE CYCLE ASSESS-
MENT METHODOLOGY, supra note 131. For a comprehensive explanation of life-
cycle assessment methodology, see generally Curran, supra note 241. For a discus-
sion of life-cycle assessment methodology as applied to the environmental labeling
programs of Germany, European Union, Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Austra-
lia, see supra notes 239-59 and accompanying text. For a discussion concerning the
lack of consensus in application of life-cycle assessment methodology, see HEAR-
INGS 1995, supra note 89, at 406-46. See also supra notes 166 & 203 (cataloguing
comments about use of life-cycle methodology).
278. See Richards, supra note 36, at 250-51. Richards explains:
The cost of obtaining an eco-label may be prohibitive to small and mid-
sized firms, and competing labels and regulatory schemes may make com-
panies wary of obtaining a label .... [In addition] price considerations
will overcome any environmental benefits in the final product decisions
by consumers.... Lack of participation in the German Blue Angel Pro-
gram illustrates this problem.
Id. at 250.
279. See id. at 250-51. "Eco-labels may simply force companies to create suffi-
ciently innovative technology to meet the criteria threshold, and no more." Id. at
251. Mandatory review and updating of criteria may prevent this situation from
occurring. See, e.g., EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 98 (discussing Euro-
pean Union's mandated periodic review). Updating comprehensive programs
such as the program undertaken by the European Union, however, will prove an
arduous task. See Richards, supra note 36, at 251 (alluding to time-consuming na-
ture of updating program criteria). For a discussion of European Union environ-
mental labeling program, see supra notes 246-51 and accompanying text. "Just as
in the case of price, consumers may be willing to give up some level of safety or
performance for lessened environmental impact, but there will be a threshold be-
yond which the price of lessened environmental impact will be too great for con-
sumers to bear." Richards, supra note 36, at 251. See also Hartwell & Bergkamp,
supra note 239, at 630 (discussing loss of performance and safety concerns).
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nical barriers to trade."280 A well-known environmental marketing
initiative found to infract GATT is the United States proscription
on the importation of tuna products where manufacturers engaged
in "unsafe dolphin" processes. 281
Third-party eco-labeling schemes are lauded for their ability to
facilitate consumer awareness and acceptance. 282 Unfortunately,
the current lack of uniformity indicates potential consumer confu-
sion: too many labels spoil environmental appreciation.28 3 One
280. EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 29. Noting the myriad of eco-
label programs throughout the world, EPA discusses international trade concerns
as follows:
Included in countries with active or planned programs are some of the
major trading nations of the world. These programs differ in some fun-
damental ways, such as methods of operation, selection of products, how
much public review is involved, and stringency of the award criteria. Con-
sequently, there is some concern that the proliferation of... [environ-
mental certification programs], both domestic and foreign, could cause
consumer confusion and, although voluntary, may act as barriers to trade.
Id. at 33. Adoption of harmonization programs may encourage trade among na-
tions, or at least eliminate the potential barriers to trade inherent in the programs.
See id. See also Richards, supra note 36, at 251-52 (characterizing eco-logo programs
as problematic in light of NAFI'A and GATT treaties).
281. See United States-Restrictions on Import of Tuna, GATT DOC. DS21/R
(Sept. 1991) (noting that United States embargo on Mexican tuna was found to
violate GATT, regardless of fact United States was enforcing federal environmental
policy legislation). Restrictive laws in the environmental marketing context may
likewise be viewed as technical barriers to trade. See Ramesh Jaura, Trade: Develop-
ing Countries Urge Help to Fulfill Eco-Standards, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 22, 1996,
available in 1996 WL 9809565 (discussing effect of eco-labels on developing coun-
tries); John Zarocostas, "Eco-Labeling" is a Sticky Issue, Say Developing Nations at WTO
Talks, J. COM., Aug. 20, 1996, at 2A (discussing eco-label concerns of developing
countries); Protectionism and Eco-Labeling, supra note 251 (quoting Elizabeth H.A.
Seiler, Director of Governmental Affairs for Grocery Manufacturers of America,
who charges eco-label programs with protectionism and technical barriers to
trade); William H. Lash, III, Protectionism in Green, J. COM., Dec. 16, 1996, at 7A
(explaining that "[c]ountries can craft eco-standards designed to favor domestic
producers at the expense of exporters. After all, standards for eco-labels are devel-
oped in consultation with domestic firms and reflect a bias against imports").
282. See Richards, supra note 36, at 253 (stating "[t]hrough heightened aware-
ness of impacts of their decisions and knowledge of expert assessment techniques
used by third-party labeling programs, consumers' waning confidence will be re-
stored"). Other noted benefits include "consumer endorsement because it is not
affiliated with the government; reduction in costs; quick turnover of information
to consumers; and elimination of the paternalistic regulatory approach, leaving
more independence in the hands of consumers." See id. at 253-54.
283. See generally EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120; EFFEcTIVENESS OF
CERTIFICATION PROGRAMS, supra note 36. See also Richards, supra note 36, at 255-56
(discussing potential for consumer confusion with use of multiple eco-labels). For
a discussion of the consumer confusion that accompanies the current lack of uni-
formity in environmental marketing, see supra notes 12-21, 58-79 & 155-66 and
infra notes 288-98 & 328-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the lack of
uniformity in environmental certification programs, see supra notes 271-82 and
infra notes 284-87 and accompanying text.
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generally presumes that the non-governmental association of pri-
vate certifiers will lessen the potential for economic pressure to in-
fluence the certification process. 284 If private firms assume the
financial burden, the government may then focus its attention on
national and international harmony in the environmental market-
ing arena. While noteworthy, these benefits have yet to be proven.
Companies do not like following government-imposed standards,
and will likely view private mandates as even more distasteful. 285
The direct costs may inhibit smaller manufacturer participation. 286
284. See Richards, supra note 36, at 254-55. "If one eliminates Congressional
oversight, there will be less chance for industry to use political pressure to receive a
label.... [A] ny program which shows a modicum of independence from direct
Congressional or executive oversight will gain greater credibility." Id. at 254. Rich-
ards recommends that eco-labeling programs not declare complete independence
from government regulation, but that the government take on a more lassiez-faire
attitude. See id. He feels that FTC Guides I provided consumers with the assurance
that manufacturers will not unduly influence third-party certifiers. See id. "Govern-
ment oversight, therefore, should attempt to take on a broader, more hands-off
approach, allowing market forces to dictate the parameters of any eco-labeling
program." Id. at 254-55. For a discussion and critique of lassiez-faire market regu-
lation, see supra notes 12-21, 58-79 & 155-66 and infra notes 288-98, 328-37 & 346
and accompanying text. For an argument in support of eco-label programs as
chief force in regulation of environmental market, see Kangun & Polansky, supra
note 8.
285. See Richards, supra note 36, at 256. See also EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND
LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36, at 48-50 (listing factors influencing effective-
ness of non-governmental environmental labeling programs); EPA ON GLOBAL LA-
BELS, supra note 120, at 9-26 (summarizing international and domestic
environmental labeling initiatives). EPA explains:
Certification programs commonly rely on the incentive of increased sales
(or the threat of decreased sales) to prompt company involvement with
their programs. [Certifiers] ... are most successful in this regard, how-
ever, when the interest of manufacturers ... corresponds with the goals
of the program. ... Because of product liability concerns, companies are
motivated to seek out labeling programs to avoid financial risk and to
protect corporate reputation.
EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36, at 49. EPA further
suggests that "participation in environmental certification programs is voluntary,
and certification by an... [environmental certification program] is intended to be
a positive selling point, encouraging the sales of products bearing the certifica-
tion." EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120, at 9. Although intended as encour-
agement, manufacturers may feel pressured into changing their behavior and do
so begrudgingly. Innovation may be reduced to achieving only the required mini-
mum standards, and environmental gains may come at the expense of perform-
ance or safety. For further discussion of these concerns, see supra note 279.
Richards assures that "if the private labels must meet minimum international stan-
dards and there is some limited form of government oversight, industry will be
more likely to allow the issuers of private labels to dictate the terms under which
industry must operate." Richards, supra note 36, at 256.
286. See Richards, supra note 36, at 256-57. Richards' asset-based solution to
this problem may be summarized as follows:
Asset based fees are assessed based upon the asset size of the company.
This fee structure could alleviate some of the concerns small companies
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Regardless of programmatic benefits, industry will always disfavor
voluntary disclosure because of the potential for criminal and civil
penalties.28 7
C. Regulation of Deception
1. FFCA Applies to Third-party Certifiers
According to FTCA, the Commission may use its deceptiveness,
unfairness and substantiation doctrines to regulate third-party certi-
fication along with environmental advertisements. 28 8 FTC made
use of this mandate by preventing Good Housekeeping from imple-
menting its seal-of-approval. 289 To warn marketers as to how FTC
have over cost because fees for small and mid-sized firms will be commen-
surate with their size. Moreover, a cap and floor on the level of the fee
will prevent large firms from citing cost as a prohibitive factor to them-
selves or an unfair advantage to the smaller firms. The third-party certifi-
ers may also want a floor in order to prevent having to provide a service
for less than its cost.
Id. at 256.
287. See id. at 256 & n.137 (citing Christopher L. Bell & James L. Con-
naughton, New Global Standards May Guide Industry on Environmental Issues, NAT'L
L.J., Sept. 6, 1993, at S2). For a list of industry comments regarding the prohibitive
effect of looming civil and criminal penalties, see HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89, at
409-524.
288. FTCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1994). The pertinent text of FTCA reads:
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such per-
son, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair method
of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or affecting com-
merce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a proceeding by it in
respect thereof would be to the interest of the public, it [is empowered to
act].
Id. §§ 45(a)(2), (b). For further discussion of FTCA and its application in the
environmental marketing context, see supra notes 15 & 58-105 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of FTC's deceptiveness, unfairness and substantiation doc-
trines, see supra notes 64-74 and accompanying text.
289. See Grodsky, supra note 5, at 194-96 (evaluating proficiency and effective-
ness of evaluators). One early example of FTC regulation of product certifiers is
Hearst Magazines, 32 F.T.C. 1440, 1461-63 (1941). In Hearst, FTC issued a cease
and desist order against Good Housekeeping for failing to back its seal-of-approval
with adequate product testing. See id. Referencing its findings in Hearst, FTC
reiterate [d] the basic principle that unscrupulous sellers and advertisers
may not make misrepresentations that are material in inducing
purchases. [The Commission further admonished that iut is not enough
for sellers to refrain from misrepresenting the merits of their wares; the
law prohibits them from making any material misrepresentations
designed to influence the public in choosing what, or what not, to buy.
Colgate-Palmolive Co. and Ted Bates & Co., Inc., 62 F.T.C. 1269, 1274 (1963).
Because of an over-inclusive guarantee and under-inclusive set of product tests,
FTC determined that Good Housekeeping's seal-of-approval was a misrepresenta-
tion and misleading to consumers. See Hearst, 32 F.T.C. at 1463. "In truth and in
fact, all the articles advertised in Good Housekeeping magazine, and all the arti-
cles carrying the various seals authorized by Good Housekeeping magazine have
not been tested and approved by any scientific laboratory." Id. at 1448. FTC fur-
1998] 209
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would pursue enforcement against product certifiers, FITC issued
Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Ad-
vertising (Endorsement Guides). 290 Like FTC Guides I & II, the
Endorsement Guides transcribe broad policy statements and exam-
ples of safe harbor compliance.29 1 Such policies may provide addi-
tional guidance as to when FTC will pursue enforcement actions
against environmental certifiers.
The Endorsement Guides require that testimonials "always re-
flect the honest opinions, findings, beliefs or experiences of the en-
dorser."292 For example, a certifier must disclose any mercantile
ther refused as a defense the fact that the product meets all the standards required
for that seal. See id. As a result, FTC mandates certifiers to explain what they
guarantee and explicitly state what they do not. See id. at 1463.
FTC has not yet attempted to regulate environmental certifiers. The Commis-
sion's ability and desire to do so remains in question. Grodsky posits "[e]ven if
environmental certifiers are covered by the FTC Act or... it is unlikely that any
regulatory body could monitor multivariate certification effectively.... It would
be difficult for monitoring bodies to detect overstatements without having an inti-
mate understanding of, and opportunity to observe, the multiple tests involved."
Grodsky, supra note 5, at 196. In contrast, FTC did not probe Good Housekeep-
ing's testing procedures. It merely admonished the certifier's failure to test prod-
ucts before awarding a seal-of-approval. See id. For a complete discussion of the
Good Housekeeping Seal-of-Approval, see EPA ON CERTIFICATION AND LABELING
PROGRAMS, supra note 36, at 53. Noted benefits of the Good Housekeeping Seal of
Approval include: "increased consumer trust of marketers and increased marketer
accountability." Id. at 56. These benefits are two of the most important goals of
environmental labeling programs. For a discussion of the benefits and criticisms
of current environmental certification programs, see supra notes 239-88 and ac-
companying text.
290. See Guides Concerning Use of Endorsements and Testimonials in Adver-
tising, 16 C.F.R. §§ 255.0-255.5 (1994) [hereinafter Endorsement Guides]. These
guidelines cover endorsements by experts, organizations and celebrities. It is ques-
tionable whether FTC will stretch the guidelines to cover the action of environ-
mental certifiers. For an in-depth discussion of the endorsement guides and a
prediction as to how they will fit in with environmental marketing regulation, see
Grodsky, supra note 5, at 197-99 (noting that guides are not adequate, as written,
and will not engender more effectual environmental certification).
291. See Endorsement Guides, supra note 290. At the outset, FTC asserted
that "[t]he Commission intends to treat endorsements and testimonials identically
in the context of its enforcement of the Federal Trade Commission Act and for
purposes of this part. The term 'endorsements' is therefore generally used herein-
after to cover both terms and situations." Id. § 255.0(a). The following is one of a
series of examples found scattered throughout the guides:
A film critic's review of a movie is excerpted in an advertisement. When
so used, the review meets the definition of an endorsement since it is
viewed by readers as a statement of the critic's own opinions and not
those of the film producer, distributor or exhibitor. Therefore, any alter-
ation in or quotation from the text of the review which does not fairly
reflect its substance would be a violation of the standards set by this part.
Id. § 255.0 (example 1). See also, FTC Guides II, supra note 9. For a discussion of
underlying environmental policy in FTC Guides II, see supra notes 20, 68, 113, 117-
18 & 157 and accompanying text.
292. 16 C.F.R. § 255.1(a) (1994).
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connection between itself and the seller of certified products, 293
and marketers may not script reactions to products, nor use an en-
dorser's findings out of context.294 Where an organization holds
itself out as an expert in the field of testing, it must use qualified
experts or "standards previously adopted by the organization and
suitable for judging the relevant merits of such producers."295 In
addition, the organization must come to its conclusion "by a pro-
cess sufficient to ensure that the endorsement fairly reflects the col-
lective judgment of the organization." 296  Although the
Endorsement Guides have deterred some false or misleading adver-
tisers, case-by-case enforcement indicates that real developments
will evolve in FTC's typical leisurely fashion. 29 7 Up until now, the
293. See id. § 255.5. The pertinent text reads:
When there exists a connection between the endorser and the seller of
the advertised product which might materially affect the weight or credi-
bility of the endorser . . .such connection must be fully disclosed....
[W]hen the endorser is neither represented in the advertisement as an
expert nor is known to a significant portion of the viewing public, then
the advertiser should clearly and conspicuously disclose either the pay-
ment or promise of compensation prior to and in exchange for the en-
dorsement or the fact that the endorser knew or had reasons to know or
to believe that if the endorsement favors the advertised product some
benefit... would be extended to the endorser.
Id.
294. See id. §§ 255.1, 2. The Guides require "[a]dvertisements presenting en-
dorsements by what are represented, directly or by implication, to be 'actual con-
sumers' . . . [to] utilize actual consumers, in both the audio and video or clearly
and conspicuously disclose that the persons in such advertisements are not actual
consumers of the advertised products." Id. § 255.2(b). While FTC permits "en-
dorsement messages . . .not ... in the exact words of the endorser, unless the
advertisement affirmatively so represents," the Commission disallows "endorse-
ment[s] ... presented out of context [ ] or reworded so as to distort in any way the
endorser's opinion or experience with the product." Id. § 255.1(b).
295. Id. § 255.4. According to the guides, an expert's endorsement
must be supported by an actual exercise of his expertise in evaluating
product features or characteristics with respect to which he is expert and
which are both relevant to an ordinary consumer's use of or experience
with the product and also are available to the ordinary consumer. The
evaluation must have included an examination or testing of the product
at least as extensive as someone with the same degree of expertise would
normally need to conduct in order to support the conclusions presented
in the endorsement.
Id. § 255.3(b).
296. Id. § 255.4.
297. For a critique of FTC's case-by-case approach, see supra notes 12-16, 8-79,
155-66 & 288-96 and infra notes 329-37 and accompanying text. Since the incep-
tion of its Endorsement Guides, FTC has attempted enforcement on a case-by-case
basis. See, e.g., Splitfire, Inc., File No. 952-3029 (1997) (consent order in which
Splitfire agreed to cease and desist advertising effectiveness of vehicles' fuel econ-
omy, level of emissions, horsepower or cost savings without substantiating claims
with proper scientific testing and endorsement); Beverly Hills Weight Loss Clinics
Int'l, Inc., File No. 912-3248 (1993) (consent order in which Beverly Hills Weight
1998]
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guides have failed to inject environmental policy into the regula-
tion of certification programs, and hence have permitted subjec-
tive, environmentally uninformed judgments to withstand
scrutiny.298
2. Unfair Competition Doctrine Spells Relief
The law of unfair competition is primarily comprised of torts
that cause an economic injury to business through a deceptive or
wrongful business practice. 299 What constitutes an "unfair" act var-
Loss Clinics agreed to cease and desist from advertising support of clients without
securing proper endorsement); Bristol-Meyers Co., 102 F.T.C. 21 (1983), affd, 738
F.2d 554 (2d. Cir. 1984) (ordering drug manufacturer to cease and desist advertis-
ing its product as free-from-side-effects without proper endorsements); In re
Cliffdale Assoc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (requiring manufacturer to cease and desist
using endorsements to advertise product without proper authorizations); Cooga
Mooga, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 310 (1978), 98 F.T.C. 814 (1981) (ordering acne skin care
manufacturer to cease and desist advertising its product through misleading en-
dorsements); Amstar Corp., et al., 83 F.T.C. 659 (1973) (preventing use of false
endorsements and nutritional claims by sugar manufacturer). Only once
amended, the Endorsement Guides have slowly injected policy into the advertising
arena and brought marketers into conformance. For further discussion of FTC's
gradual regulatory attempts in the area of nutrition labels, see supra notes 104,
156, 159-61, 209 & 219-20 and accompanying text. It is unlikely that, if applied,
the FTC Guides I & II will shape the way environmental product certifiers conduct
their evaluations. Given the fact that FTC does not intend to inject environmental
policy into its guidelines, the likelihood of non-deceptive environmental market-
ing strategies is slim. See FTC Guides II, supra note 9. For a discussion of FTC's
intention not to inject environmental policy into its environmental marketing
guides, see supra notes 82-87, 97 & 103-05 and accompanying text.
298. See Grodsky, supra note 5, at 198 (pointing to selective enforcement, un-
derstaffing and evidentiary obstacles as impediments to Endorsement Guides util-
ity). One must also keep in mind that the Endorsements Guides have not been
enacted into law and merely serve as a compliance guideline. Until some binding
law is enacted, it is improbable that certifiers or marketers will effectively change
their practices. For a complete discussion of third-party certification programs and
their effectiveness, see supra notes 239-88 and accompanying text.
299. See DEE PRIGDEN, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND THE LAw § 2.08 (1992). In-
itially, common law tort actions, such as negligent misrepresentation or deceit,
provided relief for wronged consumers. See id. See, e.g., Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.,
81 Cal. Rptr. 519 (Ct. App. 1969) (stating plaintiff had cause of action for physical
injuries against Good Housekeeping after slipping while wearing shoes that bore
its seal-of-approval). Consumers had little chance of prevailing on a cause of ac-
tion for deceit because of the extremely difficult task of proving scienter. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 cmt. h (1977). When establishing a
negligent misrepresentation claim under the Restatement (Second) of Torts for-
mulation, a cause of action lies with the group of persons for whose benefit the
information is provided. Id. § 552(1). In its earliest stages, unfair competition
consisted solely of a cause of action against misrepresentations about the source of
goods or services. See PRIGDEN, supra. See, e.g., International News Serv. v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) (creating tort of misrepresentation). Eventually,
courts identified causes of action for a vendor's misrepresentations about the na-
ture or characteristics of its own goods or services. See id. Courts required, how-
ever, proof of resulting harm to plaintiffs business goodwill. See id. See, e.g.,
80
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ies with the context of the business, the action under examination
and the facts of the individual case. The common law tort of false
advertising rectifies a competitor's misrepresentations about the na-
ture or characteristics of its own goods or services when the plaintiff
can demonstrate resulting harm to his business' goodwill.300 The
common law commercial disparagement tort redresses a defend-
ant's misrepresentations about the nature or character of the plain-
tiffs goods or services. 30 1 As a general rule, the law of unfair
competition is governed by state common law or by virtue of state
codification or modernization of the original common law
version. 30 2
Judicial interpretation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act es-
tablishes a federal cause of action paralleling the common law torts
of "passing off," "false advertisement" and "commercial disparage-
ment."30 3 Pursuant to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, competi-
National Basketball Assoc. v. Motorola, Inc. Nos. 96-7975, 96-7983 (CON), 96-9123
(XAP) (2d Cir. 1997) (denying recovery because no damages were shown as result
of defendant's actions). The American Law Institute has expanded its treatise on
the law of unfair competition and issued a set of guidelines directly on this topic.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 1-46 (1995). Section 4 de-
scribes misrepresentation as follows:
One is subject to liability to another... [for deceptive marketing] if, in
connection with the marketing of goods or services, the actor makes a
representation likely to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers by
causing the mistaken belief that the actor's business is the business of the
other, or that the actor is the agent, affiliate, or associate of the other, or
that the goods or services that the actor markets are produced, spon-
sored, or approved by the other.
Id. § 4.
300. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5. The provision
reads in pertinent part:
One is subject to liability ... if, in marketing goods or services manufac-
tured, produced, or supplied by the other, the actor makes a representa-
tion likely to deceive or mislead prospective purchasers by causing the
mistaken belief that the actor or a third person is the manufacturer, pro-
ducer, or supplier of the goods or services if the representation is to the
likely detriment of the other.
Id.
301. See id. § 6. The pertinent text of § 6 reads as follows:
One is subject to liability to another for [commercial disparagement] if,
in marketing goods or services of which the other is truthfully identified
as the manufacturer, producer, or supplier, the actor makes a representa-
tion relating to the goods or services that is likely to deceive or mislead
prospective purchasers to the likely commercial detriment of the other.
Id.
302. See PRIGDEN, supra note 299.
303. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). Under this section,
there is liability for any "false or misleading description of fact, or false or mislead-
ing representation of fact which.., in commercial advertising or promotion, mis-
represents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her
or another person's goods, services, or commercial activities." Id.
1998] 213
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tors and consumers may sue manufacturers who instate deceptive
environmental marketing schemes.30 4 Current interpretation of
the common law false advertising tort no longer requires a plaintiff
to demonstrate direct, actual loss of customers resulting from a de-
fendant's allegedly false advertisement. Although admittedly
broadening the tort, courts refuse to presume a likelihood of injury
and causation from the falsity of the advertisement and the fact that
the parties compete.30 5 Because of its flexibility and reach, plain-
tiffs typically employ section 43(a) both as an alternate cause of ac-
tion and as protection of private interests omitted from the scope of
other intellectual property doctrines. 30 6 In the event plaintiffs
make use of section 43 (a), the Lanham Act may serve as a litigative
push toward federal environmental marketing regulation and
preemption.
3. Recovery According to RICO
Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act (RICO),307 plaintiffs may bring private actions against defend-
ants falsely or deceptively claiming environmental benefits. RICO
makes it illegal for any person to conduct an enterprise that affects
interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity, or
to invest racketeering income in a business that affects interstate
commerce. 30 8 Within RICO's catalogue of requisite racketeering
activities, the only crimes applicable to green marketers are mail
304. See id. Lanham Act confers a private right of action on "any person who
believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged." Id. This includes competitor
and consumer suits. See, e.g., L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lovell, Inc., 214 F.2d
649, 651 (3d Cir. 1954) (rejecting theory in which cause of action under § 43(a)
requires passing off and finding nothing new to indicate "that this section is
merely declarative of existing law"). There are no prohibitions to consumer or
competitor suits in the context of environmental marketing.
305. For in-depth treatment of Lanham Act § 43(a), see generally 1J.T. McCAR-
THY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION (3rd ed. 1992); R. CALLMANN, THE
LAw OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES (L. Altman 4th ed.
1981 & Supp.).
306. See McCARTHY, supra note 305 and accompanying text, at §§ 10.02-10.06.
See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992) (permitting
action for trade dress infringement where determined not registrable under Lan-
ham Act). The Supreme Court stretched § 43(a) of Lanham Act to fit actions not
covered by Lanham Act. The author purports that this case leaves the door open
to claims of deceptive environmental advertisements.
307. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1300-2000 (1994).
308. Id. §§ 1962(a), (c). According to RICO,
[i]t shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has partici-
pated as a principal ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of
such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any inter-
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fraud and wire fraud.309 Both the federal government and private
parties may bring a RICO suit against environmental advertisers. 310
Although the United States may only seek criminal punishment for
violators, successful private civil plaintiffs enjoy a wide array of rem-
edies.3 11 Civil relief includes not only injunctions and reasonable
attorneys' fees, but also treble damages. 312 In the event a RICO
claimant triumphs in court, he will likely reap substantial remunera-
tion.313 Furthermore, current RICO litigation suggests that the
stigma of conviction fashions the statute into a potentially powerful
weapon against deceptive green advertisers.314
est in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is en-
gaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
Id. § 1962(a). RICO also makes it a crime "for any person employed by or associ-
ated with any enterprise engaged in ... a pattern of racketeering activity or collec-
tion of unlawful debt." Id. § 1962(c).
309. See id. §§ 1341, 1343. Mail fraud, according to RICO, includes:
[use of postal services by persons who] devise[ ] or intend[ ] to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or... obtain [ ] money by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promise[ ], or ... sell, dispose
of, loan, exchange,... give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure
for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security or
other article.
Id. § 1341. RICO describes a person engaged in fraud by wire, radio and televi-
sion, as
[one who] devise[s] or intend[s] to devise any scheme or artifice to de-
fraud, or. . . obtain [s] money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises [and] transmits or causes to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communications in in-
terstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme.
Id. § 1343.
310. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964. RICO does not limit the initiation of
lawsuits to the federal government. It grants jurisdiction to the United States Dis-
trict Courts and allows the Attorney General to institute proceedings. See id.
§§ 1964(a), (b). RICO also explicitly permits "[any person injured in his business
or property . . . [to] sue." Id. § 1964(c) (emphasis added). Federal courts have
heard RICO cases brought by both the United States government and private liti-
gants. See, e.g., R.R. Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297 (3d Cir. 1991) (suit
commenced by private individuals); B.F. Hirsch v. Enright Refining Co., 751 F.2d
628 (3d Cir. 1984) (suit commenced by federal government). For a discussion of
the remedies available to successful litigants, see infra notes 311-12 and accompa-
nying text.
311. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1964. Criminal proceedings may only be brought
by the federal Attorney General's Office. See id. § 1963. Only private litigants enjoy
civil remedies. See id. § 1964.
312. See id. § 1964(c) (noting that private RICO litigants "shall recover three-
fold the damages [they] sustain[ ] and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee").
313. See id.
314. See Appletree Square I, Ltd. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 29 F.3d 1283 (8th Cir.
1994) (dismissing RICO claim because of lack of showing of detrimental reliance
on fraudulent environmental representations); Brittingham, 943 F.2d at 297 (grant-
ing defendant's summary judgment motion because plaintiff failed to link racke-
19981
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V. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION
A. ISO Assesses Green Marketing
Founded in 1946, the International Organization for Standard-
ization (ISO) is a worldwide federation of national standards bodies
representing more than 100 countries.3 15 The existence of non-
harmonized standards for similar technologies in different coun-
tries or regions can contribute to so-called "technical barriers to
trade."3 16 Export-minded industries have long sensed the need to
agree on world standards to help rationalize the international trad-
ing process. This was the origin of ISO.317
teering activities and ultimate injury); Prudential Ins. Co. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 828 F. Supp. 287 (D.N.J. 1993) (denying defendant's motions to dismiss RICO
claim and holding that actual detrimental reasonable reliance is not necessary ele-
ment of environmental advertising under RICO); Petro-Tech Inc. v. Western Co.
of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349 (3rd Cir. 1987) (dismissing RICO claim and holding that
corporate "enterprise" cannot be held vicariously liable for its own employees'
RICO violations under theory of respondeat superior); B.F. Goodrich, 751 F.2d at
628 (dismissing RICO claim and holding that statute applies only when defendant
charged with RICO violation is distinct from enterprise).
315. See Introduction to ISO (last updated Jan. 27, 1997) <http://www.ico.ch/
infoe/intro.html> [hereinafter Introduction to ISO]. See also Roht-Arriaza, supra
note 42, at 489 (laying foundation for current ISO standard-setting effort); U.S.
EPA, ISO 14000: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT STANDARDS (EPA
742-F-95-006) (1995) [hereinafter EPA ON ISO] (discussing basic structure of ISO
14000); Balikov & Cavanaugh, supra note 44 (same); Gold, supra note 44 (same).
ISO's non-governmental mission "is to promote the development of standardiza-
tion and related activities in the world with a view to facilitating the international
exchange of goods and services and to developing cooperation in the spheres of
intellectual, scientific, technological, and economic activity." Introduction to ISO,
supra.
316. Staffin, supa note 239, at 281 (lamenting need for harmonization in eco-
labeling arena). "[D]eveloping countries have complained that the proliferation
of different eco-labeling schemes in recent years can function as a trade barrier by
making it increasingly more costly to enter North markets." Id. See also Introduc-
tion to ISO, supra note 315. For further discussion of potential "technical barriers
to trade" and the need for harmonization in the eco-labeling arena, see supra notes
4147 & 279-81 and infra notes 340-41 and accompanying text.
317. See Introduction to ISO, supra note 315. A member body of ISO is the
national body "most representative of standardization in its country." Roht-Ar-
riaza, supra note 42, at 489 (quoting INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDI-
ZATION, MOMENTO 3 (1993)). "Each national committee determines its
composition; while some national committees are almost entirely composed of pri-
vate interests, others have substantial governmental representation." Id. A major-
ity of the ISO member bodies are governmental organizations or organizations
incorporated by public laws. See id. The United States' official member is the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI). See U.S. EPA, ROLE OF VOLUNTARY
STANDARDS (EPA 742-F-95-005) (1995) [hereinafter EPA ON VOLUNTARY STAN-
DARDS]. It follows that only one member body is accepted for membership. The
member bodies have four principle tasks:
(1) informing potentially interested parties in their country of relevant
international standardization opportunities and initiatives; (2) organizing
so that a concerted view of the country's interest is presented during in-
84
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From the outset, ISO concentrated its scrutiny and guidelines
on the technical aspects of production. 318 In the last decade, how-
ever, it has evinced a broader focus: the environmental arena. In-
strumental in the development of environmental standards was the
enthusiastic espousal of ISO 9000 quality management and assur-
ance principles by industry, scholars and regulators. 319 Heeding
the manifold eco-labeling schemes and the corresponding clamor
ternational negotiations leading to standards agreements; (3) ensuring
that a secretariat is provided for those ISO technical committees [TCs]
and subcommittees [SCs] in which the country has an interest; and (4)
providing their country's share of financial support for the central opera-
tions of ISO through payment of membership dues.
INTRODUCTION TO ISO, supra note 315.
The technical work of ISO is highly decentralized, and is carried out in a
hierarchy of some 2,700 TCs, SCs and working groups (WGs). See id. "In these
committees, [highly] qualified representatives of industry, research institutes, gov-
ernmental authorities, consumer bodies and international organizations from all
over the world come together as equal partners in the resolution of global stand-
ardization problems." Id. ISO's work products are known as International Stan-
dards. See id. Exhausting all standardization fields except electrical engineering,
an ISO initiative may range from a mere four-page document to a 1000-page vol-
ume. See id. The need for a standard is usually expressed by an industry sector to a
national member body, which, in turn, proposes the item to ISO. See id.
To be adopted, an International Standard must brave a rigorous three-phase
process. "[T]he first phase involves defini[ning] ... the technical scope of the
future standard." Id. The second phase, called the consensus-building stage, en-
tails the negotiation of detailed specifications within the standard. See id. The
third and final stage embodies the formal approval procedures of the resulting
draft International Standard. See id. See also Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 489-90
(outlining chronological processing of ISO standards). The procedure of the re-
sulting draft international is as follows: first, TCs are formed by ISO Council; sec-
ond, TC members delegate work to SCs and WGs; third, SCs and WGs negotiate
the proposals into a committee draft (CD); finally, the CD is scrutinized by TCs
and approved by consensus. See Introduction to ISO, supra note 315 (discussing
three-step process under which ISO standards evolve); Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42,
at 489-90 (same). Acceptance criteria for an ISO standard stipulate approval by
two-thirds of ISO members that have participated actively in the standard's devel-
opment process, and approval by 75% of all members that vote. See Introduction to
ISO, supra note 315. Upon garnering the requisite votes, the agreed text is pub-
lished as an ISO International Standard. See id.
318. See Gold, supra note 44; Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42; Introduction to ISO,
supra note 315; Balikov & Cavanaugh, supra note 44, EPA ON ISO, supra note 315.
EPA notes that "ISO has promulgated more than 8,000 internationally accepted
standards for everything from paper size to film speeds." EPA ON ISO, supra note
315.
319. See Introduction to ISO, supra note 315. For a discussion of the five events
that cleared the path for environmental standards, see Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42,
at 490-91. These events include: (1) new EU technical regulation producing com-
petitive effects on global economy; (2) GATT's Uruguay Round negotiations; (3)
fragmented environmental marketing regulation; (4) success of ISO 9000; (5) del-
egates at Nations Conference on Environment and Development solicited explora-
tion into "sustainable development." Id. See also Balikov & Cavanaugh, supra note
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for uniformity, ISO began crafting a series of voluntary environ-
mental management standards.3 20 Many "expect [the standards] to
become the worldwide benchmark for environmental
improvement."3
21
Once ISO resolved to draft and implement voluntary environ-
mental guidelines, it erected Technical Committee 207 which was
divided into various subcommittees. 322 ISO designed a cluster of
subcommittees, including the environmental labeling subcommit-
tee (SC3), to focus its attention more on product evaluation than
on actual production procedures.3 23 After identifying three catego-
ries of product labels, SC3 assembled working groups for the pur-
pose of "develop [ing] and harmoniz[ing] methodologies, terms
320. See generally Genevieve Mullett, Note, ISO 14000: Harmonizing Environmen-
tal Standards and Certification Procedures Worldwide, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 379
(1997) (suggesting that "[w] hile the harmonization of standards under ISO 14000
• . . [may] not produce a level playing field in the global trade context, it will
reduce conflicts between national and regional environmental programs thereby
allowing organizations to avoid duplication of effort and save time and money").
For a discussion of the many eco-labeling programs espoused by various countries
and private organizations, see supra notes 239-87 & 315-19 and infra notes 320-45
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the eco-labeling programs in the
United States, see supra notes 260-87 and accompanying text. For a discussion
about the need for uniformity in the eco-labeling arena, see supra notes 271-87 and
infra note 346 and accompanying text.
321. Balikov & Cavanaugh, supra note 44; Gold, supra note 44. For a discus-
sion of ISO standards not becoming the benchmark for environmental improve-
ment, see Mullett, supra note 320, at 400. According to Mullett,
the ... [ISO] has taken a great step toward this goal of harmonization;
however, actual harmonization is not likely to occur in the near fu-
ture .... While the ISO standards may alleviate some of the costs and
difficulties faced by organizations doing business multinationally, organi-
zations should be cautious. Implementing the standards will be costly
and it is not yet clear how widely accepted the standards will be ...
While ISO 14000 is likely to have great impact in certain industries, it is
not likely to have a major impact on the overall trade versus the environ-
ment dispute.
Id.
322. See Introduction to ISO, supra note 315. ISO erected TC 207 for the pur-
pose of developing environmental management standards. See EPA ON VOLUNTARY
STA.mARDs, supra note 315. TC 207 subdivided into various SCs. See Introduction to
ISO, supra note 315. "The subcommittees constitute two functional groups: those
focused on production processes, and those focused on products themselves....
The second group involves the subcommittees on environmental labelling, life-
cycle analysis, and environmental aspects of product standards." Roht-Arriaza,
supra note 42, at 503.
323. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 503 & 510. For a discussion of the
structure of ISO, see supra notes 315-21 and accompanying text. For a discussion
of the procedure involved in the development of standards, see supra notes 317 &
322 and infra notes 324-28 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the work of
ISO's environmental labeling subcommittee SC3, see supra note 317 and accompa-
nying text.
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and principles. ' 32 4 The environmental labeling subcommittee des-
ignated independent third-party certification as type one labels.
3 25
Within this classification, certifiers recognize the best environmen-
tal performers in numerous product categories. Type two labels en-
compass self-declared environmental claims by manufacturers
about their products. 3 26 Like SCS' Environmental Report Card,
type three labels provide information on the possible environmen-
tal impacts of a product.32 7 Instead of weighing products against
each other, these labels reserve all judgments for consumers. 32 8
FTC boasts affinity between FTC Guides I & II and ISO's draft
standard on "Self Declaration Environmental Claims." 329 Although
324. Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 512; Introduction to ISO, supra note 315.
The labelling subcommittee and its various working groups aim to de-
velop and harmonize methodologies, terms, and principles for the vari-
ous types of labelling. The subcommittee is not attempting to create a
single labelling standard. Rather, it hopes to produce draft goals, princi-
ples, and specific guidance documents for the development and opera-
tion of different types of labels.
Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 312. See Eco-Labelling Tops ISO Agendas, ENvr'L Bus.,
May 22, 1996, available in 1996 WL 8692533 (discussing agenda of TC 207). "Ex-
perts are now working vigorously on draft standards dealing with ecolabelling, life-
cycle analysis, and environmental performance evaluation." Id.
325. See Standards Council of Canada, Eco-Labels Stick to the Facts with ISO 14020
(last modified Jan. 27, 1997) <http://www.ico.ch/infoe/canada.html> [hereinaf-
ter Canada on ISO]. "Labels from independent third parties who award them to the
best environmental performers in various product categories. For example, Can-
ada's Environmental Choice program awards a graphic logo of three doves inter-
twined to form a stylized maple leaf, for use on top of environmentally responsible
products." Id. For a discussion of Canada's environmental labeling program, see
supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text. United States supports two third-party
environmental labeling programs: Green Seal and SCS. Green Seal, alone, recog-
nizes the best environmental performers in certain enumerated categories. For a
discussion of Green Seal's environmental labeling program, see supra notes 10, 36-
40, 263-66 & 271-87 and accompanying text. For a discussion of SCS' Report Card,
see supra notes 10, 36-40 & 267-87 and accompanying text.
326. See Canada on ISO, supra note 325.
327. See id. For a discussion of SCS' Report Card, see supra notes 10, 36-40 &
267-87 and accompanying text.
328. See Canada on ISO, supra note 325. If ISO certifications are used in con-
junction with state and federal programs, there is a good chance consumers will
become confused. Too many labels certainly spoil the significance. The programs
will only work if there are attempts at integration and a willingness to work to-
gether. Otherwise, consumers will receive mixed messages. It is likely that frus-
trated consumers will either submit to the product with the most labels or will
scrap their environmentally conscientious purchasing altogether.
329. See Starek, supra note 18. "On the international level, the International
Standards Organization ...draft standard on 'Self-Declaration Environmental
Claims' . . . is quite consistent with the Commission's Green Guides; in fact it
adopts many of the same principles almost verbatim." Id. See also ISO SELF-DECLA-
RATION, supra note 45; FTC Guides I, supra note 17; FTC Guides II, supra note 9.
For a discussion and the pertinent text of ISO's draft standard on environmental
labeling, see infra notes 330-37 and accompanying text. For a discussion and the
1998]
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it is conceivable that ISO began its version with FTC guidelines, the
Organization is not pursuing the same path as the Commission.
First, FTC rejects the life-cycle analysis theory of environmental
benefits, while ISO embraces it.330 Because ISO has the assistance
of many research organizations and governmental bodies, it is in a
better position to forge a unified LCA and to implement it interna-
tionally.331 Had Congress empowered EPA to issue interpretive
guidelines and definitions, United States green marketing regula-
tion might more .easily harmonize with ISO efforts. Second, the
objectives of the two guidelines differ. While FTC limits its applica-
tion to deceptive and misleading advertising, ISO endeavors "to
contribute to a reduction in the environmental burdens ... and to
harmonize the use of environmental claims."332 For ISO, non-de-
ceptive environmental representations are merely incidental
perks.333 Third, ISO bans the use of general environmental claims,
but FTC permits them upon proper substantiation. 334 Fourth, in-
pertinent text of FTC Guides II, see supra notes 9-21 & 82-105 and accompanying
text.
330. See FTC Guides II, supra note 9, § 260.7 n.2; Introduction to ISO SELF-
DECLARATION, supra note 45 (stating in pertinent part: "[t]he proliferation of envi-
ronmental claims created a need for environmental labelling standards which re-
quire that, where appropriate, life-cycle considerations be taken into account when
such claims are developed"). FTC Guides II reads: "[t]hese guides do not cur-
rently address claims based on a 'lifecycle' theory of environmental benefit. The
Commission lacks sufficient information on which to base such claims." FTC
Guides II, supra note 9, § 260.7 n.2. For a compilation of industry's, agency's, and
private environmentalists' views on life-cycle assessment methodology, see HEAR-
INGS 1995, supra note 89, at 409-46. For an in-depth discussion of life-cycle assess-
ment analyses, see generally Curran, supra note 241; EPA ON LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT
METHODOLOGY, supra note 131; EPA ON GLOBAL LABELS, supra note 120; EPA ON
CERTIFICATION AND LABELING PROGRAMS, supra note 36; Wynne, supra note 2, at 64-
90; supra notes 115-16, 131-32, 165-66, 239-88 & 315-29 and infra notes 331-28 &
330 and accompanying text.
331. See Introduction to ISO, supra note 315 (explicating myriad of governmen-
tal, private and research organizations affiliated with ISO).
332. ISO SELF-DECLARATION, sup-a note 45, § 1.1. See also FTC Guides II, supa
note 9, § 260.1.
333. See ISO SELF-DECLARATION, supra note 45, § 1.1. The anticipated benefits
of ISO's standards are as follows:
(a) accurate, verifiable, nondeceptive environmental claims;
(b) increased potential for market forces to stimulate environmental im-
provements product, processes and service delivery;
(c) to better enable purchasers to make informed choices;
(d) prevention or minimization of unwarranted claims;
(e) a reduction in marketplace confusion; and
(f) a reduction of restrictions and barriers to international trade.
Id.
334. See id. § 6. The pertinent text of the ISO guideline reads:
An environmental claim that is vague or non-specific or which broadly
implies that a product is environmentally ... benign shall not be used.
Environmental claims which should not be made include: "environmen-
88
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol9/iss1/5
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETING REGULATION
stead of contriving "safe harbor" examples, ISO delimits exploita-
tion of specific environmental terms.335 Also, it identifies and
defines terms seen consistently in trade that FTC has not yet consid-
ered.33 6 Finally, ISO's comprehensive scheme incorporates all
three chief environmental label types.3 3 7 With FTC's sole emphasis
on truth-in-advertising, there is little chance for consumer educa-
tion, product innovation or favorable environmental consequences.
B. Implications and Predictions
Despite the fact that compliance is voluntary, ISO standards
have the potential of precipitating far-reaching effects. For exam-
ple, companies contemplating the environmental repercussions of
their actions may modernize their products or distinguish between
subcontractors and agents on the basis of environmental prac-
tally safe," "environmentally friendly," "environmentally friendlier,"
"earth friendly," "non-polluting," "green," "dolphin friendly," "nature's
friend" and "ozone friendly." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
Id. Compare FTC Guides II, supra note 9, § 260.5. The pertinent text of FTC
Guides II reads: "any party making an express or implied claim that presents an
objective assertion about the environmental attribute of a product or package,
must at the time the claim is made, possess and rely upon a reasonable basis sub-
stantiating the claim." FTC Guides II, supra note 9, § 260.5.
335. See ISO SELF-DECLARATION, supra note 45, § 7.1. The pertinent text of
the ISO standard reads:
This clause provides definitions and usage restrictions for selected terms
commonly used in environmental claims. The requirements in this
clause supplement, but do not replace the requirements in other clauses
of this standard. The onus on a claimant to follow the principles set out
in clause 7 shall not be diminished by substituting like terms.
Id. Compare FTC Guides II, supra note 9, §§ 260.3, 260.6, 260.7. The pertinent text
of FTC Guides II reads: "[iin many of the examples, one or more options are
presented for a qualifying claim. These options are intended to provide a 'safe
harbor' for marketers who want certainty about how to make environmental
claims." FTC Guides II, supra note 9, § 260.3.
336. See Starek, supra note 18 (admitting ISO covers more specific terms than
FTC Guides). See, e.g., ISO SELF-DECLARATION, supra note 45, §§ 7.4, 7.8, 7.9, 7.10,
7.12 and 7.13 (defining and delimiting use of following terms: energy recovery
material, energy-efficient, energy-conserving, energy-saving, reduced resource use,
water-conserving manufacturing, disassembly and sponsorship). The pertinent
text of ISO defines disassembly as "[a] claim associated with a product which is
designed to be disassembled at the end of its useful life into identifiable categories
of recyclable and/or reusable materials." Id. § 7.12.1.
337. For a discussion of the three chief environmental label types, see supra
notes 325-28 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Canada's environmental
choice program which supports type one environmental labeling scheme, see supra
notes 340-41 and accompanying text. For a discussion of SCS' Report Card, a type
three program, see supra notes 10, 36-40 & 268-87 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the advantages associated with addressing all three types of environ-
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tices. 338 As already evidenced, consumers vote with their dollars
and purchasing products from greener manufacturers. 33 9 Because
of GATT's sweeping scope, ISO drafters must word standards care-
fully so as to avoid potential trade barriers. 3 40 A violation of the
trade agreement, however, will result only if a member body statuto-
rily binds manufacturers through the codification of ISO guidelines
into national law.3 41 Key characteristics of ISO meetings, such as
the domination of industrial countries and lack of input from devel-
oping countries, may lead to geographically biased standards.34 2
Correspondingly, the exhorbitant cost of attending such functions
inhibits underprivileged nations' participation, and ultimately im-
pacts on the adequacy of ISO initiatives. 343 There is also the likeli-
hood that drafters will eliminate disputed points, leaving a "least-
common-denominator standard with few teeth. '344 While all coun-
338. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 515-18 (suggesting ISO standards may
help shift consumers and manufacturers to pollution preventers). For a discussion
of the benefits and drawbacks to eco-label programs, see supra notes 239-88 and
accompanying text.
339. For a discussion of the advent of green consumerism, see supra note 2
and accompanying text.
340. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Urguary Round of Multilat-
eral Trade Negotiations, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. 2.4, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 316, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 1428 (1994) [hereinaf-
ter Technical Barriers to Trade]. Because GATT prevents countries from forging
technical barriers to trade, violations only arise when the government statutorily
enforces the action. See id. Third-party certifiers are, therefore, safe from GATT
and NAFTA implications. Since voluntary guidelines are not enforceable govern-
ment actions, they do not violate the relevant international treaties. For further
discussion of technical barriers to trade in the environmental labeling context, see
supra notes 41-43 & 273-82 and infra note 341 and accompanying text.
341. See Technical Barrriers to Trade, supra note 340.
342. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 523-29 (relying heavily on such pro-
cess-related concerns as part of analysis). TC 207 in particular "is heavily concen-
trated in large global industry and industry-related government standard-setting
bodies." Id. Roht-Arriaza's suggestion is that only a few countries will craft the
standards to which all abiding countries must adhere. See id. The result of ISO
standards will be a set of rigorous standards which developing countries cannot
feasibly meet, but must meet to maintain its position in global trade. The situation
is like a "Catch-22." The livelihood of developing countries is their exports. To
export, there must be compliance with ISO guidelines. However, compliance with
the guidelines requires capital. Without the exports, developing countries may not
adequately adopt ISO provisions into their manufacturing. For a discussion of
FTC's "Catch-22," see supra notes 21 & 209 and accompanying text.
343. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 525 (pointing out "costs of participa-
tion" further paralyze potential involvement by underdeveloped nations).
344. Id. at 529. "Although the ISO rules do not require absolute consensus,
representatives make a sincere attempt to win the approval of all major partici-
pants. The danger, of course, is that disputed points will simply be omitted." Id.
FTC Guides II are representative of this concern. The non-binding status and safe
harbor examples provide a regulatory tool without many teeth. For a discussion of
FTC Guides II and pertinent text, see supra notes 9-21, 82-105 & 288-98 and accom-
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tries may easily comply, the standards will not inject needed envi-
ronmental policy into the global trade arena. Likewise, because
compliance is merely voluntary, many may opt not to expend the
time and effort to improve production procedures.3 45 Clearly, ISO
alone will not effectuate environmentally preferable products; nev-
ertheless, its standards remain a good point of departure for
regulators.
VI. PROPOSAL OF UNIFORM FEDERAL LEGISLATION
Has laissez-faire economics drowned out the cries of the
Lorax? Are marketers still following in the footsteps of slick Sylves-
ter McMonkey McBean? Is the environmental awareness of con-
sumers peaking or waning? Contemporary fragmented approaches
to green marketing management are ineffective. As a result, con-
sumers, manufacturers and regulators alike have turned a blind eye
on the real issue: environmental education, appreciation and
protection.
Uniformity is needed at the federal level. 346 Elimination of
misleading and deceptive advertisements and implementation of
environmentally sound trade practices are the twin goals of envi-
panying text. For a comparison between FTC Guides II and ISO draft standards,
see supra notes 329-37. For a catalogue of voiced criticisms on FTC Guides I, see
generally HEARINGS 1995, supra note 89. For a discussion of the author's solutions
to the problems associated with environmental marketing, see infra note 346 and
accompanying text.
345. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 42, at 531. For a discussion of the concerns
associated with voluntary compliance of environmental guidelines or eco-labels,
see supra notes 12-21, 58-105, 155-66, 239-87 & 315-44 and accompanying text.
346. Part VI of this Comment contains the author's proposals for regulating
the environmental market. The author's findings are supported by the materials
contained in Parts I-V. For a critique of FTC's case-by-case enforcement methodol-
ogy, see supra notes 12-16, 58-79, 155-66, 288-98 & 328-37 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of EPA efforts in regulating the environmental market, see supra
notes 22-27 & 106-51 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the necessity of a
joint regulatory plan, see supra notes 153-66, 209 & 219-20. For a discussion of the
myriad of state environmental marketing laws and the applicable difficulties associ-
ated with non-conforming regulatory schemes, see supa notes 167-223 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of first amendment implications of requisite
environmental marketing restrictions, see supra notes 224-38 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of international and national eco-label programs, see supra
notes 239-88 and accompanying text. For a discussion of life-cycle product assess-
ments, see supra notes 115-16, 131-32, 165-66, 239-88, 315-28 & 330 and accompa-
nying text. For a discussion of ISO's environmental marketing guidelines, see
supra notes 315-45 and accompanying text. For a discussion of potential barriers to
trade that are associated with regulation of environmental marketing, see supra
notes 41-43, 273-82 & 34041 and accompanying text. To further support the au-
thor's joint-agency regulatory plan, it is necessary to review FTC's Nutritional La-
beling guidelines. For a discussion of the Nutritional Labeling guidelines, see
supra notes 104, 156, 159-61, 209 & 219-20 and accompanying text.
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ronmental labeling. Legislators will easily fulfill these objectives
through the joint efforts of FTC and EPA. On account of EPA's
technical expertise, environmental policy mandate and regulatory
experience, it should define terminology and promulgate guide-
lines. FTC should incorporate EPA's determinations into interpre-
tive rules and scrutinize advertisers' representations in light of
Agency findings. To promote global harmony, EPA should liken its
life-cycle analysis to that of ISO. Furthermore, the federal govern-
ment must entirely preempt state action in the green marketing
context. Otherwise, states enacting excessively restrictive legislation
will hamper industry from taking strides toward environmentally-
conscientious behavior. Green Seal's and SCS' schemes must col-
lapse into a single federally-run environmental certification pro-
gram. Keeping a sharp eye on technical barriers to trade, EPA
should expand its "Energy Star Program" to envelop all consumer
products and services. To facilitate consumer cognizance, the same
EPA standards must govern both the truth-in-advertising and con-
sumer-education arms of the environmental labeling program. Fi-
nally, drafters should try to coordinate their standards with those of
ISO, so as to dodge GATT and NAFTA implications. In view of
these treaties, the United States government may not enact guide-
lines that geographically bias the free flow of trade in the global
market.
Because environmental awareness in the marketplace turns on
the legislative schemes proposed, regulators have a difficult task
ahead of them. Right now, it is unclear in which direction United
States' reformers are headed. With the power of reform in its
hands, FrC has chosen to slowly arrest the deceptive practices of
manufacturers and dismiss the pleas of environmentalists. Such ac-
tions make one wonder whether regulators will ever heed the
Loraxian warning. Perhaps only time will tell.
Kimberly C. Cavanagh
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